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 This dissertation is concerned with international financial crisis response and the role that 
formal and informal international institutions play in this process. It is about understanding the 
potential of and limits to international crisis governance. It tries to answer three interrelated 
questions. First, what are the mechanics of international crisis lending? Second, what role can 
international institutions play in effectively distributing information so that policy responses can 
be optimized? Finally, what crisis governance structures are best suited to economic and political 
circumstances of the global financial system? In order to address these questions this dissertation 
uses a combination of formal (game theory) and informal theory building. It then examines these 
theoretical arguments using an empirical analysis based on historical survey of crisis response 
since the late nineteenth century and a comparative case study of crisis management during the 
Great Depression (1930-31) and the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98). With regard to the first 
question, it argues that crisis lending is not simply shaped by the interaction of crisis lenders and 
borrowers. Ultimately, the terms of a crisis loan are negotiated in a space whose limits are 
determined by two additional actors: international investors/speculators and domestic political 
opposition. With regard to the second, it argues that both formal and informal international 
institutions play an important role in disseminating information and thus policy adaptation and 
change. However, there are clear limits to what institutions can do. In practice, this means that 
 
 
the goal of creating a crisis-free system is impossible. Finally, with regard to the broad question 
of crisis governance, it argues that the most effective financial governance system is one build 
around a partnership between a concert of key financial powers and an international financial 
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In August of 2008 the US housing market, which just a few months ago seemed to be a 
model for the rest of the world, collapsed. Of course, this was not the first financial bubble in US 
history. As recently as 2000 the dot.com boom burst. Nor was it the only housing market to 
collapse at the time. Britain, Spain and a number of other countries had similar housing bubbles 
ruptured, negatively affecting their banking systems and their economies. What made this crisis 
significant is that through a financial innovation (so-called mortgage backed securities) more 
investors around the world were affected by the bubble that is typical for a housing market 
collapse. Over the next two year, the crisis spread exposing more fundamental problem in the 
international financial system. Of these perhaps the most prominent is debt problems of the 
industrial economies, in particular those of Europe and the United States. Thus, the crisis become 
the first systemic or global financial crisis of the Twenty-first Century. 
These financial problems were a sobering reminder of two basic facts that are regularly 
forgotten: financial markets are periodically prone to crises and some of these crises can be very 
painful. This is perhaps the most shocking thing about financial crises, despite their relative 
frequency and the problem they create, people regularly forget about them. After all, it was only 
a decade before the current crisis that a financial meltdown in Thailand developed into the Asian 
financial crisis spreading to other parts of the world. In between these two systemic crises, and 
the other that have happened since the emergence of the international financial system, there 
were numerous smaller financial problems. While these may not be a dramatic, from the 
perspective of the nations they affect they are just as problematic. 
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Thus the biggest problem with financial crises is that many people tend to think of them 
as being unusual event: a glitch in an otherwise stable financial system.1 Even when crises are 
thought of they tend to be viewed as an emerging market problem. Either way financial crises are 
seen as temporary problems which are the result of unusual circumstance. One that will go away 
once a county puts its financial house in order. Of course there are exceptions to this view. 
Authors such as Kindleberger (1978/1996) have argued those financial crises are an inseparable 
aspect of financial markets: one that can be managed but never eliminated. This is not to 
condemn financial markets in principle. This dissertation will take the fact that capitalist markets 
are prone to crashes as proof of the need for effective crisis response governance, not proof for 
the need to abandon of markets. 
Even today this problem persists and has affected the attitude many have adopted in 
response to current problems. Many have called for policy and regularity reforms that would stop 
future crises. Some have even called for a more ambition reform program, one that would return 
society to “traditional” values favoring honest hard work over speculative greed. Of course 
reforms are necessary. However, as we will soon see, the belief that any program of reform can 
eliminate future crisis is simply naïve. 
This dissertation is concerned with the mechanics of international financial crisis 
response and the role that formal and informal international institutions play in this process. 
Specifically, it explores the way states and international institutions interact during crises, how 
this defines the potential and practical limits for global financial crisis governance, and the 
implications this has for effective crisis response. This work addresses three related issue by 
asking three fundamental questions about crisis governance. The first two are micro questions 
 
1 The best recent discussion of the problem from a policy point of view is Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). 
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about the ability of institution to deal with actual or potential crises. The first asks: how does 
intervention in an international financial crisis actually work? That is, what are the mechanics of 
crisis lending? The second: what role can international institutions play in effectively distributing 
information so that policy responses can be optimized? Finally, the last question take a more 
macro approach by examine the possible financial governance structures. It asks: what crisis 
governance structures are best suited to economic and political circumstances of the global 
financial system? 
Thus, this dissertation is about understanding the potential of and limits to international 
crisis governance. Briefly stated it argues the following. With regard to the fist question it argues 
that crisis lending is not simply shaped by the interaction of crisis lender and borrows. 
Ultimately, the terms of a crisis loan are negotiated in a space whose limits are determined by 
two additional actors: international investors/speculators and domestic political opposition. With 
regard to the second, it argues that both formal and informal international institution play an 
important role in disseminating information and thus policy adaptation and change. However, 
there are clear limits to what institution can do. In practice, this means that the goal of creating a 
crisis-free system is impossible, if not dangerous. Finally with regard to the board question of 
crisis governance, it argues that the most effective financial governance system is one build 
around a partnership between a concert of key financial powers and in international financial 
institution (IFI) dedicated to maintaining stability in the financial system. 
The next section of this paper will give a brief overview of financial crises and highlight 
those issues that will be tackled in this dissertation. The next three sections will examine in more 
detail each one of the three questions discussed above. The final section will conclude. 
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A Brief Overview of the Problem 
In simplest terms a financial crisis can be defined as a sudden and dramatic fall in the 
price of a financial asset. However, to qualify as a crisis this drop in price must be more 
pronounced and its impact must be greater than a typical price drop associated with normal 
market volatility. 
Financial crises, in one form or another, are relatively common phenomena. Most are 
relatively short-lived and their effects are modest. In sophisticated financial markets a typical 
financial crisis will tend to have only moderate effects on the financial system and the economy 
as a whole. A crisis in one financial sector may depress that market for a period of a few months 
but its effect will not have a major impact on other financial sectors or lead to a slowdown of the 
real economy. However, in an emerging financial market the effects of a crisis are usually more 
dramatic. With shallow markets, a crisis can quickly spread and affect the real economy. In the 
worst case, a crisis can lead to capital flight that can have serious long term effects. But even the 
most sophisticated financial markets are not completely immune to serious meltdowns. An 
international financial crisis is simply one that has an international dimension. This means that in 
an international crisis the financial market is strongly influenced by factors outside the national 
economy: cross border capital mobility, changes in foreign economic markets, foreign economic 
policy, etc. 
Financial crisis are not simply economic phenomena. Financial and political crises are 
often closely related. On the one hand, if they have serious economic consequence they can 
trigger political results. However, it is not merely economic dislocation that leads to this result 
but also the fact that crises can serve as powerful signals of government incompetence. The 
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causality can also work in the opposite direction with political instability either leading to crisis 
or rendering policy intervention ineffective. 
Finally, the system cannot be made crisis proof. Financial markets are complex. This 
means that it is impossible to plan for every contingency that could lead to a financial crisis. In 
addition, there are tradeoffs involved with diminishing financial market risks. The more rules 
you impose, the less adaptive the system will become. This means that stability comes at the cost 
of flexibility. To a point, this tradeoff makes sense, but some risk is necessary for the sake of 
having financial markets that can meet new economic opportunities. Finally, the fact that finical 
markets are increasing interconnected provides economic opportunities and the possibility of risk 
diversification. However, this also means that financial markets are exposed to new sources of 
risk. Given the realities of international and domestic politics, it is impossible to impose a 
uniform set of standard that would eliminate these risks. 
Thus, three key points need to be understood about financial crises. First, while the most 
serious financial problems are relatively rare, financial crisis themselves are not. With interlined 
financial markets, the potential for crisis increases. This means that there is always a need for 
crisis management. Second, there is no way to crisis proof the system. It is simply too complex 
and there are too many jurisdictions to be able to deal eliminate all potential causes of financial 
crises. Finally, financial crisis are never simply technical problems that can be dealt with in a 
functional manner. There is always a political dimension and this creates both the need for a 
complexity of financial crisis governance. 
The Politics of Crisis Lending 
The first topic that will to be addressed is the politics of bailout negotiations between an 
international lender and governments facing an international financial crisis it cannot manage on 
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its own. Since the most common lender today is the International Monetary Fund, the focus will 
be on its crisis lending. However, argument raised here apply equally to any other crisis lender 
be it a state, group of states, IFI or a combination of these. Similarly, the focus will be on 
currency crises for two reasons: because most international financial crisis has a currency crisis 
component and because dealing with such crises is part of the IMF’s mandate. It will be argued 
that IMF crisis lending is shaped by markets and domestic political pressure. Therefore, both the 
IMF and recipient country have much less freedom of action than is often supposed. The 
theoretical argument is developed using a dynamic negotiation game between the IMF and a 
recipient government, under simultaneous market and domestic political pressures. 
The goal of this work is to investigate a the interplay of financial and political crises. The 
particular focus is on how IMF crisis lending is affected by market behavior and domestic 
political factors. It investigates the connection between currency and political crisis by asking the 
following questions: Why and how do currency speculators organize and coordinate to attack a 
currency? When will a government defend its currency and how effective are the tools that 
governments have at their disposal for dealing with currency crises? When will a government 
decide to deal with the currency crisis on its own and when will it look to the IMF or other 
international lenders for help? What factors determine the success or failure of an ILOLR 
assisted defense? When will a currency crisis develop into a political crisis and what determines 
a government’s ability to deal with these twin crises? 
It will be argued that the willingness and ability of a government to defend its currency 
will depend on both political and economic factors. Among other things: if a government 
believes that a devaluation will likely lead to a political crisis, it is more willing to defend its 
currency. A government’s ability to defend its currency is not merely dependent on economic 
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factors (such as its balance of payments, level of reserves, capital controls, etc.) but also on 
political factors (such as its domestic political support, political institutions, etc). That defending 
a currency can also mean adopting policy measures (such as increasing interest rates and 
tightening fiscal and monetary policy) which can impose economic costs on citizens and can thus 
lead to political backlash. This, in turn, can limit the government’s credibility in the eyes of 
currency speculators or even prevent the government from taking necessary steps to deal with the 
crisis. 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that governments can turn to the IMF for 
aid during a crisis. This involves the negotiation of a loan package that has policy conditionality 
attached. Conditionality requirements, which usually mean the imposition of economic cost on 
citizens, can lead to political opposition either from institutional veto players such as the 
legislature or from the public. Public opposition is most often seen in the form of political 
protests, which have become a common if not regular response to IMF intervention. Even if 
protests do not materialize, governments still face the prospect of losing office though the ballet 
box, coups or popular revolutions in the days or months after a crisis. This opposition can 
influence the government’s negotiation with the IMF. In extreme cases the political cost of 
negotiating with the IMF can lead to the government abandoning negotiation or deciding not to 
turn to the IMF in the first place.2 In fact, the popular belief that the IMF makes crisis worse is 
well known and has even been investigated and confirmed by a number of academics.3 
 
2 A good example of this is the position taken by the Malaysian government during the Asian financial crisis. While 
this was in part driven by the ideological position of the Malaysian government, it was also motivated by nationalist 
concerns that Malaysia was the target of reckless speculative behavior and that the IMF was surviving the interest of 
the international currency speculators and not those of the states affected by the crisis. 
3 See for example Bordo & Schwartz (2000), Przeworski & Vreeland (2000), Easterly (2005) and Dreher (2006). 
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International Financial Institutions and Policy Learning 
The second topic is the effect that international institutions have on policy learning, 
especially during financial crisis. The recent financial crisis has been protracted and very costly 
thus clearly demonstrating the vulnerability of the global economic system. As a result, 
international efforts are underway to prevent similar crises in the future. These fall into two 
broad categories. The goal of the first is to fix the ‘rules of the game.’ That is, to improve 
financial markets regulation and promote discipline in macroeconomic policy. The aim of the 
second is to establish a global ‘early warning system’ through institutions such as the IMF. 
Surveillance, it is hoped, will allow policymakers to identify and deal with future problems 
before they develop into crises. 
However, international macroeconomic cooperation in this scale is not easy. Aside from 
collective action problems, the most serious obstacles cooperation faces is arriving at a common 
conceptual framework about the nature of the problems that have to be dealt with and the best 
way of overcoming them. If there is no consensus then cooperation cannot happen. If that 
consensus is incorrect then cooperation will do more harm than good. 
Thus, the success of cooperation between policymakers crucially depends on the quality 
of the policy models they use. For this reasons understanding the process of policy learning is 
crucial. The goal is to examine this process in order to better understand how an appropriate 
policy consensus is reached. Specifically, it will look at the role that intentional institutions play 
in macroeconomic policy learning. 
Structuring Global Financial Crisis Governance 
The goal of this paper is to examine the mechanics of international crisis response and 
evaluate the governance structure currently in place. In order to do this, the paper asks three 
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related questions. First, what are the strengths and weakness of different governance types? 
Second, what is the current structure and how effective is it in dealing with financial crises? 
Third, what reforms are necessary in light of recent experience? 
With regard to the first question, the paper argues that the most effective governance 
regime is one that is centered on a concert of key financial powers and supported by an 
international financial institution (IFI) dedicated to maintaining financial stability. This setup 
allows for an effective division of labor which builds on the strengths of each governance type. 
A concert is best able to maintain stability at the core of the financial system through information 
sharing, policy coordination and joint interventions when necessary. An IFI can help monitor the 
international financial system as a whole and deal with crises in low and middle-income 
countries. Systemic crises are best dealt with through the coordinated efforts of the two. 
With regard to the second question, the paper argues that current global governance is 
built around such a division of labor between the Group of Eight/Group of Twenty (G8/G20)4 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This partnership works because it is based on four 
strengths: the resources and influence of these organizations, the close institutional ties between 
them, a clear delineation of responsibilities, and an emphasis on coordinated rather than common 
action. 
Finally, while this institutional arrangement is not without its problems, it is effective and 
acts as an essential buttress of the international monetary system. In fact, this paper will show 
that it is superior to all governance arrangements that have existed since the emergence of the 
international financial system in the late nineteenth century. Therefore, while necessary reforms 
 
4 It is important to keep in mind that in the area of international financial and monetary policy the work of the G8 is 
the product of five interlinked and co-evolving institutions. Thus, the term “G8/G20” will be used to refer to the 
coordinated operations of all five institutions. 
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to this regime are underway, its basic framework should not be altered. The international 
financial system does not need new institutions. Rather it requires the strengthening of existing 
ones and the continuation of the reform process begun in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. 
Overview of Chapters 
This thesis will proceed in nine chapters. Chapter one will function as an extension of the 
introductory chapter. It will outline in more detail the nature of financial crisis and the problems 
they pose. This will provide the necessary background for understanding the argument in rest of 
the dissertation. 
Chapter two will present a theoretical analysis of the problems involved in negotiating a 
bailout agreement between a country facing an international financial crisis and an international 
financial institution. The argument will be evaluated using a formal model of loan negotiation 
under the simultaneous pressure of international speculators and domestic opposition to 
conditionality attached to the loan. 
Chapter three will examine the role that difference governance institutions can play in the 
process of financial policy learning. This chapter will present a dynamic formal model which 
compares the learning process in three different environments: learning by observing others, 
direct information sharing through international conferences, and formal IFIs as additional 
sources of information. This chapter will outline the possibilities and limits of what governance 
can do for preventing and preempting financial problems. 
Chapter four to eight will examine in detail the issue surrounding the general structures of 
global financial governance and examine the strengths and weakness of possible governance 
arrangements. Two basic questions will be examined through a paired theoretical and empirical 
chapter. Chapters four and five will look at a verity of crisis governance structures a make the 
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argument that the optimal arrangement is one that combines a concert of financial powers and an 
IFI under a particular division of labor. Chapter four will outline the theoretical arguments in 
favor of this arrangement. Chapter five will provide empirical support for this proposition by 
examining the evolution of crisis governance for the late nineteenth century to today. 
Chapters six and seven will take the arguments from chapters four and five and develop 
them further to examine what make for an effective partnership between these two institutional 
types under this governance arrangement. Chapter six will present the theoretic arguments for 
what makes an effective partnership. It will also examine the partnership that has developed 
between the G8/G20 and the IMF as well as its strengths and weaknesses. Chapter seven will 
provide empirical support for the necessity of an effective partnership between a concert and an 
IFI. It will do so by examining the international response to the banking and debt crises of 1931 
with response that was mobilized for the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. It will ask why the 
outcomes were so different given the similarity of the governance structures in place during both 
periods. 
This dissertation will conclude with two chapters. Chapter eight will examine the 
experience of the American sub-prime mortgage crisis which triggered a global financial crisis. 
While the financial crisis has not been completely resolved to date, in particular the debt 
problems of the US and Europe, this chapter will focus on the period from 2008 to 2010 because 
this was the period of greatest systemic threat and most active crisis response. This chapter will 
apply the argument made in the body of the thesis to this crisis. Finally, the conclusion will 




Chapter 1: The Need for Crisis Response 
 
The goal of this chapter is to outline the nature of financial crises and the problems they 
pose for the international financial system. This is essential because of the complexity and 
controversy that surrounds financial crises and crisis response. 
The term financial crisis encompasses a diverse set of problems. In simplest terms, a 
financial crisis can be defined as a sudden and dramatic fall in the price of a financial asset 
associated with a market bubble.5 However, while accurate, this simple definition obscures the 
complexity of the topic and its importance. The sudden collapse of a financial market can 
produce ripple effects that are felt throughout the financial system and real economy. On 
average, the economic effects of a crisis are sharp but short lived.6 A financial collapse can 
impact prices and incomes, diminish investor and consumer confidence, and lead to recessions 
and even depressions.7 Crises can also dramatically diminish a government’s ability to conduct 
fiscal and monetary policy, and provide social safety-nets when they are needed most (Burnside 
et al, 2006). 
The fallout from crises is not limited to the economy, however. In keeping with the logic 
of the political business cycle, financial crises can have important political consequences.8 This 
 
5 The controversy surrounding market bubbles is discussed in the next subsection. 
6 Eichengreen and Rose (2003) find that a currency crisis is followed by an economic loss equal to one year of 
economic growth or 3% of GDP. Similarly, Bordo et al (2001: 72-73) found that banking, currency and twin crises 
cause downturns which on average last two to three years and cost 5-10% of GDP. 
7 However, it must be born in mind that the causality can also run in the opposite direction: crises can also be 
triggered by unexpected economic slowdowns. 
8 Frankel (2005) points out that currency devaluation in a developing country increases the probability of its leader 
being removed from power by 45% and double the chances of a change in the county’s top leadership within the 
next six months. Of course, as with the relationship between financial crises and economic slowdowns, the causal 
link can also run in the opposite direction: a political crisis can act as a catalyst for financial meltdowns. Thus, a 
number of authors have explored the relationship between exchange rate and political crises; see for example 
Leblang (2003), Bernhard & Leblang (2006) and Lebland & Satyanath (2006). Similarly Chang (2005) has explored 
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connection between economic and political crises is most often associated with the 1930s, but it 
is by no means limited to this period. The potential political effects of financial crises were 
clearly demonstrated by the events in Indonesia in 1997 and Argentina in 2001. In both cases, a 
financial crisis, and the government’s ineffectual response, led to massive demonstration that 
brought down the government: in the former, an entrenched authoritarian regime and in the later 
a democratically elected one. In the case of Argentina, this led to prolonged instability and a 
succession of short-lived administrations. 
The most recent crisis has had similar effects. It has impacted elections in the Unites 
State, Japan, the United Kingdom to name just the most prominent cases among the member of 
the G20. In the case of Japan, the loss of the 2009 elections by the Liberal Democratic Party 
marked only the second time since the party was out of government since it was founded in 
1955.9 In Canada, debates over the conservative budget and economic stimulus even triggered a 
brief constitutional crisis October 2008. Subsequent economic fallout from the crises has 
triggered further instability. Thus, the European Debt Crisis and attempts by the EU to deal with 
it lead to massive protest. Finally, even the protests and political changes that began in the 
Middle East were in part triggered by rising food prices, which in turn are one of the 
consequences of the current crisis. These events where of course driven by various political 
factors, but in each case the governments’ financial and fiscal response to the crisis acted as a 
catalyst for political opposition and change.10 Simply put, financial crises and their economic 
 
the relationship between debt and political crises and MacIntyre (2001) has examined the impact of different 
political institutions on policy responses to the Asian crisis. 
9 The first time was for eleven months in 1993-1994. This first period out of power was connected to the end of 
Japan’s economic miracle. However, with well over two hundred seats it was still by far the biggest party in 
parliament and with the collapse of the shaky coalition of opposition parties, the Liberal Democratic Party quickly 
regained power. The election in 2009 marked a much more dramatic reversal for the party and was the first real 
democratic transfer of power in Japan’s history. 
10 These political consequences will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight. 
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consequences offer a convenient rallying point for opposition groups in both democracies and 
non-democracies. 
With interconnected markets these problems are amplified. A financial crisis in a 
globalizing world can have the same impact as an infectious disease has in a densely populated 
community. Money can leave the national economy as investors seek safe havens to weather the 
financial storm. This “flight to safety” can in turn trigger crises in other financial markets.11 Even 
without direct financial contagion the economic fallout from a financial crisis in one country can 
still affect its economic partners. A recession in one country will disrupt cross-border trade and 
investments, which can mean economic slowdown, even recession, for its trading partners. 
In the worst case scenario, financial crises can take on pandemic proportions: 
destabilizing numerous financial markets and causing or deepening worldwide recessions. Of 
course, as with most worst-case-scenarios, financial crises on this scale are rate. In the 20th 
century there have only been four crises that approached this threshold: the banking and currency 
crises of 1930-31 that exacerbated the Great Depression; the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System in the early 1970s; the Debt Crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s; and the Asian 
Meltdown of 1997/98 and the crises that followed in its wake into 2001. Though relatively rare, 
such crises tend to dominate the collective memories of markets, policymakers and ordinary 
citizens. 
1.1 Nature, Causes and Frequency of Crises 
According to the theory of perfect markets the price of a good or service reflects all the 
information that is relevant for determining its value. Financial markets are the closest 
 
11 Though, as will be discussed shortly, there is still controversy over whether financial contagion only happens to 
weak markets, and is thus justified, or whether it is a result of irrational market panic. 
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approximation of perfect markets because financial instruments are in essence promissory notes 
which have no intrinsic value aside from the issuer’s ability to honor them. This means that the 
price of any financial instrument (e.g. a unit of currency, a stock or bond, bank deposit, etc.) 
should reflect all the information that is relevant for determining the present value of the 
expected future income stream associated with that instrument. This information is commonly 
referred to as the fundamentals of that instrument. 
Prices should be automatically updated to reflect changes in underlying fundamentals and 
financial crises should not occur. While prices will fluctuate to reflect the revelation of new 
information, these fluctuations should be orderly and have a minimal impact on the real 
economy. That is to say, since the price of financial instruments reflects the state of the real 
economy their fluctuation should not have an independent impact on the real economy. 
A financial crisis is associated with the creation of what is known as a market bubble: 
dramatic price inflation not justified by underlying fundamentals. Unless the bubble is deflated 
by market or policy mechanism,12 it eventually bursts producing a financial crisis: an equally 
dramatic price collapse, often below the fundamental value. Thus, markets are often said to be 
driven by two basic emotions: greed and fear. Greed inflates bubbles and, once the price inflation 
becomes untenable, fear bursts them. The problem with market bubbles is that they have an 
independent impact on the real economy because they distort incentive and negatively influence 
resource allocation. Thus with the creation of market bubbles, financial downturns will 
exacerbate problems in the real economy rather than being merely symptoms of real economic 
downturns. In some cases, speculative bubbles may even be the independent cause of an 
economic recession. 
 
12 In which case there will be an orderly realignment of the price with its fundamentals with minimal disruption to 
the financial system and real economy. This is commonly referred to as a “soft landing.” 
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So why do bubbles occur? One explanation is that the theory of perfect markets does not 
match reality.13 Even in the current “information age,” access to information is imperfect. 
Financial markets are subject to local conditions that may be unknown or poorly understood by 
investors, especially foreign ones. Standards for information disclosure can vary from market to 
market and from firm to firm. Even sophisticated financial markets with traditions of strong 
private and public oversight are not completely immune to failures in information dissemination. 
The Enron Scandal of 2001 is a good illustration of this point. The company’s management was 
able to hide serious problems in its balance sheet and appear very profitable for a number of 
years. They did this by exploiting the company’s close ties with both public and private 
institutions that were supposed to be conducting independent oversight of their corporate 
governance and financial reporting. This included both state and federal regulators and the 
accounting firm Author Andersen.14 
Just as important as information failures is the role that human psychology plays in the 
operation of financial markets. Psychology often “helps” investors fill in the gaps in publicly 
available information. It can also lead investors to discount/ignore relevant information that does 
not fit their expectations. When markets are doing well investor psychology can lead to 
overconfidence, or “irrational exuberance” as treasury secretary Allan Greenspan famously put 
it, which leads investors to ignore potential signs of trouble. Similarly, when markets are doing 
poorly investor are more likely to ignore good news. 
 
13 Indeed, as the name clearly indicates the “Theory of Perfect Markets” is a description of an ideal type of market 
not a description of reality. 
14 Arthur Andersen became a casualty of this scandal. Prior to the collapse of Enron it was one of the top five 
accounting firms in the world. This scandal also led to changes in the structure of the world’s top accounting firms. 
In particular the separation of their accounting and consulting operation in order to avoid the kind of conflict of 
interest that allowed the Enron Scandal to take place. 
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Governments can also impede the proper functioning of financial markets through 
reckless policy. Such behavior can be broadly characterized as either “sins of omission” or “sins 
of commission.” Sins of omission happen when governments do not provide effective regulatory 
and legal frameworks for market operations. Without these, markets will not properly 
disseminate information. Sins of commission happen when policy actively distorts markets 
incentives. This leads to moral hazard problems: where government policy leads investors to act 
recklessly. For example, governments can commit to an ambitions currency peg or guarantee 
private sector debt in order to promote investment. In effect the government policy provides 
investors with “insurance” against the downside risk of an investment. If these commitments 
seem ex anti credible this can lead investors to discount or even ignore risk. This can cause a 
crisis if the commitments turn out to be non-credible ex post, i.e. when it becomes clear that the 
government is unable to live up to its commitments due to an unexpected shift in underlying 
fundamentals. 
Thus we have two primary explanations for financial crises. For market advocates, the 
main culprit is usually government failure: improper regulation, bad policies, inappropriate 
response to shifts in fundamentals, corruption, etc.15 For market skeptics, the main cause is 
irrational or unscrupulous behavior by investors, which leads to the collapse of otherwise sound 
markets.16 On balance, however, there is generally enough blame to go around. 
Although all crises share these general characteristic, there is a great deal of variation 
between different types of crises and individual crises themselves.17 The nature of a financial 
 
15 This is sometimes referred to as the first generation or fundamentalist view of financial crises. See for example 
Kaminsky & Reihart (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini (1999), and Horowitz & Heo (2001). 
16 This is also referred to as the second generation or self-fulfilling views of crises. See in particular Kindelberger 
(1978/1996), Obstfeld (1986), Morris & Shi (1998), and Harmes (2001). 
17 So much so, that some have gone so far as to argue that the only common denominator all crises share is their 
heterogeneity (see Rose’s discussion of Bordo et. al. (2003): 75-77). However, this problem is not unique to 
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crisis is defined by parameters such as: origin, course, duration, spread, and impact. Crises can 
take place in any financial market. The most common are debt, banking and currency crises.18 A 
debt crisis occurs when debtors are unwilling or unable to meet their short-term and/or long-term 
obligations. The former are termed problems of liquidity and the later of solvency. Similarly, a 
banking crisis is a situation where banks find themselves facing liquidity and/or solvency 
problems. Both debt and banking crisis can lead to what is known as a credit crunch: where 
lenders become unwilling to lend even to creditworthy borrowers. A currency crisis happens 
when speculators abandon a currency for fear that it might become devalued. In each case, the 
crisis can be the product of shifting fundamental, self-fulfilling prophesies, or a combination of 
the two. Finally, so-called twin crises are also common: simultaneous crises in two different 
financial markets which feed off and exacerbate each other. For example, the crises in Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines in 1997-98 were all twin banking and currency crises, where the 
devaluation of the currently lead to a deterioration of bank balance sheets due to mismatches in 
the currency denominations and maturities of bank assets and liabilities. 
A debate rages over whether and how crises spread.19 The key question is when, and if, a 
crisis in one country will trigger a crisis in another. The contagion school argues that crises can 
spread to otherwise “healthy” financial markets. As a market in crisis collapses, investors in 
“similar” markets begin to fear that their investments are now also in danger. In response they 
will pull out of these “similar” markets, even if they are in fact sound, leading to a new crisis 
 
financial crises. Most social phenomena (e.g. wars, elections, etc.) display levels of heterogeneity that raises similar 
questions. 
18 Stock market crashes are also relatively common, but they tend to have a less significant impact, especially at the 
international level. The notable exception to this rule is of course the Wall Street Crash of 1929. However, even in 
this case the economic downturn was already underway almost a year before the crash, see Eichengreen (1998: 222-
57). 
19 There is also some disagreement over whether contagion actually happens. For example, Schwartz (2002) and 
Brealey (1999) have argued that worries about international contagion are greatly exaggerated. However, studies 
such as Botman & Jager (2002) and Edwards & Rigbon (2002) have shown that crises do spread. 
19 
 
(Franklin & Gale 2000; Yusoff & Zulkhibri Abdul Majid 2000; Chang & Majnoni 2002). The 
vulnerability school, on the other hand, argues that this type of contagion does not happen and 
that financial crisis will only spread to those markets that were vulnerable to a financial crisis in 
the first place (Warr 2002; Simone 2002; Ellison et al 2006). However, these two schools are not 
incompatible. 20 For example, Pesenti & Tille (2000) and Berger & Wagner (2005) have shown 
that the outbreak and spread of crises are characterized by both the presence of panic and a 
response to changes in fundamentals. But, even without direct financial contagion the economic 
fallout from a financial crisis can still affect other economies. A recession in one country will 
disrupt cross-border trade and investments, which can trigger slowdowns, even recessions, in its 
trading partners. 
The overall impact of a more typical crisis is, on average, sharp but short lived. For 
example, Eichengreen and Rose (2003) find that a currency crisis is followed by an economic 
loss equal to one year of growth or 3% of GDP. In a broader survey, Bordo et.al. (2001: 72-73) 
find that banking, currency and twin (simultaneous banking and currency) crises cause 
downturns that on average last two to three years and cost 5-10% of GDP. There have also been 
regular lending booms in the 1820s, 1880s, 1900-14, 1920s, and 1974-82, each leading to 
defaults, crises and credit crunches (Eichengreen & Lindert, 1989: 2-3).21 All of these crises can 
dramatically diminish a government’s ability to conduct monetary and fiscal policy, and provide 
social safety-nets when they are needed most (Burnside et al, 2006). Finally, in keeping with the 
logic of the political business cycle, financial crises can have important political consequences. 
Frankel (2005) points out that the devaluation of a developing country’s currency increases the 
 
20 It is also important to keep in mind that empirically it is not easy to distinguish between different types of 
contagion. See De Bandt & Hartmann (2002). 
21 As Fishlow (1985: 383) points out, what is truly remarkable about these episodes is that each generation seems to 
react to its crisis as if it was historically unprecedented. 
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probability that its leader will be removed from power by 45% and doubles the chances of a 
change in the county’s top leadership within six months. 
In terms of crisis frequency and impact, there is a clear distinction between the “core” 
and the “periphery” of the international financial system.22 Throughout the last 150 years 
financial crises have primarily been an emerging market phenomenon. Over 75% of all financial 
crises before 1914 happened in the periphery and this is also true of the post-1945 period (Bordo 
et.al. 2001: 58).23 In addition to being more frequent, the impact of crises is also generally more 
severe in emerging markets (ibid). 
The difference between core and periphery is primarily due to four factors. First, less 
developed economies tend also to have less developed financial and regulatory institutions. This 
makes them more vulnerable to crises. Second, they have less diversified financial systems. This 
means that financial problems in one firm or market are more likely to spread to other parts of 
the financial system and impact the real economy. Third, such financial systems are more 
vulnerable to sudden changes in short-term international capital flows (so-called “hot money”). 
This means that during a crisis they are much more likely to face massive capital flight which 
undermines their policy response and amplifies the shock to their real economy. This 
combination of poorly developed financial and regulatory institutions with financial openness 
(i.e. lack of capital controls) is particularly dangerous (Eichengreen 1998: 190-96). Finally, the 
smaller and less integrated a national financial system is, the less important it is to the overall 
 
22 “Core” refers to those countries that have large and diversified financial markets with strong ties to the global 
financial system. “Periphery” refers to countries whose financial systems are much less developed and connected, 
especially small open emerging economies. 
23 This was only reversed during the Interwar Period (Bernanke & James, 1991). Bordo et.al. (2001: 58) confirm this 
finding, although they note that this reversal is partially the result of the reclassification of a number of economies 
from “developing” to “developed” after 1918. 
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stability of the international system. As a result, it is less likely to receive international help 
during a crisis. 
1.2 Crises Prevention and Its Limits 
A great deal of academic and policy work has focused on the reform of domestic and 
international financial institutions in the hope that this will prevent the outbreak and spread of 
future crises. Such work is important, but it is doubtful that any reform could completely 
eliminate all possibility of financial crises. There are a number of reasons for this, of which the 
following are the most important. 
First, it is impossible to create a comprehensive reform proposal that would be 
universally acceptable. Individual governments, international institutions, investors and citizens 
all have very different ideas about what needs to be done and which problems pose the greatest 
threat. This partially reflects the perennial ideological differences over the role of the governed 
verses free markets. But it also reflects different material interests between actors as well as 
political realities across jurisdictions. 
Second, even if a universal agreement could be reached, it would be impossible to ensure 
that it was consistently implemented thought the entire global financial system. This is 
particularly true as states vary greatly in their capacity and willingness to implement such 
reforms. For example, the members of the European Union are hampered in their efforts because 
there is still no Europe-wide regulator, despite the process of financial integration and the 
adoption of a single currency. Even countries such as Canada and the US do not have single 
national regulator. Finally, even having a single national regulator is not a guarantee of success. 
It is well established that regulators can easily be captured by the very institutions that they are 
supposed to regulate. 
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Third, every design involves some compromise between competing goals. This is 
especially true of the goals of flexibility and stability. The former is the ability of financial 
institutions is a system to adapt to changing market circumstances and take advantage of new 
opportunities. The later is that ability to avoid and minimize downside risk. One cannot achieve 
these two goals simultaneously, nor is there a “correct” balance between the two. The same is 
also true of the goals of creating a uniform system on the one hand and maintaining local policy 
and regulatory autonomy on the other. The former requires financial standards which are 
consistent across jurisdiction thus removing the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. The latter 
means allowing for regulations that meet local conditions. While consistency is desirable, 
variation in financial regulations is still necessary since financial systems are still predominately 
national in character, though they are increasingly interconnected. 
Fourth, international financial markets are complex and continually evolving. New 
products and services are coastally created because there is an economic incentive to be the first 
to create new financial instruments. However, the effects of these developments are often hard to 
predict. This means that framers of the financial architecture cannot conceivably predict the 
future development of the international financial system. Thus they cannot plan for every 
possible contingency. Of course, one could decide to ere on the side of caution and impose limits 
on the use of new instruments, but this comes at the cost of financial innovations. And while 
financial innovation has received a negative connotation as a result of the recent crisis,24 it is not 
inherently negative. 
Finally, no set of rules can ensure that policymakers or investors will not act recklessly at 
some point. To borrow a phrase from domestic politics, ‘you cannot legislate against stupidity.’ 
 
24 See chapter eight. 
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This is particularly true if the reckless behavior is a result of government action. Thus, a good 
deal of responsibility for the current crisis can be laid at to door of the US Treasury and it loose 
monetary policy which kept interest low thus ensuring the expansion of the real-estate bubble. 
Another potential way of preempting crisis is to try to predict them before they happen 
since it is easier and less costly to deal with a potential crisis than an actual one. Many public, 
private and international institutions devote a lot of time and effort to monitoring the 
international financial system. However, it is still very difficult to predict a crisis before it 
happens. Financial markets are constantly growing and evolving, creating new financial 
instruments and opportunities. This makes monitoring the system and reaching a consensus on 
the implications of observed changes rather difficult. Even with the combined efforts of the 
G8/G20, IMF and the other IFIs it is still impossible to predict all problems before they happen. 
We must also bear in mind that identifying a problem does not automatically mean one is 
able to fix it. The problems plaguing the Bretton Woods Monetary System were well known for 
years. However, this foreknowledge did not lead to a consensus on what needed to be done or 
how the cost of adjustment would be born (James, 1996: 175-204; Eichengreen, 1998: 93-135). 
Even if a consensus can be reached, crisis prevention still faces substantial obstacles. 
First, while the policy measures needed to pre-empt a crisis are visible to both markets 
and citizens, their success may not be. That is, how do you show that the costs of crisis 
prevention outweighed the costs of a crisis that did not happen? In fact, the same problem exists 
even in crisis response. This is illustrated by the critics of the Bush and Obama administrations’ 
handling of the crisis in 2008/09. They have argued that the bailout and stimulus were 
unnecessary (since the market would have corrected itself anyway) and are in fact harmful (since 
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they are increasing government debts and the risk of inflation). Furthermore, if pre-emption fails 
then the government might be worse off than if it had done nothing. 
Second, we cannot forget that if policymakers have the ability to predict a crisis, then 
chances are that markets (or at least some market participates) will also have this ability. If 
speculators see the potential problem and believe that government policy will not work, then 
they will use their foreknowledge to bet against the intervention in order to make a profit. If 
enough speculators act in this way they can undermine crisis prevention efforts. Indeed this is 
exactly what happened during the two crises that hit European Monetary System (EMS) in the 
early 1990s. 
1.3 Domestic Crises Response 
In the domestic sphere, the government, specifically the central bank, is primarily 
responsible for crisis response and plays the role of lender of last resort (LOLR).25 As we noted 
above, a financial crisis is, in effect, a panicked response to the realization that the market value 
of an asset does not match its underlying/fundamental value. This panic puts significant 
downward pressure on prices which dramatically decreases market liquidity.26 This in turn can 
destabilize other financial markets and the real economy. Therefore, an effective crisis response 
entails some mix of three policy elements: immediate crisis response, financial reform and 
economic stimulus. Immediate crisis response is aimed at restoring liquidity thus helping to deal 
with markets panic. A package of financial reforms is in essence a promise to deal with the 
underlying causes of the crisis. Finally, the provision of economic stimulus is intended to 
 
25 For an excellent overview of the evolution and issues surrounding the idea of a lender of last resort please see 
Goodhart & Illing (2002). 
26 Market liquidity is the extent to which you can sell a financial asset (i.e. convert it to cash) without lowering its 
value. During a financial crisis, market liquidity diminishes rapidly. 
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counteract the negative impact on the real economy. Since the role of economic stimulus is self-
evident we only need to elaborate on the first two elements. 
Immediate crisis response is the preview of the LOLR, a role most commonly played by a 
central bank. The aim of this policy is restores stability to the distressed market by infusing both 
liquidity and confidence. The former is done by supporting the price of the distressed asset 
through open market operation, interest rate policy, or direct loans or bailouts to distressed 
financial institutions. All of these are short term measures designed to provide temporary relief 
for liquidity problems. This gives investors time to get over their initial panic and properly 
process information. 
In the case of a purely self-fulfilling crisis this may be enough to restore stability to the 
distressed market. In the case of a crisis triggered by fundamental problems, the intervention will 
provide the government and market with the breathing space necessary to correct the underlying 
problems which caused the crises. If these cannot be corrected then the intervention will provide 
the market with a “soft landing” (i.e. an orderly adjustment of the new asset price). 
The goal of reform efforts is to identify the underlying problems that led to the crisis and 
create a policy package that will fix them. These reforms can pertain to market practices and 
institutions, regulation, government policy, etc. Thus, while immediate crisis response and 
economic stimulus are a stop gap designed to minimize the impact of a crisis, financial reforms 
are the longer-term solution designed to prevent similar crises. 
The difficulty of creating an appropriate crisis response package lies in getting right 
combination of these three elements. The “right” mix will depend on the characteristics of the 
crisis and on the economic and political environment policymakers’ face. Any one of these three 
elements can face serious opposition form markets or powerful political groups. Such opposition 
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can render crisis response ineffective. Thus crisis response is as much about the management of 
competing political and financial interest as it is about implementing technical solutions to 
economic and financial problems. 
Getting the mix right also means making sure that the various crisis response efforts do 
not interfere with one another. This is a potential problem because these three responses can 
neutralize each other. For example, consider the case of a banking crisis that is the result of 
reckless lending. In the long-run reforms need to be enacted that will make sure that banks adopt 
sound lending practices, which in this context means adopting more conservative lending and 
reserve ratio standards. However, in the short-run the crisis makes banks very reluctant to extend 
credit. Thus, if lending reforms are imposed too early, they will exacerbate the credit crunch, 
which will in turn frustrate short-terms financial and economic stabilization efforts. 
Another important tension may develop between financial reform and economic stimulus. 
In the case of a sovereign debt crisis governments can face double bind. On the one hand, cutting 
spending and increasing taxes is necessary to deal with the debt crisis but may lead to an 
economic recession. On the other, if the government tries to stimulate the economy to avoid a 
recession they will make their debt situation worse. This is in fact the problem faced by many 
advanced economies today especially a number of EU members and to an extent the US. 
But even successful crisis response can create long-term problems in the form of moral 
hazards. By bailing-out investors and financial institution, governments reward rather than 
punish reckless behavior. This can effectively remove the downside of risk taking, which can 
lead to more reckless behavior in the future. Some would even argue that in the long-run it would 
be better to force market participants to face the consequences of their actions as this would 
promote market discipline. 
27 
 
While this argument is valid it is not without its dangers. This “tough love” approach is 
economically costly and politically risky. Therefore we should not expect governments to be 
willing to consider this option lightly. A better solution to this problem would be to design crisis 
response in a way that minimizes the overall negative economic effects or a crisis while ensuring 
that market participants face the negative consequences of their actions. However, creating and 
implementing such a response in practice is very difficult. 
1.4 International Crisis Response 
What makes a crisis international is that the liquidity shortage affecting the financial 
market (be it for foreign exchange, debt, or bank instruments) is a shortage of foreign exchange. 
As economies move from autarky to increased economic openness financial crises and the 
mechanics of crisis response become more complex. Capital mobility increases the potential size 
of market bubbles and the rate at which they can inflate and burst. Capital flows can also help 
transmit crises from one financial market to another. This can happen as the result of 
fundamental problems in other markets, investor panic, or a combination of the two. Real 
economic flows can also spread economic problem to other economies. 
We can identify three general types of international crises: national crises which have 
international components, truly international crises, and systemic crises. National crises with an 
international component but which do not have an international effect typically affect small open 
economies which are vulnerable to international economic flows but whose financial markets 
and real economy are too small to significantly impact other markets. In this case, other countries 
can either simply ignore the crisis or take unilateral policy measure to neutralize its negative 
effects on their economy. While these crises pose little systemic risk, they are often devastating 
to the national economy in which they take place. 
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Truly international crisis are financial crises that have a substantial impact on the 
financial system or real economy of more than one country. The extent of this impact will 
depend on the size and depth of a country’s financial system, the size and diversity of its real 
economy, and the level of economic and financial integration between it and the country from 
which the crisis spreads. Such crises can affect just two countries but are more likely to impact 
one or more supra-national regions. Examples of such crises include the two EMS crises of 1992 
and 1992-93 and the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis. 
Finally, as the name implies systemic (or system-wide) crisis have a substantial effect on 
international financial system as a whole. In addition to the financial and economic effects we 
have already discussed, such crises can have a dramatic impact on the way the international 
financial system functions. First, as capital seeks safe havens, it flows from high risk markets 
(where capital is typically relatively scarce) to lower risk markets (where it is relatively 
abundant). Thus international financial markets begin to function in a perverse way: moving 
capital form where it is scarce to where it is abundant. Second, such crises can produce an 
international credit crunch. This can affect real economic flows, especially trade flows which 
depend on short term financing. This can in turn choke off trade, which is already vulnerable due 
to economic downturns caused by the crisis. Finally, diminishing international liquidity and 
capital flight to safe havens can affect international currency and debt markets: putting further 
pressure on distressed markets and even triggering secondary financial crises. This will further 
weaken real economic flows as well as the ability of governments to meet their fiscal and debt 
obligations. Thus, even if a country is not directly affected by a systemic crisis, unless it is 
autarkic or nearly so, it will be impacted to some extent by the secondary economic and financial 
effects of a systemic crisis. In the worst case scenario, the economic meltdown can tempt 
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policymakers to abandon international cooperation and adopt beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This 
can lead to a further erosion of international economic flows and a movement to a more autarkic 
international economic system.27 
Regardless of their type, international financial crises are much harder for governments to 
deal with on their own because economic openness limits the effectiveness of national crisis 
response efforts. Immediate crisis response can be neutralized by capital mobility. Liquidity 
injected through open market operations will quickly leave a national financial system in crisis 
rather than support it. This is especially the case with small open economies. Interest rate policy 
can also be unintentionally neutralized by the interest rate policy of other central banks. For this 
reason, coordination of interest rate and other financial policy responses is usually critical. 
Economic stimulus can also be rendered ineffective in two primary ways. First, economic 
openness means that some portion of the stimulus will leave the national economy diminishing 
its effectiveness. This may not only slow national economic recovery but may lead to a popular 
backlash against the government. Second, economic stimulus can lead to protectionism. This can 
be either deliberate (e.g. raising tariffs to stimulate the economy) or an unintended consequence 
of government policy (e.g. providing loans to firms affected by the crises which can in effect 
become export subsidies). While protectionism can be beneficial to the national economy in the 
short run, it does have negative welfare effects in the long run. However, even in the short run, if 
nations simultaneously adopt protectionist measures they will in effect be limiting each other’s 
economic opportunities when they are needed most, thus frustrating recovery. For these reasons, 
it is often necessary to coordinated economic stimulus across national boundaries. 
 
27 As noted above, this has only happened during the Great Depression. However, the spectre of the 1930s was a 
powerful influence on policymakers during the post war period, especially during the collapse of Bretton Woods and 
subsequent systemic crises. In addition, a similar dynamic affected the international system during WWI and the 
policies adopted immediately after the war had a significant impact on post war recovery in the 1920s. 
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Finally, financial reform efforts will influence and be influence by the actions of other 
policymakers. As a consequence increasing interconnectedness of financial markets and the 
international diversification of financial intuitions countries have less autonomy in enacting 
financial regulation then they once did. There a number of ways in which national reforms can 
be frustrated by the actions of other policymakers. First, enacting measures that investors view as 
too strict can mean that capital will flow out of the national economy, thus affecting long term 
recovery and growth. Second, financial regulation usually ends at the water’s edge. Thus while 
national and multinational financial institution can be forced to follow strict guidelines within a 
nation’s jurisdiction, in other markets they may be able to act recklessly. This can make financial 
systems vulnerable despite the best efforts of national regulators. Finally, as we have already 
noted, economic openness means that crises can spread, this means that the health of a financial 
system depends on the health of the financial systems it is connected to. 
This, however, does not mean that policymakers have to enact the same policy measures 
in the face of a common crisis in order to be effective. In fact this would be just a dangerous as 
adopting national crisis responses without considering the actions of other states. Countries vary 
greatly in terms of their financial, economic and political systems. This means that each country 
will be affected differently by the same systemic crisis. More importantly, this means that 
policymakers in each country will have different policy options and constraints, and face 
different pressures from international and domestic financial actors as well as from their 
domestic constituents and opponents. Therefore, for international crisis response to be effective it 
must be able to coordinate and harmonize national efforts in a way that minimizes negative 




Chapter 2: Politics of IMF Crisis Lending 
 
A great deal has been written on the topic of international financial crises. Scholars have 
focused on their causes, how they spread, what effect they have, and how states should respond 
to them. The topic of intervening in financial crises has also received substantial attention 
recently. Analysis has centered on issues such as moral hazard problems associated with 
intervention, the efficacy of intervention in dealing with crises, the short and long term effects of 
intervention, particularly the impact of conditionality, and more recently, factors influencing the 
decision to intervene. 
Surprisingly, two issues have not been addressed. The first issue concerns how bailouts 
are negotiated between borrowers and lenders of last resort. This topic has either been ignored or 
it has been assumed that the lender simply dictates terms to the borrower. But this leaves a lot 
out of the picture.28 After all, it is strange to assume that the borrower has no say when such 
negotiations are a regular feature of all bailouts. Also, if the lender simply dictates terms to the 
borrower, then it is much harder to explain why bailout packages differ from country to county. 
By neglecting the bailout question, scholars effectively ignore the related question of what 
motivates the lender. If a lender is motivated simply by generosity, the question arises: why 
would terms be dictated and not negotiated?29 However, it should be clear that the lender usually 
derives some benefit from the intervention. Since this is the case, the lender should have an 
 
28 An exception to this is Kahler (1993) who looks at IMF bargaining with developing nations over structural 
readjustment programs. 
29 One could give a paternalistic explanations for this by saying that the lender of last resort does not trust that the 
government in need of a loan will simply see this as an opportunity to get out of a mess it created without dealing 
with its underlying problems. In effect, this is like the argument that to simply giving money to panhandlers is the 
worst possible way of helping them. However, even if this was the case, a lender would still find that some level of 
negotiation with the borrowing would provide benefits if for no other reason than in helping him understand the best 
way to help. 
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interest in reaching an agreement with the borrower that will overcome the crisis in a mutually 
beneficial way as this will likely increase the chances of success. As Kahler (1993, p. 376) points 
out, despite its leverage the IMF cannot implement its own programs so for them to succeed 
there must be some level of cooperation on the part of the borrower. 
The second, and related, issue neglected in the current literature involves the role of 
politics in influencing how bailouts are structured. It is often argued that the conditions attached 
to loans have political consequences for the borrower and can cause popular backlash at home. 
Argentina is one recent, dramatic example of this. But domestic backlash is not only an 
expression of popular outrage. It is also a danger to the success of the intervention and in 
extreme cases to the borrowing government’s political survival. So are lenders really oblivious to 
all this, acting such as doctors who are relatively indifferent to whether the patient lives of dies 
as long as their operations are technically successful? If lenders derive a benefit from a 
successful intervention then they should be sensitive to these political factors if for no other 
reason then that politics are constraints that they must confront in designing a bailout. 
This paper is a first attempt at remedying this gap in the literature by looking at 
intervention as a cooperative process between borrower and lender, albeit one characterized by 
pronounced power asymmetry. It also seeks to incorporate the role of domestic politics in the 
negotiation processes to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how intervention 
works. This is in an important area of investigation as it not only poses an interesting puzzle, but 
may also help us to better understand the dynamics of creating bailout packages, and lead to 
improved responses to financial crises.  
The rest of this paper will proceed in five sections. The next section will outline the 
theoretical framework that will be used to analyze this problem. It will outline the actors 
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involved as well as their interest and how they interact. The second section will then provide a 
theoretical explanation of how intervention works to stop a financial crisis and introduce the 
problem of negotiating a bailout package between borrower and lender. This section will build 
on the models of self-fulfilling crisis developed by Obstfeld (1986, 1994, & 1996) and Morris & 
Shin (1998 & 1999). In particular the paper will use Heinemann & Illing’s (2002) generalization 
of the Morris & Shin model to show how intervention can work to stop a financial crisis. The 
third section will then add domestic politics to the problem of intervention by adding the 
counties citizens who could challenge the conditions attached to the loan. This will be done first 
by assuming perfect information and then by adding uncertainty about citizen preferences. The 
fourth section will consider interaction between speculators and citizens by assuming that 
speculators can view citizen responses and respond to them. This section will also consider 
whether the government can send mixed signals (or two separate) about the composition of the 
loan agreement to citizens and speculators. The final section will conclude the discussion and 
present some testable hypotheses.  
2.1 The Framework 
The Players: The game consists of four players: the International Lender of Last Resort 
(L), the borrower or government facing the financial crisis (G), international speculators (S), and 
the citizens of the country facing the crisis (C). The game itself tries to model the dynamics of 
creating a bailout package that will help the borrower stop an international financial crisis that is 
threatening one of its financial markets. Morris & Shin’s model and Heinemann & Illing’s 
generalization of it are models of crisis in a fixed exchange regime. However, the model itself 
can be applied to any financial market where the government cares about the market price of the 
asset and where a crisis occurred which threatens a sudden drop from the pre-crisis level in the 
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value of the asset, a price drop that the government views as unacceptable. The financial crisis 
thus can be in any number of financial markets that have a large exposure to international 
investors; this model can therefore apply to currency crises, banking crises, sovereign debt crises, 
and others. It can also address twin crises in which a currency crisis occurs simultaneously with 
another crisis, such as a banking sector crisis. The model assumes that the reason for the crisis 
breaking out is that there is, or speculators believe there to be, a discrepancy between the pre 
crisis price p* and the price dictated by underlying fundamentals f(θ). Where θ is the state of 
underlying fundamentals that characterize the financial market. The market price in the absence 
of intervention is given by the function f(θ), and it is assumed that f is strictly increasing in θ (i.e. 
higher levels of θ mean stronger underlying fundamentals, and thus a higher market price). 
The International Lender of Last Resort, referred henceforth as the lender or ILOLR, is 
the actor that provides a bailout package to the government that is experiencing a financial crisis 
that it cannot deal with on its own. The ILOLR can take on a number of forms. It can be a single 
donor government such as Great Britain or the United States.30 It can be a group of donor 
countries, either an established organization such as the Group of Seven during the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997/8, or an ad hoc group of lenders such as the joint US-Canadian 
Intervention during the 1996 Peso Crisis. Finally, the role of ILOLR can be played by an 
international financial institution such as the IMF acting alone or coordinating its efforts with the 
efforts of one or more lender governments as it did during the Asian Financial Crisis. To begin 
with the lender in this game will be treated as a unitary actor. Later on in the next section the 
implications of multiple lenders of last resort will be examined. The motives for the lenders 
 
30 This need not be a dominant global economic power that always acts or should act as a lender of last resort as 
argued by Hegemonic Stability Theory (see Kindelberger 1978/1996, Krasner 1985 or Gilpin 1975). This is simply a 
state that has the resources and the will to intervene to stop a financial crisis. 
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intervention can be numerous ranging from the lenders responsibility as in the case of the IMF, 
self-interested altruism due fear or crisis contagion, the consequences of economic and political 
problems stemming from the crisis (especially if the borrower and lender have strong economic 
or political ties) or more genuine concern for the welfare or the government facing the crisis. But 
whatever the motive for intervention this paper assumes that the lender is a rational actor that 
wants to maximize the chances of success of the bailout while at the same time minimizing the 
cost associated. This means that the lender may at some point decide that the benefits associated 
with the intervention are not worth the cost involved and break off negotiations. 
The second player is the borrowing government that faces the crisis and that has asked 
for a bailout package from the lender. The government is also assumed to be a rational also will 
also want to intervene in the market so long as the political and economic costs of intervention 
do not outweigh the benefits of stopping the crisis.   
Thus the borrower and lender must come together to design a bailout package that will 
successfully stop or prevent a financial crisis. The bailout package itself consists of two 
components: a loan and the conditions attached to it. The first component, the loan, is intended to 
help provide liquidity to the distressed market, thus providing a temporary support to prices until 
the crisis is resolved. In effect, the loan provides funds that the government can use to neutralize 
attacks on the currency. By buying up the distressed financial assets the government supports the 
pre-crisis price in the market p*. The loan will be represented by the parameter l, which is the 
portion of speculators whose attack the loan can neutralize. Theoretically, l can take on any value 
in the range [0,1]. There is an upper limit on this, however, which is imposed by two facts. First, 
given the size of modern international financial markets, it is practically impossible that a lender 
would be able to provide a loan that could satisfy all speculators, i.e. l = 1. Second, the lender 
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would not want to provide a loan that would exceed the number of speculators likely to attack 
the market α. Thus, the practical upper limit on l is α or the closest that the lender can, or is 
willing to, provide. 
The second component of the bailout package concerns the conditions that are attached. 
The lender makes policy recommendations to which the borrower must agree in order to receive 
the loan. These conditions are policy measures that are enacted to restore the fundamentals in the 
distressed market, that is strengthen fundamentals and realign the pre-crisis price with the 
shadow price implied by the underlying fundamentals, and thus provide a longer-term correction 
to the market. This point may be controversial because some would argue that financial crises 
rarely result from bad policies that lead to a misalignment of market prices form their underlying 
fundamentals, for example, by providing bad incentives to investors. Rather, this argument 
would hold that financial crises tend to result from herd-like or even predatory behavior by 
investors. According to this view there is nothing wrong in the underlying market and the crisis 
is simply the result of self-fulfilling prophecies by speculator who profit from their actions.31 
While this argument may be accurate, conditionality may nonetheless be beneficial in these 
circumstances as making such policy commitments can calm panicking investors or reduce the 
likelihood that the attack by profiteering speculators will work and thus lower the speculators’ 
chances of profiting from the attack. Conditionality will be represented by the parameter c, 
which represents policies that can increase the underlying fundamental θ thus closing the gap 
between the pre crisis price p* and the price that speculators believe should hold in the market 
f(θ). Theoretically, c can take on any value in the range [0,1], but its value will be chosen such 
that f(θ + c) = p* or as close as possible under the circumstances. 
 
31 Bad policy vs bad markets debate. 
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The international speculators respond to the bailout package that is created by either 
continuing their attack on the market or by ending it. As noted above, the way the bailout works 
depends on the reason for the crisis but is roughly similar across cases. We can think of three 
cases. First, bad government policy may lead to distorted market signals which, in turn, leads to 
bad investment decisions on the part of investors. The crisis then results because investors realize 
that the information they based their decisions on was wrong and want to de-invest from the 
market. Second, the crisis may result from herd-like behavior in which investors jump into a 
market where they see high returns reaped by earlier entrants, but one that they are not familiar 
with so they are not fully aware of the risk-reward tradeoff that the investment involves. This 
pushes prices beyond their fundamentals and leads to a market bubble (an inflation of prices 
beyond what is justified by fundamentals). Eventually the bubble bursts as investors realize that 
prices are inflated and try to cash-out of the market before it collapses. Finally, the crisis may 
result from self-fulfilling speculative attacks where enough speculators go short in the market 
eventually putting enough pressure on the price, which leads to a collapse of the market, despite 
the fact that the market was sound. In each case, investors/speculators put pressure on the market 
because they believe that a collapse is likely. This pressure in turn, leads to a crisis. The bailout 
package strengthens/stabilizes the market by including a loan l  that provides temporary liquidity 
and thus a temporary price support. The package includes policy reform in the form of 
conditionality c that promise a realignment of prices and underlying fundamentals in the market 
in the medium term. By providing such price supports, the bailout will reduce the value of 
leaving the market for both investors (whether they want to leave as a result of a rational or a 
panicked response to new information) and speculators (who now have a decreased likelihood of 
succeeding in their attack). 
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The final players are the citizens of the borrowing government. While the citizens may 
benefit from a successful bailout,32 they also bear the brunt of the costs associated with 
conditionality. They will therefore have a mixed incentive to support the bailout. They will 
support it only to the point where the benefits from averting the financial crisis outweigh the 
costs of the policy reforms associated with the bailout. Citizens may resent the conditions 
attached to a loan for three reasons (Kahler, 1993: 369-70). First, some citizens may have 
ideological objections to the conditions attached. Thus the IMF is often seen as pushing market-
oriented reforms at the expense of other approaches to the economy. Second, some citizens may 
object to the conditions attached because they feel they go against their nations interest or simply 
because they do not wish to subordinate national policy to the demands of some lender. Finally, 
as was alluded to above, citizens may simply feel that the conditions, or even the bailout itself, 
go against their national economic interests. Of course any combination of the three can motivate 
a citizen again the loan agreement, or citizens may use the first two explanations to cover up 
acting in their economic best interest. 
But citizens may not simply want to derail the bailout; they may in fact decide that this is 
also the time to get rid of their government, as was the case of the most resent financial crisis in 
Argentina or during the Asian Financial Crisis when the Suharto regime in Indonesia was finally 
overthrown. There are three reasons for this. First, a government may be very unpopular to some 
or a majority of its citizens so the financial crisis and bailout may be a catalyst or be used as a 
pretext for their citizens to remove it from power. Second, the crisis may indicate to citizens that 
 
32 There are cases where government policy to support a price in a financial market is in fact welfare reducing see 
Krugman (1979). In this case no only do citizens not benefit form successful intervention but would be heart by it. 
In fact Krugman argues that in these cases a financial crisis should be welcome because it will lead to an 
improvement in social welfare. If this is the case then it does no change the argument of this paper since this 
situation is analogous to a net negative effect of intervention where successful intervention is beneficial but the cost 
associated with conditionality lead to a net loss for a group or all citizens. 
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the government is incompetent and or corrupt. Finally, the if the condition the government agrees 
to are seen as very harsh this may make the government look as if it is indifferent to the welfare 
or its citizens. So even of a government was not unpopular to begin with citizen resentment may 
grow leading to their removal. All of this will be explored in section three of this paper. 
In this model, the citizens are direct participants in the process and do no act primarily 
though their elected representatives or lobby organizations. This allows the application of the 
model across regime types. It is also justified by the fact that, even in a democracy, it is unlikely 
that public discontent with a bailout agreement will be articulated primarily through elected 
representatives. The relatively compressed time frame of negotiating and implementing a bailout 
agreement precludes citizens from acting through their elected veto players such as the 
legislature. That is citizens cannot wait for elections to fix the problem and must signal their 
discontent with the intervention as it is happening if they want to stop it. 
Sequence of Play: This game unfolds in three stages. In the first, the borrower and lender 
try to come to an agreement about the bailout package that will be offered. In essence, they 
decide on the size of the loan l and the number of conditions attached c. The central tension in 
this stage comes from the different preferences of the borrower and lender. The lender is 
providing the money for the bailout loan and reasonably wishes to give the lowest possible 
amount that will provide sufficient liquidity: lL. Because they do not directly bear any of the 
political cost of conditionality, they also wish to impose the maximal amount of conditions to the 
loan: cL. The borrower, on the other hand, directly bears the political fallout of conditionality so 
it wants the largest possible loan: lB and the minimal amount of conditionality necessary: cB. 
Thus the relationship between the borrower’s and lender’s ideal points is as follows: lB > lL and 
cL > cB.  
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This does not mean that the borrower does not want any conditions imposed on the loan. 
On the contrary, the government may consider some level of conditionality useful, as it may 
involve policy adjustments that the government would have enacted if left to its own devices. 
Conditionality may even be useful as a way of enacting measures that the borrower government 
considers to be necessary, but which are politically unpopular and therefore deemed too costly 
for the government to impose on its own. Conditionality can in these circumstances enable the 
borrower to enact policies while deflecting the blame from itself and onto the lender. But even if 
conditionality is useful, it still represents some level of political cost to the borrower. At the end 
of the day, it is the government that agrees to the loan’s conditions, and so it will not be able to 
deflect the entire popular backlash for two reasons. First, because it may look to weak to its 
citizens, perhaps going too far that the citizens see it as being subservient to international 
pressure. Second, it may simply be seen as being indifferent to the suffering of its people.  
However, it is also not the case that the lender does not case when effect the conditions 
have on the lender. If the borrower and lender have existing political ties then the lender may be 
hesitant to impose maximal conditions because of the political repercussions they may have on 
their strategic partnership. But even in the case of the IMF, which usually tried to minimize the 
influence that strategic and economic interests of its board members have on loan agreements 
(Kahler, 1993: 369), there are still reasons why it would not necessarily want to impose the 
maximal possible conditions. First, there is no point in imposing conditions that will simply lead 
to a political crisis that will derail the intervention. Second, as Kahler points out, the IMF for all 
its leverage cannot implement its own programs (1993: 375). This of course applies equally to 
any ILOLR as there is little point in insisting on conditions that the borrower is unwilling or 
unable to implement. Thus at this stage in the model two outcomes are possible: the borrower 
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and lender reach an agreement on the loan (set l and c), or they do not, in which case intervention 
has failed. 
In the second stage of the game, the citizens decide whether they will accept the loan 
agreement or voice their political discontent with it. As stated above, while citizens may benefit 
from a successful bailout, they will also bear the cost of the conditions attached to the loan and 
there is no guarantee that the loan will work. Citizens therefore will support the loan agreement 
if the costs associated with conditionality do not outweigh the benefits of a successful bailout. 
Thus, those citizens who oppose the loan will take political steps to try to derail it. The 
government can then respond to the political crisis by ignoring it or trying to repress it. Both 
actions entail a political cost for the government cp(β, c), where β is the proportion of the 
population that is unhappy with conditionality and c is the level of conditionality imposed. The 
political cost cp is strictly increasing in both β and c. That is, as the number of people upset with 
conditionality rises the more costly it is for the government to ignore them, and as the level of 
conditionality increases the wore off each discontented individual is, all else being equal, so the 
higher the political cost of ignoring them. In this stage, the government will ignore or repress 
political dissent if the political costs of doing so do not outweigh the benefits of a successful 
intervention. Otherwise it will abandon the intervention. 
In the final stage, the market will respond to the intervention. If enough speculators 
decide to continue their attack so that the benefits of government intervention do not outweigh 
the costs, the government will abandon intervention and the financial market will collapse. 




There are four possible outcomes to the game. In three of them, intervention can fail for 
one of three reasons: the borrower and lender cannot reach an agreement, citizens successfully 
veto the bailout because of the conditions attached, or speculators successfully defeat the 
government’s intervention in the market. However, in the final outcome, if the government 
overcomes each one of these potential barriers, the crisis will be successfully stopped.  
Stage I: 




Outcome I: Bailout fails 
No agreement is reached 
Stage II: 
C respond to conditionality 
G decide to continue or 
abandon intervention 
Outcome II: Bailout fails 
Citizens successfully veto aid 
bailout conditions 
Stage III: 
S respond to conditionality 
G decide to continue or 
abandon intervention 
Government decided to 
bear the political const of 
conditionality 
Outcome III: Bailout fails 
Speculators successfully 
defeat aid bailout package 
Government decided to 
intervene to stop the 
crisis 
Outcome IV: Bailout succeeds 
 
Figure 1: Game Layout 
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2.2 The Logic of Intervention 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how intervention works to stop a financial 
crisis. In order to do this the argument presented here will first build on the logic of speculative 
attacks under certainty developed by Obstfeld (1986, 1994, & 1996). Then it will show how 
intervention can prevent speculative attacks even in the case of multiple equilibria. The next 
section will use Heinemann and Illing’s (2002) generalization of Morris and Shin’s (1998 & 
1999) model of speculative attacks under uncertainty, which eliminates the possibility of 
multiple equlibria.33 
The model is set in a competitive financial market where: θ is the state of fundamentals 
characterizing the market and is assumed to be a random parameter θ  ; f(θ) is the market 
shadow price which would prevail in the absence of government intervention, f is strictly 
increasing in θ; and p* is the pre crisis market price such that p* ≥ f(θ). 
The model is concerned with speculators who have not yet left the market (i.e. they still 
hold one unit of the distressed financial asset). It is assumed that there is a continuum of agents i 
 [0, 1]; each speculator decides independently on whether to attach or not; the transaction cost 
associated with selling short is give by tf > 0; and each speculator has one unit of capital. 
Speculators can therefore take one of two actions: sell short one unit of the financial asset (e.g. 
currency, bond, etc.), which will continue the pressure on the market and may eventually lead to 
its collapse; or they can refrain from doing so. The government can then decide whether it will 
defend the currency or not. 
 
33 Morris and Shin’s 1998 paper contained an error in it proof. This was corrected in Heinemmann (2000) without 
weakening the unique equilibrium result. 
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If a speculator decides to attack and the attack is successful, her payoff will be p* - f(θ) - 
tf or R(θ) - tf, where R(θ) is the differential between the pre crisis price p* and the market 
shadow price as determined by θ. R(θ) is a non-increasing function in θ, that is the smaller is θ, 
the smaller is the deviation of the market price p* form the shadow price f(θ) and therefore the 
lower the return from a speculative attack. Each speculator therefore faced the following payoffs 
depending on her actions and the actions of other speculators: 
1. If she does nothing, regardless of the action of others: 0 
2. If she participates in a successful attack:   R(θ) - tf 
3. If she participate in an unsuccessful attack:  - tf 
The government’s decision to defend or abandon the market under attack will depend on 
its payoffs. The government can avert a crisis by bearing the cost cf(α, θ), where α  [0,1] is the 
proportion of speculators that decide to attack the market and of course θ are the fundamentals 
that determine the assets price. This cost is assumed to be a continuous function that increases in 
α - with a rise in the proportion of speculators who attack (i.e. the more speculators that attack, 
the more the intervention will cost); and decreases in θ - the level of fundamentals characterizing 
the market. 
The following assumptions are made about the cost of intervening cf: 
− cf(0,0) > v: In the worst case of fundamentals, the cost of defending the market price 
exceeds the benefits of doing so, even if all the speculators refrain from attack. This 
is a situation where fundamental are so bad that the government know that a 
devaluation of the price is necessary and that even a single attacker would be 
enough to bring down the price of the asset. (See figure 2) 
− cf(1,1) > v: Even in the best case of fundamentals, if all speculators decide to attack 
the market, the cost of defending will exceed the value of doing so. This simply 
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reflects the fact that the entire market dwarfs the resources of a single government. 
(See figure 2) 
− p* - f(1) < tf: In the best case of fundamentals, θ = 1, if transaction costs outweigh 
the profits made from speculation, then speculation will not occur. (See figure 3) 
Three Part Classification of Fundamentals 
Let θ denote the value of θ which solves for cf(0,θ) = v (see figure 2). This means that θ is 
the value of θ at which the government is indifferent between defending the market and letting it 
collapse, even when there is no speculative attack. That is, when θ < θ, the cost of defending the 
currency is greater than the benefit. Similarly, let   be the value of θ where f(θ) = p* - tf (see 
figure 3). This means that   is the value of θ where speculators are indifferent between attacking 
the market and refraining from doing so. That is, when θ >   the speculators cannot profit by 












Figure 2: G’s cost of intervention Figure 3: S’s profitability of attacking  
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and assuming θ >  , we can divide all possible values of the fundamentals into three discrete 
areas: 
− (-, θ]: the cost of defending the market is larger then the benefit (cf(α,θ) > v) 
regardless of the action of speculators. In this region, the market is unstable. 
− (θ,  ): the relationship of cf(α, θ) and v depends on α. This is the region of self-
fulfilling prophecies. If none of the speculators attack the market, then the value of 
defending the currency is greater then the cost, and the government will 
consequently defend the market. This means that there is no incentive for a 
speculator to deviate and attack the currency because the peg will be maintained 
and the speculator will incur a loss of -tf. If all the speculators attack, then the value 
of defending the market will be less than the cost of doing so. The government will 
not defend the peg. In this case as well, it is not in the speculator’s best interest to 
deviate; if she does not attack she will lose out on a sure profit of p* - f(1) - tf > 0. 
Therefore, in this region, if speculators believe that p* will be abandoned, engaging 
in attacks is rational since they will profit. In this region, the market is ripe for 
attack. 
− [ , +): transaction costs are greater than the price difference (p* - f(1) < tf). 
Consequently, speculators cannot make a profit and no attacks will occur. The 
market, in this region, is stable. 
Thus, with perfect information, there will be multiple equilibria in the region (θ, ) due 
to self-fulfilling beliefs. 
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2.3 Effect of ILOLR intervention 
So how does a bailout package change the dynamics of this situation? To determine this 
we first need to set up the logic illustrate the logic under which a speculative attack occurs. A 
was just stated in the region (-, θ] the government is unwilling to support the asset price even it 
no speculators attack. Similarly in the region [ , +) attacking is unprofitable so no attack will 
occur. In the region (θ,  ) an attack may or may not succeed depending on speculator beliefs 
about the likelihood of an attack. But although speculators can bring about a successful attack in 
this region the number of speculators necessary for a successful attack will critical depend on the 
value of the fundamentals θ. This is due to the fact that the government is willing to bear the cost 
of cf(α, θ) to prevent the attack though open market intervention up to its reserve value of v. The 
cost of intervention depend not only on the proportion of speculators that attack but also on the 
level of fundamentals θ because this determine the difference between p* and f(θ), which the 
government will have to spend on each asset speculators wish to sell in order to neutralize the 
attack. 
Thus there is a critical mass of investors α(θ) that are necessary for the attack to succeed 
in this region and it is determined by solving the equality v = cf(α, θ). The critical mass is an 
increasing function of θ because the higher is θ the lower are the returns from the speculative 
attack R(θ), that is the smaller the differential between the pre-crisis price p* and the shadow 
price f(θ) that the government must pay. This is presented graphically in figure 4. As θ    the 
critical mass α(θ)  +, and as θ  θ the critical mass α(θ)  0. 
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Intervention can affect the critical mass of the investors needed through both the size of 
the loan l and the conditions attached c. The effect of intervention is presented in figure 5. The 
larger is the loan l the mode investors are needed to at any given level of θ, where θ < θ >  . 
Graphically this is represented by a tilting of α(θ) to the higher critical mass of α’(θ). The reason 
it tilts rather then shifts up is that a levels of θ close to θ R(θ) is very large to the effect of a loan 
of any size is rather small compared to its effect as θ    where R(θ) becomes very small. 
Conditionality works by shifting expectations of a give θ’ to a higher level θ’ + c or θ” which is 
close to  .34 This also increases the critical mass necessary for successful intervention and if c is 
large enough it may shift the fundamentals to the right of  , that is θ”   , thus making the 
market stable. Therefore, intervention effectively increases the state of fundamentals through 
 
34 If we assume that speculators are ration, then they will use all available information to determine the values of θ, 
and as long as the commitments c undertaken by the government as part of the bailout are credible then as a result of 
the bailout fundamental will shift from θ’ to θ”. The issue of commitment credibility will be dealt with when 
domestic politics are introduced into the model. 











conditionality and makes each state θ relatively more stable because the loan attached increases 
the critical mass of investors that are necessary to bring about devaluation at any level of 
fundamentals. 
But if conditionality is so effective could not the government simply make this policy 
commitment by itself without the ILOLR? The answer is a qualified yes because although the 
government can make such commitment on its own speculators are likely to view this a simply 
being cheap talk. The bailout package makes such commitments more effective for two reasons. 
First, because the commitment is made as a part of a loan agreement it is more credible then if 
the government made it unilaterally, although as we shall see later on this may still not be fully 
credible. Second, because the policy commitments also come with a loan this will help the 
government defeat speculators that remain skeptical about its commitments to the conditions 
attached to the loan. Of course there is a tradeoff between the size of the loan l and the conditions 
attached c. This will be discussed in detail at the end of this section. 
2.4 Introducing Imperfect Information 
The next step is to introduce a model of imperfect information. This presentation is a 
summary of Heinemann and Illing (2002) generalization of Morris and Shin (1998). This game 
follows the following form: Nature randomly chooses θ  . Speculators do not observe θ 
directly, rather each agent observes a private signal xi   that is also randomly distributed like θ. 
The common distribution of θ and the signal (xi)i[0,1] is common knowledge among speculators. 
The government observes both the portion of speculators that attack the currency α and the state 
of the fundamentals θ. It is further assumed for simplification that if speculators are indifferent 
between attacking and not attacking, they will not attack, and that if the government is 
indifferent between defending and abandoning the market, it will abandon it. 
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By solving out the government’s strategies at the end of the game, we can define a 
reduced-form game between the speculators only. Let α(θ) be the critical mass of speculators 
needed to force the government to abandon the market. If θ   (θ,  ), then α(θ) solves cf(α, θ) = 
v and α(θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ. 
The distribution of θ and x is as follows. Let h(θ) is the marginal density of θ and gi(xi|θ) 
is the conditional density of the signal xi given θ. The following is further assumed: that for all θ 
all conditional distributions of xi|θ are identical and independent of each other with finite 
variance and expected value, i.e gi(xi|θ) = g(xi|θ) = gi(xi|θ, xj) and E(xi|θ), var(xi|θ)   for all θ, 
xi, xj and for all j  i.  
The cumulative distribution of xi given θ is G(xi|θ). The following is assumed about the 
distribution: 1) G/θ < 0 for all xi and θ with 0 < G(xi|θ) < 1, this simply means that a better 
state of underlying fundamentals leads to a smaller proportion of speculators getting signals 
worse that any fixed signal xi. 2) G(xi|θ) approaches one as θ approaches - and zero as θ 
approaches + for each finite xi. 3) H(θ|xi), the conditional distribution of θ given xi, decrease in 
xi whenever 0 < H(θ|xi) <1. This means that the posterior probability for a state being worse then 
any given θ decreases if the signal gets better. These assumptions imply that xi and θ are 
positively correlated.35 
The strategy of the individual speculator is a given by the function i:   {0,1}, which 
means that agents attack after a signal xi if i(xi) = 1. If all agents get the same signal the 
fraction:  
 
35 These characteristics are fulfilled by the uniform and normal distribution assumed by Morris and Shinn (1998 & 
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will attack the market. If the fundamental state is θ, a fraction: 
(2) = R dxxgxs )|()(),(   
will attack with probability one, because signals are independent. The event where 
attacks are successful with probability one is given by: 
(3) )}(),(|{)(  = sA  
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For private information to work as a selection device it is essential for there to exist 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ states of the world at which not attacking and attacking respectively are the 
dominant strategies. In order to get this it is sufficient to assume that there exists 1) some signal 
for which there is a positive payoff of an attack, provided that none of the other agents follow the 
attack, and 2) that for some other signal the expected payoff of an attack by all speculators is 
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Both of these functions, u(x,0) and u( x ,1), are decreasing in xi, therefore if xi < x then 
attacking is the dominant strategy and if xi > x  then not attacking is the dominant strategy. 
Following Heinemann & Illing the game is solves assuming that speculators are rational, the 
structure of the game is common knowledge and that each speculator know the others are 
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rational. The method of iterated elimination of dominated strategies is used to reach a set of 
rationalized expectation equilibria.36 Rationality of course requires that speculators do not play 
dominated strategy, since in this game speculators know the game and that other speculators are 
rational and also know the structure of the game, they will conclude that not of them will play a 
dominated strategy. Thus if speculators receive a signal below x they will attack the currency and 
a signal above x  the will not attack. In the region (x, x ) an attack may or may not succeed and 
the payoff is of course determined by the likelihood of success. The more speculators join an 
attack at any given distribution of privates signals the more likely the attack will be a success. 
Therefore, the worst outcome an attacking speculator can expect is for all other speculators to 
play the strategy xI , similarly the best outcome she can expect is for all other speculators to play 
the strategy 
x

















Where 1 indicated the decision to attack and 0 the decision to refrain from attacking 
depending on whether the private signal is above of below some threshold k. If all speculators 
use this strategy then all those that receive a private signal x below k will attack the currency, 
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36 As Heinemann & Illing note this includes all Nash equilibria but also all a-posterior or sunspot equilibria. They 
get the same condition for uniqueness as Morris and Shin (1998, 1999). These results are robust even if we consider 
sunspots as a correlating device or differing subjective beliefs about the strategies of other player. See also the result 
of Milgrom and Robets (1990). 
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Since, as was indicated in figure 4, α(θ) is increasing from it beginning value of zero at θ 
until it reached   and G(k | θ) is non-increasing in θ and ranges from 1 to 0, there is a unique ̂
(k)  θ, defined by 
(9)  ),ˆ()ˆ(|sup)(ˆ kIsk  ==  
such that a event where a successful attack occurs 
(10) )](ˆ,()( kIA k −=  
The expected payoff to an attacking speculator i when everyone else plays the strategy Ik 













Eliminating all dominated strategies, it is unambiguously clear that it pays to attack when 
u(xi, Ix) > 0, and it does not pay to attack when u(x
i, 
x
I ) < 0. Since u(xi, Ik) is decreasing in xi,37 
there are unique values x1,
1
x   (x, x ) for which 
(12) 0),(
1





and we may eliminate all strategies that assign a positive fraction of non-attackers to 




However, this outcome is a product of a situation where the government can rely only on 
its own resources. If the government, however, knows θ* and has access to foreign aid, it can 
determine what levels of l and c can eliminate the distance between θ and θ* (assuming θ < θ*). 
See figures 5 and 6. 
 
37 For a proof of this see the appendix of Heinemann & Illing (2002) pp. 448-49. 
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Figure 5 shows the effect of a given loan size l on the outcome on the critical level of 
fundamental θ*. In effect l diminishes the cost of intervening for the government and therefore a 
larger proportion of speculators are needed for a successful attack for any given level of 
fundamental θ. This is shown show in figure 5 as an upward shift of α(θ,0) to α’(θ, l) and a shift 
from θ* to θl* such that θl* < θ*. Similarly, Figure 6 shows the effect of conditionality c has on 
the underlying fundamentals θ. The imposition of conditions c shift the level of fundamentals 
from θ to θ + c, and since c ≥ 0 then θ ≥ θ + c. This means that conditionality increases the 
underlying fundamentals (i.e. shifts them right) and if c is sufficiently large so that θ + c > θ*, 
then it can even prevent the crisis. 
Therefore, the potential bailout agreements that can theoretically stop the crisis consists 
of all those combination of loan l and 
conditions c that shift θ so that θ = θ*. 
That is if the level of underlying 
fundamentals, adjusted by conditionality, 
is equal to the critical level of 
fundamentals θ*, adjusted for the size of 
the loan given: θ + c = θ* - Δθ*(l) 
In other words, is all those combination 
of loans and conditions attached that 
restore market fundamentals to a stable 




Figure 6: Successful bailout packages 
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Where Δθ*(l) is the effect that l has on θ* though its affect on α(θ, l), the higher is l the 
lower is θ*. This relationship is illustrated in figure 7. It will be explained in more detail in the 
next two sections. 
2.5 Government and Citizens 
Setup: This stage is similar to the interaction in Stage III with a few variations. Here, the 
two players are the government and its citizens. The citizens learn about the conditions c 
attached to the bailout agreement and decide whether they will attack them or not. The citizens 
are assumed to derive some benefit from a successful intervention, but they also experience a 
cost associated with the conditions attached to the bailout agreement. These costs are represented 
by the function g(c). We assume that g is strictly increasing in c, i.e. as c increase the cost 
associated with the bailout also rises. As noted above, c is assumed to represent the level of 
commitment that the government undertakes to enact policy reform that will end the crisis. It is 
assumed to be uniformly distributed on a unit interval [0,1], where 0 means that the government 
has committed to none of the reforms that are necessary for supporting market fundamentals  , 
and where 1 means that it has committed to all such reforms. We further assume that while 
citizens can express their discontent with the bailout agreement, and in particular the level of c, 
these activities involve a political transaction cost tp. This transaction cost can range from 
something as small as sacrificing free time or working hours to protest, to enduring bodily harm 
if the government decides to repress popular discontent. Thus a citizen can choose to either 
oppose a bailout agreement or refrain from doing so. One final and very important assumption 
for the behavior of citizens: the government will not agree to a bailout package and the political 
cost it entails if it does not believe that the package will enable it to successfully intervene to stop 
the crisis in the financial market. This means that when citizens are weighing the decision of 
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whether to support or oppose the bailout package on the merits of the conditions attached, they 
assume that if they do not defeat the package it will succeed in stopping the financial crisis. This 
means that if the bailout succeeds, the citizens pay off is b – g(c). If it fails, it is 0. If the citizens 
decide to oppose the package, they bear the transaction cost of  - tp. If they do not participate in 
the opposition, they bear no transaction cost. This gives four possible payoffs for each citizen: 
1. Participates in a successful attack   = - tp 
2. Does not participate in a successful attack  = 0 
3. Participates in an unsuccessful attack   = b – g(c) - tp  
4. Does not participate in an unsuccessful attack = b – g(c) 
For the government, if it succeeds in overcoming the political crisis, it is then assumed to 
go on to successfully intervene in the financial market and receive a benefit of v’ for ending the 
crisis, where v’ = v – cf(α, θ). Since this has been determined in stage III, it will be treated as a 
fixed amount such that v’  v since cf(α, θ)   0. The government will also bear a political cost if 
it pushes the bailout through despite popular opposition. This cost is given by the function cp(β, 
c), where β is the percentage of the population that opposes the bailout, and c is the level of 
conditions attached; cp is strictly increasing in both β and c. 
The following assumptions, analogous to the assumptions made about cf, are made about 
the cost of intervening cp: 
− cp(0,1) > v’: In the worst case scenario, where full conditionality is imposed on the 
borrower, the cost of defending the bailout from political attack by citizens exceeds 
the benefits of doing so, even if all citizens refrain from attack. If conditionality is 
this severe, and even if citizens do not actively protest the bailout, there will be a 
high political cost in terms of resentment (i.e. there is discontent among citizens 
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even if it is not actively expressed). Under these conditions the value of a successful 
bailout is less then the cost the government bears as a result of citizens’ resentment. 
(See figure VIII) 
− cp(1, 0) > v’: Even if no conditions are imposed, if all citizens decide to attack the 
bailout, the cost of defending it will exceed the value of doing so. (See figure 8) 
− b – g(0) > tp: In the best case of conditionality, c = 0, political attacks on the bailout 
will not occur because the cost of attacking does not outweigh the benefits of doing 
so. (See figure 9) 
2.6 Three Part Classification of Conditionality 
The logic here is similar to that in Stage III above except that the logic is flipped since cp 
is increasing in c while cf was decreasing in θ. Let c  denote the values of c which solves for cp(0, 








Figure 7: G’s cost of intervention Figure 8: C’s profitability of Attacking 
b – g(c) 




above c  the cost outweighs the benefits and the bailout will be abandoned. Similarly, let c denote 
the values of at which g(c) = b - tp. Thus when conditions are imposed below this level, the 
benefits of the successful bailout always outweigh the costs, and citizens will never attack. We 
have then the following tripartite division: 
− [0, c]: The costs of attacking the bailout package are greater than the benefits, no 
matter what other citizens decide to do (see the case of b – g(0) > tp above), so 
citizens will not attack the bailout package. The bailout agreement will be accepted. 
− (c, c ): The relationship between cp(β, c) and v depend on β. If no citizens attack the 
bailout package, the government will uphold it. Citizens have no incentive to 
deviate since doing so they will only incur transaction cost tp and not change the 
outcome. If all citizens attack the package then it will collapse, and the government 
will not defend it. However, if one citizen deviates and refrains from attacking the 
package then he will reap the same benefit as all the other citizens, but will not have 
to bear the transaction cost tp of protest. This is a classic collective action problem 
and it means that the equilibrium is unstable and will unravel to the point where no 
one will attack due to the free rider problem. Thus, in this case, the government can 
impose any kind of agreement without having it overturned. 
− [ c , 1]: The cost of defending the agreement outweighs the benefits in this region, 




The above means that the highest 
level of conditionality that the government 
is willing to impose is c = c , and citizens 
will not be able to coordinate to challenge 
this decision by the government because 
of collective action problems. The will 
give us a new set of l and c combinations 
that will lead to successful intervention. 
This new set, which is shown in figure 10, 
is a subset of the precious set of bailout 
packages, given in figure 7, such that:  
θ + c + Δθ*(l) = θ* 
Conditional on: 
cc   
 
2.7 Government and Lender of Last Resort 
Setup: In the first stage the government and the lender meet to come to a loan agreement, 
that is, decide on the amount to give and the conditions to attach. From Stage III, the government 
and lender know that the critical level of the fundamentals is θ*, and that for any value of the 
fundamentals such that θ < θ*, the financial crisis will lead to a collapse of the market. The 
borrower and lender must therefore create a package that will prevent this from happening. As 
stated above, the level of conditionality c works to push θ towards the level of θ*, and the size of 
the loan, or rather the portion of the speculative attacks that the loan can neutralize, l pushes θ* 










depends on is α(θ). Since the loan effectively reduces the number of speculators participating in 
the attack by neutralizing their effect, all things being equal, this will push *  to a lower level. 
Thus, as was stated above, intervention will succeed if θ + c = θ* - Δθ*(l). Where Δθ*(l) is the 
effect that l has on θ* though it’s affect on α(l), the higher is l the lower is θ*. We know from 
stage II that the highest level of conditionality that the borrowing country can bear is c* = c . 
Thus the lowest loan that can possibly be is given by Δθ*(l) = θ* - θ - c. 
The government’s benefit from a successful intervention is given by the equation: 
),(),( cclcv pf  −−−  
This is the value of a successful intervention minus the economic and political cost of 
attaining it. If the intervention is unsuccessful then the payoff is 0. The payoff for the lender is 
given by: 
))(*(),( fppe tfpSlccv −−−−   
That is, the value of a successful intervention is equal to the benefit that the borrower 
receives for a successful recovery v modified by the level of economic ties between the borrower 
and lender δe, minus the political cost born by the borrower cp modified by the level of political 
ties between borrower and lender δp, minus the total value of the loan (proportional size of the 
loan l , times the number of speculators S, times the profit from attacking the market p* - f(θ) – 
tp). Thus, the intervention will succeed if only if the following conditions are met: 
0*),(),( −−− cclcv pe   
0))(*(**),( −−−− fppe tfpSlccv  , and  
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lc  −−= *  
Where: 
πL: is the lenders payoff from a successful intervention 
λ: is the modifier representing the effect of l on θ* such that Δθ*(l) = λl 
This gives the bailout package (l*, c*) if and only if πL ≥ 0 otherwise no bailout 
agreement is reached and the intervention fails. If such a solution exists, then it can take one of 
two forms. The first is a tangency solution given by figure 11, where the lender chooses his 




). The second is a corner solution given by figure 12, where the 
bailout package (l*
c






















Figure 11: Corner Solution 
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) but the 
best possible package is (l*
c
, c ), such that l*L > l*c and c*L < c  as a result of this the lender 
receives a lower payoff then if it there was not a upper limit on c (π’L ≥ πL ). 
2.8 Conclusion 
Therefore adding domestic and market press to the process of negotiating a bailout 
agreement we get a much richer picture of the process. In particular it becomes clear that 
governments facing a crisis are not necessarily helpless nor are domestic pressures ignored. Of 
course this does not mean that every government receives a bailout package that it is perfectly 
happy with nor that all domestic concerns are always dressed but it does show that both 
governments and their citizens are not simply at the mercy of International Lenders of Last 




Chapter 3: Policy Learning in Monetary and Financial Cooperation 
 
The recent financial crisis has been protracted and very costly thus clearly demonstrating 
the vulnerability of the global economic system. As a result, international efforts are underway to 
prevent similar crises in the future. These fall into two broad categories. The goal of the first is to 
fix the ‘rules of the game.’ That is, to improve financial markets regulation and promote 
discipline in macroeconomic policy. The aim of the second is to establish a global ‘early warning 
system’ through institutions such as the IMF. Surveillance, it is hoped, will allow policymakers 
to identify and deal with future problems before they develop into crises. 
However, international macroeconomic cooperation in this scale is not easy. Aside from 
collective action problems, the most serious obstacles cooperation faces is arriving at a common 
conceptual framework about the nature of the problems that have to be dealt with and the best 
way of overcoming them. If there is no consensus then cooperation cannot happen. If that 
consensus is “incorrect” then cooperation will do more harm than good. 
Thus, the success of cooperation between policymakers crucially depends on the quality 
of the policy models they use. For this reasons understanding the process of policy learning is 
crucial. The goal of this paper is to examine this process in order to better understand how an 
appropriate policy consensus is reached. Specifically, it will look at the role that intentional 
institutions play in macroeconomic policy learning. 
3.1 Problems 
Macroeconomic cooperation plays a very important role in an open international 
economic system. Trade and financial flows are beneficial but they constrain policymakers, 
limiting their autonomy to peruse national economic priorities. The pursuit of national policies 
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can also cause negative externalities, policy spillovers which adversely affect other economies. 
Thus avoiding beggar-thy-neighbor policies is more difficult in an interconnected world. For this 
reason, international policy coordination is not only beneficial but is essential for maintaining the 
stability of the international economy.38 The four most common macroeconomic issues where 
states coordinate policy are the collective provision of crisis lending, coordinated exchange rate 
interventions, monetary policy coordination, and the harmonization of financial regulation.39 
Each one of these has its critics, but few would argue that no cooperation is desirable. At the 
very least, countries should strive to minimize the negative externalities their policy actions 
cause. 
Macroeconomic cooperation can be very difficult. Iida (1999: 8) makes the argument that 
there are two categories of cooperation failure. He terms the first abortive cooperation. This is 
the breakdown that most students of the international system are familiar with. Namely, the 
failure of cooperation due to collective action problems associated with buck-passing, domestic 
constrains, etc. The second problem Iida terms counterproductive cooperation. In this situation, 
cooperation breaks down because states find that cooperation produces no positive effects or 
they are actually made worse off through cooperation. 
Iida (1999: 10-12) identifies four explanations for counterproductive cooperation in the 
literature: uncertainty, third-party interference, domestic imperfections, and international power 
politics. The first refers to uncertainty about how the economy works and thus how best to deal 
 
38 For a more general discussion on the need for international economic cooperation see for example Ruggie (1983), 
Keohane (1986), Eichengreen (1995, 1996), and Bergsten and Henning (1996). 
39 Cooperation on financial regulation can also be seen as a microeconomic issue. However, given the affect of 




with current problems (see for example Frankel 1988 or Frankel & Rockett 1988).40 Third-party 
interference is the effect that actors not under the control of policymakers can have. This 
includes market participants such as financial institutions, foreign investors, trade unions, etc. As 
the rational expectation revolution in economic demonstrated, such actors can effectively 
neutralize a policy or cause outcomes not anticipated by policymakers (Rogoff 1995). Domestic 
imperfections refer to the possibility that policymakers may be captured by special interests. This 
can produce perverse incentives which lead policymakers to peruse a narrow interest at the 
expense of national welfare. Even worse, if similar interests capture policymakers in different 
countries, then international cooperation can exacerbate this problem (Feldstein 1988). Finally, 
powerful states can use their influence to persuade or coerce other states to adopt a particular set 
of policies out of the range of possible choices. In this scenario, the “cooperative” policy will 
benefit the powerful at the expense of other states (Krasner 1991). 
In his empirical examination of these four propositions, Iide finds the strongest empirical 
evidence in favor of uncertainty as the best explanation for counterproductive cooperation (1999: 
37-64). However, there is another reason why uncertainty is the focus of this analysis. Namely, 
in many cases the other three arguments can be collapsed into the problem of uncertainty. The 
economy is not an entity in and of itself. Rather it is the end result of aggregated individual 
actions. Therefore, the preferences, behaviors, and influence of a powerful state, narrow 
domestic interests, and market participants have to be factored into any effective policy model. 
Assuming that policymakers are not bribed or coerced, they will only engage in 
counterproductive cooperation if they are unaware that it will be counterproductive. 
 
40 Realist have argued that policymakers’ talk of uncertainly is just a disguise for other conflicts of interest. 
However, as Iide (1999: 100) points out, such arguments are difficult to prove or disprove but the burden of proof 
lies with those making the assertion. 
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Of course, this proposal is not without its problems. First, one can argue that making the 
assumption of no coercion or bribery is itself problematic. Both are important parts of the power 
politics and the domestic capture explanation. Second, collapsing everything into uncertainty can 
be undesirable because one is arguably gaining parsimony at the expense of explanatory power. 
However, the argument being made is not that uncertainty is the only fruitful avenue of 
investigation. Rather, uncertainty is the most fruitful one. 
3.2 Role of Ideas 
The argument that beliefs about how the monetary and financial system works influences 
intentional cooperation and it outcomes is not new.41 Ruggie (1983) gave a general framework 
for the role that ideas play in the establishment and change of international monetary-financial 
regimes. More specifically, a number of authors have explores the role that the ‘ideology of 
gold’ – i.e. the belief in the gold standard – played in maintaining the pre-WWI monetary 
standard (see Polanyi 1944/2001; Gallarotti 1993, 1995). 
Similarly, it is well established that policymakers’ commitment to the gold standard 
model dominated the Interwar Period in a largely negative way. The difficulties of this period 
were largely the result of the clinging to the belief in gold despite the fact that it was not longer 
appropriate due to the political and economic changes caused by World War I (Eichengreen, 
1992; Simmons 1994). Furthermore, Eichengreen (1992) has convincingly argued that the 
breakdown of international cooperation during the Great Depression was due to the divergence 
of conceptual frameworks, despite this commitment to gold. Finally, it was only after the 
 
41 At this stage it may be helpful to introduce a note on terminology. For the rest of this discussion the terms causal 
beliefs, policy models, and conceptual frameworks – the last being coined by Eichengreen (1992) – to refer to the 
beliefs policymakers hold about the international economy, the problems they face and how best to deal with them. 
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monetary system collapsed that policymakers finally abandoned their commitment to gold (Pauly 
1997). 
There have also been numerous studies of the impact of causal beliefs on the 
development of the postwar monetary system. Perhaps one of the best, and certainly most 
exhaustive, is James’ (1996) analysis of international monetary cooperation during and after the 
Bretton Woods system. Authors such as Krasner (1985), Pauly (1997) and Wade (2002) have 
explored the ideological dimensions of the conflict between developed and emerging economies 
and their impact monetary cooperation. Finally, Bergsten and Henning (1996) have argued that 
G7 monetary cooperation suffered from a ‘false’ consensus that policymakers should defer to 
markets in exchange rate policy. 
However, when discussing the role of ideas in macroeconomic cooperation, indeed any 
international cooperation, it is crucially important to keep in mind that the process by which 
ideas change is not uniform. Rather, we can distinguish between two very different changes to 
how governments conduct policy. The first are what we might call paradigm shifts. This is when 
the actor’s beliefs are dramatically changes. In term of Krasner’s (1983) famous definition of 
regimes as: “principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area,” a paradigm shift would be a dramatic change in the 
principles and norms of a regime. As Ruggie (1983) put is thus is a radical rethinking of the 
nature and purpose of a regime. Ruggie contrasted this with a change is the rules and decision 
making procedures, which are associated with changes in the balance of power. He called the 
former a change of regimes and the later change in regime. This is analogous to Kuhn’s (1962) 
argument about revolutions in the science.  
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Example of such intellectual policy transformations are the emergence of the Classic 
Liberalism in the late 19th Century, Embedded Liberalism under the Bretton Woods System, and 
Neo-Liberal after its collapse. Such transformations are relatively rare and they are very 
complex. Thus, Helleiner (2010: 622-25) argues that such transformation usually proceed in four 
stages. The first is a legitimacy crisis which fundamentally undermines the old order of things. 
This is followed by an interregnum, where policymakers experimented with new policies, 
usually independent from one another. The third phase is constitutive phase, when states come 
together to create a new order. Finally, there is the implementation phase.42 
However, the periods between these major transformations are not statics. Learning 
continues, but it is more conservative; that is it is constrained by the dominant principles and 
norms of the regime. In these periods policy models are adapted and refined to deal with real 
world problems, which are inevitable. This second type of ideational change is analogous to 
Kuhn’s notion of “normal science,” where scientist develop their theories to deal with existing 
puzzles but do not challenge the established paradigm. While, this process is not a dramatic as a 
paradigm shift it is nevertheless an important aspect of policymaking. 
In fact, this second type of learning is very similar to the interregnum stage of a paradigm 
shift. The main difference between them is the extent to which basic assumptions are questioned. 
In fact, it also has to be realized that the boundary between a legitimacy crisis and an 
interregnum may only be clear in retrospect. This is because a legitimacy crisis is not one 
moment but rather a protracted period in which old policies begin to fail dramatically and new 
ones are sought. Thus, while we may now think of the stock market crash of 1929 as the event 
 
42 Of course, this process does not have to take this exact form. As Helleiner (1994), Abdelal (2007) and Chwieroth 
(2009) have noted, the creation of the post Bretton Woods regime not a product of a conference and this did not 




that triggered the great depression and lead policymakers to seek new answers, this view is base 
on retrospect. Between the 1929 and the banking crisis of 1931 which transformed a recession 
into a depression,43 most policymakers had not abandoned their old models. It was only after this 
crisis and the collapse of the gold standard that the interregnum began. Similarly, even the 
unilateral decision for the US to suspend gold convertibility did not automatically convince 
everyone that the era of fixed exchange rates was over. 
3.3 Policy Cooperation 
Thus, in practice the distinction between the two learning processes is not always clear. 
In fact, it remains an open question whether we are currently facing a paradigm shift in the area 
of financial policy and specifically the relationship between government and financial markets. 
Certainly the American sub-prime mortgage crisis was a shock to the international system; much 
more so than any crisis since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System. But it remains to be 
seen whether it is a legitimacy crises which will lead to a transformation of the international 
financial system. The Asian crisis of 1997/98 was also a major shock and lead many to call for a 
transformation of the international finance. Yet, many saw the crisis as the result of problems 
with the countries hit by the crisis not with the system as a whole. Today, especially in the US, 
there are many whole blame government interference in financial markets, not the markets 
themselves, for the crisis. As was noted above, it took years of economic difficulties in the 1930s 
and the 1970s before a genuine legitimacy crises emerged in the minds of policymakers. 
The current period has been difficult, however it remains to be seen whether it marks the 
pushing back of Neo-Liberalism and the creation of a new Embedded-Liberalism or some other 
system. Thus, it is unclear whether were are at the beginning of an interregnum (a period of 
 
43 See chapter two. 
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experimentation which leads to a transformation) or simply a more modest process of policy 
adaption to fix problems in the current system.  
What is certain, however, is that the members of the G20 have agreed that policy 
coordination and cooperation will remain the key not only to their response to the current 
economic crisis and their attempts to reform the system to prevent future crisis, but also for their 
interaction for the foreseeable future. To this end, the G20 has straightened IMF and given it the 
primary responsibility to monitor the international economic and monetary system in order to 
identify problems before they have a chance to develop into serious crises. They have also 
expanded and transformed the FSF into the FSB, making it responsible for guiding the financial 
reform efforts. In addition, the Basel Commission has also played a key role in the process to 
reform bankin systems around the world. 
Thus, this issue of how policymakers learn and the role that international institutions play 
in this process is of the outmost importance today. There are disagreements among G20 
policymaker about how best to deal with regulatory reform, international imbalances, and the 
exchange rate system. Cooperation on these issues since November of 2008, when the G20 first 
pledged to deal with them, has been sustained but very difficult. Certainly, this is due in large 
part to disagreement on how the costs of adjustment should be born. However, there are also 
genuine disagreements on both positive and normative questions. These have not only affected 
G20 cooperation, but also the reaction of markets and domestic political actors. G20 policy 
coordination, especially on issue of financial regulation and surveillance, is going to remain a 
work in progress. This process will have to adapt to future developments, and will likely be a 
process of trial and error. Policy learning will be at the heart of this effort. 
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3.4 Learning and Policy Models 
So why are conceptual frameworks so important? Macroeconomic policy models are 
beliefs about the way in which the domestic and the international financial system function and 
the role that governments can, or should, play in maintaining the stability and growth of these 
systems. They are tools that policymakers use to: interpret information; make predictions about 
the likelihood of future states; decide what actions are possible; and how best to achieve their 
goals (Eggertsson 1999; Lindsay 2000). If there is a divergence in the models policymakers use 
then cooperation will not be possible. Even worse, if the policymakers share beliefs about the 
economy that do not reflect reality, then cooperation will do more harm than good. 
Of course, policymakers are well aware of these problems and they devote substantial 
resources to making sure the models they use are appropriate. However, the divergence of 
conceptual frameworks from each other and form reality still happens for a number of reasons. 
First, like most policy areas, the monetary-financial system is complex and evolving. Second, 
switching models is costly and entail risks. Therefore, one should expect a conservative bias 
among policymakers that favors small adjustment of tested models over dramatic change. Third, 
there are also significant psychological obstacles to learning, especially in groups (Denzau & 
North 1994). In general, people are more likely to learn more from big events than they do from 
small ones and are more likely to learn from events that they directly experienced then from the 
experience of others (Jervis 1976; Reiter 1996; Eggertsson 1997). Thus, it may sometime take 
the direct experience of a crisis before policy models can be modified. Finally, policy models not 
only inform decision-making but they also process and interpret information (Eggertsson 1999: 
93). This means that policymakers often ignore or discount information that is incompatible with 
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their causal beliefs. Thus, policy models are in part responsible for hampering their own 
evolution. 
Modeling the learning process by which policy models change is important. The 
contribution of this analysis is to propose a general model by which causal belief change. In a 
recent review of the literature of learning Dunlop & Radaelli (2010: 6-7) used two variables to 
construct a typology of learning: problem tractability and certification of actor or venue. The 
former is nature of the uncertainty in the learning problems; i.e. what needs to be learned. The 
latter is the level of authority and legitimacy of some key actors; i.e. the “teacher.” This teacher 
is the source of new information and its interpretation. 
The problem of macroeconomic policy learning will be examined through three models. 
In each of these the problem tractability will remain the same. That is, in each case policymakers 
will be uncertain about whether the policy framework they are using is appropriate. Each version 
of the model of learning will vary in terms how policymakers receive information. That is, their 
teacher will change in each. The first is a social learning model in which playmakers can observe 
the action of their colleagues. The final two models introduce direct information sharing through 
international institutions. 
Institutions have long been recognized in the literature as important sources of 
information in the international system. In addition, current efforts to shore up the international 
economic system depend heavily on institutions such as the G20, IMF, Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), Financial Stability Board (FSB), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), and others. The ability of these institutions to help guide future reforms of the 
international system depends on their ability to guide the policy learning process. 
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International intuitions can play two distinct roles in the learning process. They can be a 
forum for the exchange of idea. They can also be an independent source of information. 
Institutions such as the G20, FSB and BCBS are example of the former. The theoretical 
advantage that such forums have over social learning is that they should be able to speed up the 
process dramatically. Examples of the second include international financial institution (IFIs) 
such as the IMF and the BIS. Such institution can act as an independent information source 
because they have technocratic expertise, much like domestic central banks of treasures, which 
they can draw on. In addition, because their focus is international rather than national, the 
information they provide to states is different than the type of information that states share in 
forums such as the G20. However, while institutions provide a valuable contribution to policy 
learning, they are not a panacea for the problems arising from uncertainty. 
3.5 Model I: Learning through Observation44 
In this model there are N player, which represent governments that have to decide 
whether to stick with their existing macro policy models or to adopt new measures. Policymakers 
are not sure whether the system has change and therefore warrants the adoption of new tools (the 
structure of information is described below). It is further assumed that there is a fixed numbered 
of periods T in which the players can make a onetime decision to make the switch to a new 
policy model.45 Before the first period, nature decided randomly and for the duration of the game 
 
44 The basic model of social learning is adopted from Chamley (2003, 2004b, 2004a). 
45 One could argue that the fixed number of time periods and a onetime decision to change models are not realistic 
assumptions since government can change policy at any time and the onset of a crisis is often unpredictable. The 
unpredictability of the onset of a crisis is especially problematic since in this model there is uncertainty about 
whether current policy responses are appropriate. However, adding uncertainty about the end of the game does not 
dramatically change the results of this model and would simply add complexity. This is addressed in a little more 
detail in the last part of this section when expansions to the model are addressed. With respect to the assumption that 
the switching decision can only be made once and is irreversible, this is not unrealistic give the cost of switching and 
the inertia of the decision to switch discussed above. 
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whether a switch in policy is appropriate by choosing the value of 𝜃 ∈ {𝜃0, 𝜃1}, such that 𝜃0 <
𝜃1. Without loss of generality, the values are set as: 
𝜃1 = 1  The “New State,” which means that a policy change is appropriate, and 
𝜃0 = 0  The “Old State,” which means that a policy change is not appropriate 
The state of nature is not perfectly observable, rather at the beginning of the first period 
each government is given a onetime private signal (i.e. private information) about the state of 
nature which is not observed by the other players. Each country uses its signal along with some 
common knowledge in the system to form its private belief 𝜇𝑖, which is that government’s 
probability assessment of whether a policy switch is appropriate or not. The initial distribution of 
private beliefs is defined by a cumulative distribution function 𝐹1
𝜃(𝜇).46 Thus in the first period 
the distribution of beliefs is supported by the bounds (𝜇1, 𝜇1). These bounds can be infinity but 
must be independent of 𝜃. The distribution must satisfy the condition of compatibility with the 
Bayesian framework.47 If they satisfy the condition of compatibility, then they satisfy the 
following assumption of fist order stochastic dominance. 
Assumption 1: For any 𝜇 ∈ (𝜇1, 𝜇1), 𝐹1
1(𝜇) < 𝐹1
0(𝜇). 
In the last period (i.e. in period T + 1), it is revealed to governments whether the policy 
change was appropriate and each receives the following payoffs: 
If they decided to switch policy response:  
𝑁−𝑛𝑇
𝑁
𝛿𝑡−1(𝜃 − 𝑐) 
 
46 For simplicity and without loss of generality it is assumed that this cumulative distribution function is 
differentiable. 
47 For example if they have density 𝑓1 and 𝑓0 in the two state then 𝑓1(𝜇) 𝜇⁄ = 𝑓0(𝜇) (1 − 𝜇)⁄ . 
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If they decided not to switch:    0 
Since the key to the problem is whether it is appropriate to switch, normalizing the payoff 
of doing noting to 0 does not affect the outcome of the model. Thus the payoff of switching 
depends on three factors: 
1) 𝜽 − 𝒄 (Core payoff of the decision to switch):  For simplicity the model assume that the 
benefit of switching is given by the state of nature 𝜃 ∈ {0,1} and that the cost of 
switching is 0 < 𝑐 < 1.48 Since 𝜃 ∈ {0,1}, if the policy switch was appropriate the payoff 
is 1 − 𝑐 > 0 and if it was inappropriate the payoff is −𝑐. Thus it is always best to switch 
if the government face a new state of nature and inappropriate if they do not, regardless 
of what other governments have done. 
2) 𝜹𝒕−𝟏 (Timing of the switch):  Where 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1. The model assumes that the sooner a 
government is able to make the switch the fewer problems it will face in the new policy 
environment. This also means that switching early will be more costly if governments are 




 (Coordination of the switch):  Where 𝑛𝑇 is the number of governments that have not 
made the switch by the end of the game. This is introduced to capture the benefits of 
coordinating policy. As was argued above, since this model assumes that all governments 
 
48 There are a couple of ways to interpret the cost of switching as discussed above: 1) the psychological costs of 
changing your causal beliefs, which may be high, particularly in a group setting such as a government agency; 2) 
actual cost of making the switch which may include institutional reorganizations and retraining, the obsolescence of 
assets that are not longer useful under the new regime and the acquisition of new one, and of course the political cost 
of making such a decision (especially if there is uncertainty about its appropriateness); 3) the opportunity cost of 
changing policy. This final conceptualization of the cost of switching is the most appropriate for this model. 
Namely, if a government is in the “New State” the switch is appropriate but if it is in the “Old State” then it is not 
and the government will suffer from using inappropriate policies. 
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are linked to the international economy, their payoff for making an appropriate switch 
depends on whether other have done the same. 
Nature gives no new information and individual update their beliefs by observing the 
actions of other. In each period, a government can make a onetime irreversible decision to switch 
to a new policy regime. This decision is based on the government’s updated beliefs for that 
period. These updated beliefs consist of the beliefs at the beginning of the last periods and an 
update based on observed policy switches made by other governments in that period. Thus, in 
each period the government knows its initial beliefs (based on the signal it received and common 
knowledge) and the history ℎ𝑡 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑡+1), where 𝑥𝑘 is the number of governments that 
made the policy switch in period 𝑘. 
As was noted above, the only decision that the government can make in each period is 
whether to make a policy switch. For simplicity, only symmetric equilibria and pure strategies 
will be considered. Given the initial distribution of Beliefs 𝐹1
𝜃(𝜇) and the history ℎ𝑡, a strategy in 
period 𝑡 is defined by the investment set 𝐼𝑡(ℎ𝑡) of beliefs of all switching agents. Thus the 
government switches its policy model in period 𝑡 if and only if 𝜇𝑡 ∈ 𝐼𝑡(ℎ𝑡), where 𝜇𝑡 is the 
government’s belief at the beginning of that period. In an equilibrium, governments who are 
indifferent between switching and not switching will be of measure zero and are ignored. 
At the end of a given period of the game 𝑡, governments observe 𝑥𝑡: the total number of 
governments that have made the switch in that period. Individual updating of beliefs transforms 
the distribution of belief from 𝐹𝑡
𝜃 to 𝐹𝑡+1
𝜃 . At the beginning of the next period the government 
that remain in the game 𝑛𝑡, using their information and the equilibrium strategies of all agent for 
any future date and future history, choose a strategy that maximizes their expected payoff. The 
government switches to the new policy regime if and only if the decision to switch is greater than 
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the decision to delay the switch. If the government is indifferent between switching and not 
switching the model assumes that it will not switch.49 The model focuses only on symmetric 
subgame perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). 
This Bayesian updating can be expressed as a Log likelihood Ration (LLR) of the new 
verses the old policy environment. For each private belief 𝜇𝑖there is a corresponding LLR, which 
is increasing in 𝜇𝑖:
50 




So if in periods 𝑡 there are 𝑛𝑡 governments that have not made the switch and 𝑛𝑡 is common 
knowledge, these government will make the switch in this period if and only if their 𝜆𝑡 ∈ 𝐼𝑡 (i.e. 
their LLR is an element of the investment/switching set in that period). In each period, after 
observing the number of policy switches made (i.e. 𝑥𝑡), each government’s LLR is updated from 
𝜆𝑡 to 𝜆𝑡+1 as follows: 










𝑛𝑡−𝑥𝑡, 𝜋𝜃 = 𝑃(𝜆𝑡 ∈ 𝐼𝑡|𝜃).   (1) 
Because strategies are symmetric all government update their individual LLRs by the same 𝜁𝑡 
value. This means that the distributions of LLRs at any point in time for any two governments 
will differ by their initial difference. 
 
49 This in part reflects the risks of switching under uncertainty and the conservativism of policymakers discussed 
previously. 
50 For simplicity the government index 𝑖 will be ignored for the rest of the analysis. 
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Lemma 1: Let the LLRs of any two governments at 𝑡 = 1 by 𝜆1 and 𝜆1
′ . The for any 𝑡 > 1, their 
LLRs in period 𝑡 are such that:  𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡
′ = 𝜆1 − 𝜆1
′  
Given a state 𝜃, the distribution of beliefs in LLRs in period 𝑡 is generated by a translation of the 
initial distribution by a random variable 𝑧𝑡. 
Because of the discount factor, the only reason for a government to delay its decision to 
switch is in order to get more information. However, governments that have a strong belief that 
the policy environment has changed have more to lose and relatively little to gain from delaying 
the switch. This property restricts the model to monotone equilibrium strategies. This greatly 
simplifies the analysis: 
Lemma 2 (monotone strategies): In any arbitrary period 𝑡 of a PBE, if the payoff of delay for an 
agent with belief 𝜇𝑡 is at least equal to the payoff of no delay, any government with belief 𝜇𝑡
′ <
𝜇𝑡 strictly prefers to delay. Equilibrium strategies are monotone: governments who delay in 
period 𝑡 have a belief 𝜇𝑡
′ ≤ 𝜇𝑡 for some 𝜇𝑡
∗ which may be equal to 𝜇𝑡. 
Let 𝜇𝑡
∗ be the minimum belief needed to make a policy switch. Since no government will 
make a stitch if the cost of switching is greater than their beliefs about the likelihood of being in 
the new state this means that 𝜇𝑡
∗ ≥ 𝑐. The support of beliefs in period 𝑡 is (𝜇𝑡, 𝜇𝑡), so if no 
governments makes the policy switch in period 𝑡 then one can define the equilibrium strategy as 
𝜇𝑡
∗ = 𝜇𝑡. 
The existence of a nontrivial equilibrium in the subgame which begins in period 𝑡 
depends on the payoff of the most optimistic agent (i.e. 𝜇𝑡 − 𝑐). This is given by the next lemma: 
Lemma 3 (Conditions for positive investment): In any period 𝑡 of a PBE: 
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(i) If 𝑐 < 𝜇𝑡, then any equilibrium strategy 𝜇𝑡
∗ is such that 𝑐 ≤ 𝜇𝑡
∗ < 𝜇
𝑡
. If there is a least 
one remaining player, the probability of at least one investment in period 𝑡 is strictly 
positive. 
(ii) If 𝜇𝑡 ≤ 𝑐 , then with probability 1 there is not investment in any period 𝜏 ≥ 𝑡. 
In order to make the switch the government must take into account the strategies of all 
other governments in all future periods, which can become very complicated. However, since 
strategies are monotone, any equilibrium is just a sequence of consecutive two-period equilibria 
each of which can be determined separately. 
Lemma 4 (series of two-period equilibria): If the equilibrium strategy 𝜇𝑡
∗ of a PBE in period t is 
an interior solution (𝜇𝑡 < 𝜇𝑡
∗ < 𝜇
𝑡
), then an agent with belief 𝜇𝑡
∗ is indifferent between switching 
in period 𝑡 and delaying to make a final decision in period 𝑡 + 1. 
The government compares the payoff of switching immediately (i.e. 𝜇 − 𝑐) with that of 
delaying until the next period (i.e. 𝑊(𝜇, 𝜇∗), where 𝜇∗ is the strategy of other). From Lemma 4 
and the Bayesian formulae (1) with 𝜋𝜃 = 1 − 𝐹𝜃(𝜇∗), the function 𝑊 is well defined. An 
interior equilibrium strategy must be the solution of the arbitrage equation between the payoff of 
immediately switching and that of delaying: 
𝜇∗ − 𝑐 = 𝑊(𝜇∗, 𝜇∗) 
The equation has a solution if the cost of switching (i.e. 𝑐) is within the boundaries of the 
support for beliefs, as shown by the next lemma: 
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Lemma 5: In any period, if the cost 𝑐 is in the support of the distribution of beliefs, i.e. 𝜇 < 𝑐 <
𝜇, then there exists 𝜇∗ > 𝑐 such that 𝜇∗ − 𝑐 = 𝑊(𝜇∗, 𝜇∗): an agent with beliefs 𝜇∗is indifferent 
between switching and keeping the status quo policies. 
These lemmata allow us to characterize the PBE and by forward induction show the 
existence of all PBE: 
Theorem 1: In any period 𝑡 where the support of private beliefs is the interval (𝜇𝑡, 𝜇𝑡): 
(i) If 𝜇𝑡 ≤ 𝑐, then there is a unique PBE with no agents make a policy switch in period t 
or any subsequent period. 
(ii) If 𝜇𝑡 < 𝑐 < 𝜇𝑡, then there is at least one PBE with strategy 𝜇
∗ ∈ (𝑐, 𝜇𝑡). 
(iii) If 𝑐 ≤ 𝜇𝑡, then there is a PBE with 𝜇
∗ = 𝜇𝑡 in which all remaining players switch in 
period t. 
In cases (ii) and (iii) there may be multiple equilibria. The equilibrium strategies 𝜇∗ ∈
(𝜇𝑡, 𝜇𝑡) are identical to the solution of the arbitrage equation: 
𝜇∗ − 𝑐 = 𝑊(𝜇∗, 𝜇∗)         (2) 
They are such that 𝜇∗ > 𝑐. 
The value of switching in any given period is given by the difference between switching 
in that period versus switching for sure in the next periods: (1 − 𝛿)(𝜇 − 𝑐). The value of 
delaying is the expected value of not switching in the next period, or keeping the option not to 
switch. The belief 𝜇∗ of a marginal government is defined by the equality between the 
opportunity cost and the option value of the delay is the value of keeping the option of not 
switching in the next period if: 
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Proposition 1 (Arbitrage): If 𝜇∗ is an equilibrium strategy with 𝜇𝑡 < 𝜇
∗ < 𝜇𝑡 in a game with 
𝑛 ≥ 2 remaining players, then it is the solution of the arbitrage equation between the 
opportunity cost and the option value: 
(1 − 𝛿)(𝜇 − 𝑐) = 𝛿𝑄(𝜇∗, 𝜇∗) 
with 




× 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑐 − 𝑃(𝜃 = 𝜃1|𝑥 = 𝑘, 𝜇, 𝜇
∗, 𝐹𝜃, 𝑛), 0),    (3) 
where 𝑥 is the number of governments that switched to the new policy model in this period. 
𝑄(𝜇, 𝜇∗) is a “regret function” which depends on the governments beliefs, 𝜇, the strategy 
of other governments, 𝜇∗, and the cdfs 𝐹𝜃 at the beginning of the period. This regret function is 
the expected value of the amount the government would be prepared to pay in order to undo its 
investment at the beginning of the next period, which is the cost of the switching minus the value 
of the new policy model after receiving bad news. 
Proposition 2 (The case of worst news): In any period 𝑡 of a PBE for which the equilibrium 
strategy 𝜇𝑡
∗ is interior to the support (𝜇𝑡, 𝜇𝑡), if 𝑥𝑡 = 0, then 𝜇𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑐 and the game stops at the 
end of period 𝑡 with no further investment in any subsequent period. This means that in a game 
with 𝑁 governments will last at most 𝑁 periods. 
3.6 Model II: Learning through International Conferences 
Suppose now that the governments have the option to share their signals through a 
conference. Specifically, suppose that during the first period, after they have received their 
private signal about 𝜃, governments have the options of sharing their signal by sending a 
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message 𝑚𝑖. There are three different pieces of information such a message could convey: 1) 
each government’s private signal 𝑠𝑖, 2) each governments private belief after receiving that 
signal 𝜇𝑖, or 3) each governments expected payoff from the switch 𝜇𝑖 − 𝑐. However, since the 
cost of making the policy switch 𝑐 and the common beliefs that governments use along with their 
signal to form their private beliefs are common knowledge these three messages are equivalent. 
Thus for simplicity it is assume that at the conference government reveal their private signal 
about the state of nature 𝜃, 𝑚𝑖(𝑠𝑖) ∈ {0,1}. 
In terms of social learning at the conference, if we assume that the conference takes place 
at time 𝑡 then each government’s LLR will be updated as follows: 




𝑀𝑡 is the number of government that say they received a signal to switch policy regimes 










𝑁𝑡−𝑀𝑡 , 𝜋𝜃 = 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ∈ 𝐻|𝜃).   (1) 
So two key questions that come out of this new set up are: 1) Will policymakers tell the 
truth at the conference? 2) Will policymakers delay: either in their decision to hold the 
conference or in their decision to invest after the conference is held. 
Lemma 6 (conference truth-telling): If governments have the opportunity to share their private 
signs, each government will engage in truth-telling, 𝑚𝑖(𝑠𝑖) = 𝑠𝑖 
This model does not assume that there are any reputational or other such benefits from 
telling the truth. However, because this game is a game of coordination on the right equilibrium, 
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the payoff depend on both what others do and what is the likely best course of action given the 




𝛿𝑡−1(𝐸[𝜃] − 𝑐)𝑥 
Where 𝑥 = {0,1} is the decision to switch or not. Assume that if all private signals are revealed 
truthfully at the conference then each government’s beliefs are given by ?̂?𝑖 such that: 
𝑁 − 𝑛𝑇
𝑁
𝛿𝑡−1(?̂?𝑖 − 𝑐)𝑥𝑖 
The value of ?̂?𝑖 depends on whether governments honestly reveal their signals at the conference 
or not. However, if the government decides to deviate from truth-telling (given that all other 
governments tell the truth) this decision will not affect its assessment of ?̂?𝑖 since it knows its own 
signal. The value of the conference is in revealing the signals of others and using this to get a 
better idea of whether the government is dealing with a new or an old policy environment. In 
terms of the core payoff of policy switching, truth-telling entails no costs and deviating from 
truth-telling confers no advantage to the government. However, the government’s payoff is not 




). Thus, in this model the government might have an incentive to deviate from 
truth-telling in order to get other governments to take the same action it has. But at the time of 
the conference its best assessment of it payoff is given by 
𝑁−𝑛𝑇
𝑁
𝛿𝑡−1(𝜇𝑡 − 𝑐)𝑥𝑡. Since the 
government can only give a signal of 𝑚𝑖 ∈ {0,1} it cannot easily manipulate information. The 
only governments that might be tempted to lie are those that received a good signal 𝑠 = 1 but for 
whom 𝜇𝑡 − 𝑐 < 0 or those that received a bad signal 𝑠 = 0 but for whom 𝜇𝑡 − 𝑐 > 0. However, 
as long as there is not a large cluster of governments whose 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑐 or if they are symmetrically 
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distributed on the whole there should be truth-telling. Of course, if governments are not limited 
to binary singles, but rather share probability assessments, there is more room for manipulation. 
However, in this case, since 𝑐 and prior beliefs are common knowledge, as assumed above, the 
ability of governments to manipulate this information will be greatly limited. 
Before moving on to the question of timing, it should also be pointed out that the fact that 
payoffs are contingent on what other governments do (i.e. payoffs depend on 
𝑁−𝑛𝑇
𝑁
) is not really 
necessary for truth-telling. As long as there is no cost to telling the truth and lying confers not 
strategic advantage then truth-telling should prevail. This is the case in this model. 
Lemma 7 (investment timing after the conference): Once private signals are revealed, all policy 
switches that take place in the game will take place in the period immediately after the 
conference. 
Remember from Section 3 that the only reasons governments would want to delay in this 
game is if delaying provides information (see lemma 2). And according to Lemma 6, there is 
truth-telling at the conference. This means that all relevant information is revealed at the 
conference and there is no reason to delay after the conference. It should also be clear that for the 
same reasons there is no reason to delay the conference once the game begins since there is a 
cost to delaying and the conference is a very effective and efficient way of conveying 
information. From the above we can define the equilibrium as follows: 
Theorem 2: In the period 𝑡 = 1 where the support of private beliefs is the interval (𝜇1, 𝜇1): 
(i) If 𝜇1 ≤ 𝑐, then there is a unique PBE with no agents making a policy switch. 
(ii) If 𝜇1 < 𝑐 < 𝜇1, all government for whom ?̂?
∗ > 𝑐 will switch to the new policy regime 
all other will stay with the old regime 
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(iii) If 𝑐 ≤ 𝜇1, then there is a PBE with 𝜇
∗ = 𝜇1 in which all remaining players invest in 
period t. 
Because of the ability to share information and coordinate this model does not have multiple 
equilibria. 
3.7 Model III: Leaning through IFI Advice 
This final model builds on the previous two by adding an international institution that 
acts as an expert which provides governments with additional information about the policy 
environment they are in. It is assumed that the international institution (e.g. IMF or BIS) has a 
superior signal to that of governments. As noted in Section 2, the best way to think about the 
institution is as another participant in the conference but one whose message holds more weight. 
In this situation, the message of the IFI only matters if it differs significantly from the average 
signal revealed at the conference. The outcome of this model does not differ significantly from 
that outlined in the previous section and the equliibria of the model will be the same as outlined 
in Theorem 2, except that since the institution has a better signal and this signal differs 
significantly from that of the average government the outcome will more likely arrive at the right 
policy choice. 
The question then is does an IFI have an incentive to reveal its signal truthfully. If the IFI 
knows the individual signals that governments received it may be tempted to simply confirm this 
in order to please policymakers. The willingness of the IFI to tell the truth will depend on its 
payoffs. Two types of institutional payoffs will be examined in this section. First, where the IFI 
receives a payoff based sole on how well its message at the conference predicts the state of the 
word. This is valuable for the institution since it provided proof of its value to states, for which it 
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depend on its existence. The second is where the payoff directly depends on the payoffs of the 
governments. The logic here is similar. 
Proposition 3: If the institutions payoff is linked to the verification of its message in period 𝑇 then 
(i) If 𝜇1 ≤ 𝜇, it recommends a policy shift regardless of its private signal 
(ii) If 𝜇1 < 𝜇 < 𝜇1, it will give its true signal 
(iii) If 𝜇 ≤ 𝜇1, it will argue against a policy switch no matter what its signal 
If the Institution computes its payoff based on the verification by the governments then 
its payoff is given by 𝑣(𝑚,𝜃) ∈ {0,1} × {0,1} where 𝑚 is the message it sends and 𝛳 is the 
realization of the true state in period 𝑇. The institution then computes its payoff as follows: 
𝑉(, 𝑚) = 𝑃(𝜃1|𝑠, 𝜇)𝑣𝑚𝜃1 + 𝑃(𝜃0|𝑠, 𝜇)𝑣𝑚𝜃0      (4) 
where 𝑠 ∈ {𝑠0, 𝑠1} is the institution’s private signal and 𝜇 is public belief before the conference. 
Truth-telling is optimal only if strictly smaller then deviation from truth-telling. This gives us 
two compatibility constraints: 
𝑉(𝑠0, 𝑠0) ≥ 𝑉(𝑠0, 𝑠1) and 𝑉(𝑠1, 𝑠1) ≥ 𝑉(𝑠1, 𝑠0) 
From the expression for this is equivalent to 




This is because the institution wants its prediction to conform to the expectations of 
governments. Because it is rewarded if he predicts the true state, if prior beliefs are strongly in 
favor of one of the policy environments it will give the message to match the expected state 
regardless of its actual signal. 
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Proposition 4: If the institution payoff is liked the outcome governments’ policy decision in 
period 𝑇 then the institution has an incentive to tell the truth. 
If we think of the IMF as a benevolent social planner then it would be reasonable to 
imagine its payoffs as being defined as the average of the payoff of each government: 
∑ 𝛿𝑡−1
𝑁−𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1 (𝜃 − 𝑐)
𝑁
 
Knowing it has a superior signal it thus has an incentive to share that signal regardless of priors 
beliefs since its payoff is directly dependent on getting the policy decision right and not on 
matching the message to the outcome. This proposition follows from Lemma 6 above. 
3.8 Comparison of Leaning Processes 
The conclusion that comes out of this analysis is that institutions can be an essential tool 
to help governments solve coordination problem under uncertainty. Specifically, intuitions in the 
form of information exchanges (i.e. conference) allow government to share information more 
quickly and more completely then the process of social learning. However, they do not 
necessarily produce better outcomes then the process of social learning through observation. 
That is, while information exchange allow governments to coordinate quicker then social 
learning they do not significantly improve the likelihood that the right outcome is achieved (i.e. 
that the appropriate policy switch is made). But this is still a great improvement over the social 
learning process because in situations where timing is crucial, such as during an actual or 
potential crisis, being able to coordinate faster is of the utmost importance. 
Institutions can also aid in the learning process if they are a source of superior 
information. Institutions may be a source of such information because of their specialization and 
broader focus then those of individual governments. In fact, intuitions might even be able to 
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provide better information outside the structure of a formal conference. However, as with all 
agency problems the usefulness of intuitions in this regard crucially depends on how they are 
rewarded. It is of great importance that intuitions are rewarded based on the actual outcomes of 
their advice. To an extend this is the case with the IMF as its resources (i.e. the quotas of its 
members) in part depend on the continued wealth and prosperity of its members. Similarly the 
value of its assets is tied in to the prosperity of the international financial system. This means that 
the IMF has an interest in maintaining the stability and prosperity of the international system as a 
whole. This does not, however, mean that it is equally concerned with the prosperity of all its 
members. It may in fact be willing to provide advice that is very costly to some of its member if 
it feels that this will benefit the system as a whole, or at least the core of the system (i.e. the more 
important financial powers). 
Before concluding this section it is important to note two additional factors: the role of 
prior beliefs and the cost of cooperation. In all three models the outcome is heavily dependent on 
prior beliefs. While institutions facilitate learning they do not necessarily fix the problem of the 
weight of prior beliefs. Even an independent institution such as the IMF is subject to this 
problem. Even if it has better information about the need for policy change than governments, it 
may be unwilling to play an entrepreneurial role and encourage the adoption of new policy 
responses. IFIs are just as prone to the problems associated with learning as governments are. 
However, this is another issue in which a strong intuitional framework can improve conditions 
even if it cannot entirely remove the problem. With regular meeting and independent research by 




Of course, the value of information sharing and coordination also depends on the costs of 
these actions. As noted in Section 2 governments may be reluctant to share information is certain 
strategic situations. However, in terms of international finance this logic in not very compelling. 
With globalization and financial integration the value of coordination in financial policy has 
increased. This is in large part evidenced by the regular meeting of G7 and G20 Finance 
Ministers, both in the context of the IMF and independent of it.  But even when problems of 
cooperation arise this does not diminish the importance of coordination problems and, as was 
noted in the introduction, cooperation itself cannot happen unless there is a prior consensus about 
what kind of cooperation is necessary. 
Second, these regular meetings of the G7/G20 also highlight another problem of 
information sharing. Namely that as the number of participates at a conference increases so does 
the difficult of coming to a consensus. In fact, as the number of IMF member countries increased 
various smaller working groups were created to deal with this problem.51 Thus while conferences 
are useful, smaller “steering committees” may be essential for arriving at a consensus; especially 
the speed at which the consensus is reached is a factor. 
  
 
51 The number of these groups is rather large and includes, in chronological order, the G10, G5, G7, G22, G33 and 
G20. For a brief overview of these please consult http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm. 
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Chapter 4: A Theory of Global Financial Crisis Governance 
The goal of this chapter is to take the first step in examining the current international 
regime for dealing with financial crises. It will present a general argument about the necessary 
components for an effective regime based on the characteristic of the international financial 
system and the problems it faces. Thus, the primary research question being addressed is: what 
are the elements of an effective intentional crisis response regime? 
The aim is not to make broad normative arguments about what crisis governance 
structures should look like. Neither is it to attempt a comprehensive examination of all possible 
crises response regimes. In particular, this discussion will avoid evaluating regimes in terms of 
things such as their legitimacy (understudy in strictly normative terms), their ability to produce 
socially optimal outcomes, or their ability to prevent or preempt financial crises. These issues are 
of course important and will have to be addressed to some extent necessary. However, the 
primary question being asked is simply: what general governance arrangements are best able to 
mobilize resources in response to a financial crisis under the current political and economic 
realities of the international financial system? 
It will be argued that the optimal52 governance arrangement consists of a partnership 
between a concert of key financial powers and an International Financial Institutions (IFI) 
dedicated to maintaining financial stability. This setup allows for an effective division of labor 
which builds on the strengths of each institutional type. A concert is best able to maintain 
stability at the core of the financial system through information sharing, policy coordination and 
joint interventions when necessary. An IFI can help monitor the international financial system as 
a whole and deal with the outbreak of crises in low and middle-income countries. Finally, 
 
52 What makes an arrangement “optimal” is discussed detail in section three. 
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systemic crises are best dealt with through the coordinated efforts of the concert and IFI. For 
these reasons, a hybrid regime will perform better than regimes consisting unilateral action by 
either a concert or an IFI. 
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows. The next section will discuss the key 
characteristics of the international financial system and their implication for the argument 
presented here. Section two will discuss the need for global crisis governance. Section three will 
present the benchmark used for evaluating financial crisis governance. Section four will present 
the main theoretical argument of the paper. The final section will conclude. 
4.1 The Threat of Crises 
The nature of financial crises, the threat they pose, and the means of dealing with them 
have been discussed extensively in chapter one. The goal of this brief section is simply to 
highlight the three most relevant points from this discussion. The first is that there is no 
intentional financial system per se. That is, there is no single global financial market. Rather, 
despite increasing financial integration, the international financial system is still just a “system of 
systems” rather than a unified whole. This means that while domestic financial markets are 
increasingly interconnected, they are not fully integrated. This fact has important implications for 
the nature of international crises, how they spread, and the means that are available to deal with 
them. 
The problem this poses is the following. Because financial markets are integrated and 
capital is very mobile, national institution will often be unable to deal with international financial 
problems. However, national financial systems are still distinct in terms of how they operate (e.g. 
actors, services, and regulation) as well as in terms of their sophistication (i.e. size, complexity, 
92 
 
and level of diversification). Thus, there is a need for global financial crisis governance but there 
are limits to how much responsibility can be delegated to global institution. 
The second fact is that the international financial system is divided into a core and 
periphery.53 The core consists of the most important financial powers be they highly developed 
economies with highly sophisticated financial systems (e.g. the member of old the Group of 
Seven)54 or emerging economic powers with large financial reserves (e.g. the BRICS 
countries).55 The periphery consists of low and middle-income countries that are connected to the 
international financial system but which are not significant sources or destinations for 
international capital. However, this division is not a strict dichotomy but more of a continuum of 
countries in terms of their importance to the global financial system. 
This fact is important because of how capital behaves during financial crisis. In normal 
circumstance, capital will generally flow through the system seeking higher returns and 
diversification. However, during financial crisis, whether they take place in the core or the 
periphery, internationally mobile capital will invariably flow from the periphery to the core in 
search of safe heaves. This means that crisis in the core will always have an impact on the 
periphery but the reverse is not always true. In short, the periphery is more vulnerable to 
financial problems and less important to the overall stability of a financial system. 
The final fact that has to be kept in mind is that international crises come in a variety of 
forms, though it is most convenient to group them in terms of their impact as: national crises 
(with an international component), regional crises, and systemic crisis. The first two can be 
 
53 It is important to note that the use of the core-periphery terminology should not be taken to mean that the 
argument presented here is based on Dependency Theory. 
54 These are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and US. 
55 The original members of the BRICs were Brazil, Russia, India and China. Recently South Africa has been added 
to this list, which is now referred to as the BRICS countries. 
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devastating to the economies they affect but otherwise have only a modest impact on the system 
as a whole. Systemic crisis on the other hand are, by definition, a threat to the stability of the 
system as a whole. Thus, not all crises are created equal and not all financial problems will 
receive the same attention for the international community. 
4.2 Is There a Need for Crisis Governance? 
As Goodhart and Illing (2002: 21) point out, a national lender of last resort (LOLR) has 
to balance the current risk of a crisis (i.e. the threat of contagion) against the future risk of poorly 
executed crisis response (i.e. the threat of moral hazard: if access to crisis lending is too painless 
markets will discount the costs of future crises). There is a great deal of debate about whether it 
is possible or even desirable to create an International lender of last resort (ILOLR). The 
question of desirability centers on whether the benefits of an ILOLR outweigh the social 
inefficiencies and moral hazards that it produces. 
Whether it is possible to have an ILOLR rests in large part on how the term is defined. 
Unfortunately, the literature tends to be vague in its definition of this concept (Freixas et.al. 
1999: 152; Humphrey & Keleher 1984). Further, as Moggridge (1982: 173) points out, thinking 
about an international LOLR as a simple analog to national LOLR is misleading. Thus, many 
have criticized the concept on the ground that an ILOLR could not have the primary 
characteristic of a national LOLR. A national LOLR is the ultimate source of liquidity because of 
its ability to increase the money supply and raise taxes. Since there is no international authority 
with these powers there cannot be a true international LOLR (Capie 1998). 
However, supporters of an ILOLR point out that even in the domestic context this role is 
performed by a variety of institutions: finance ministries, central banks, even private actors 
(Marz 1982: 187; Kindleberger 1978/1996). None of these are a perfect LOLR because no 
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national actor has the ultimate authority over either taxation or the money supply. In fact, the 
move toward central bank independence is a conscious policy decision to limits the governments 
control over the money supply. Furthermore, the semantic argument misses the fact that when a 
crisis has an international dimension (i.e. when the liquidity shortage is a shortage of foreign 
exchange) then the national LOLR will have to turn to a source of foreign exchange (Goodhart & 
Illing, 2002: 20). Of course, crisis lending at the international level is complicated by the fact 
that there is no central authority that can coordinate multiple agents or enforce the repayment of 
loans, since the loan recipients are sovereign (Goodhart 1999; Goodhart & Illing 2002; Giannini 
2002). But, while this makes international crisis lending more difficult than at the national level, 
it does not make it impossible. 
Whether it is desirable to have an ILOLR depends on whether the benefits outweigh the 
costs. The primary benefit is that crisis lending can prevent international contagion. Some have 
questioned the value of this benefit, arguing that contagion is rare and that the moral hazard 
problems associated with bailouts are much more serious (see Capie 1998; Brealey 1999; Chari 
& Kehoe 1999; Schwartz 2002). Chapter one has already discussed the issue of contagion. 
Suffice it to say that, while the most serious cases of contagion are rare, contagion itself is not. In 
addition, the most serious cases of contagion have had grave consequences. 
However, even if the impact of most international crises is actually confined to one or a 
few countries, having an ILOLR is still beneficial. First, it is not always possible to determine ex 
ante whether a crisis poses a strategic risk. Second, there is theoretical and empirical evidence 
that, over the long-run, capital account liberalization leads to increased growth. Unfortunately, 
this increase is not smooth but follows a pattern of booms and busts (see Rancière et.al. 2003, 
2005, and 2006). A national LOLR in small open economies will likely have serious difficulties 
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coping with such crises. It would therefore be desirable to have a mechanism that helps national 
LOLR deal with the busts. 
But does crisis response enhance global welfare? Many have argued that it does not. 
Some claim that it simply serves the interests of the most powerful states (Gill 1993; Thacker 
1999; Wade 2002). Others have made the case that it favors wealthy international investors over 
both the poor in less developed countries (LDCs) and taxpayers in industrialized economies 
(Schwartz 2002; Goodhart & Illing 2002: 21). The latter are the ultimate source of liquidity used 
in crisis response. The former ultimately have to repay these loans. The burden that the poor in 
LDCs have to bear is particularly unfortunate since, unlike international investors, they have 
only a limited capacity to take preventive measures in case of a crisis. 
There is more than a little truth to these arguments (see for example Marz 1982: 191). 
But they also have to be put into context: while investors usually fare better during crises, this is 
due to their mobility and their importance to economic growth, not due to some inherent bias on 
the part of ILOLR (see Lindblom 1977; Strange 1986, 1998). Also, while investors fare better, 
their ability to get out of financial crises unscathed is largely exaggerated. Even successful crisis 
response entails risks for investors. Finally, the very fact that the poor are the most vulnerable to 
crisis suggests that they would not be made better off by scraping the idea of an ILOLR. Crises 
would still happen and they would still have a disproportioned impact on the most vulnerable. 
While the poor in LDCs may not have to pay back loans and bear the burden of conditionality in 
the absence of an ILOLR they would still face economic difficulties. It is certainly not the case 
that the most vulnerable are better off today due to the existence of institutions such as the IMF 
than their predecessors were in the 19th Century when no such institutions existed.56 In the end 
 
56 See chapter five for a more detailed discussion of this comparison. 
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these criticisms are important because they underscore the need to structure crisis lending in a 
way that minimizes social inefficiency, but they are not sufficient cause to reject an ILOLR in 
principle. 
The final question is how serious are the moral hazard problems produced by an ILOLR? 
Critics such as Brealey (1999) and Schwartz (2002) have argued that the very existence of an 
ILOLR is ultimately destabilizing because it increases the likelihood of future crises. However, 
we must keep in mind that financial crises often have serious economic and political 
consequences. It is hard to justify ignoring these for the sake of minimizing moral hazards. It 
would be like arguing that fire departments should be banned on the grounds that they promote 
laxity in fire safety and thus encourage fires. Even if this argument could be accepted in theory, 
in practice it would be hard to execute. It would be particularly hard to ignore a crisis that hit a 
country that was strategically important for economic or security reasons. This could undermine 
market confidence and may exacerbate financial problem is other countries. From a political 
perspective, this inaction could lead to resentment by trading partners and/or allies which could 
harm future relations. 
There is also a serious disconnect between concerns over loan conditionality and moral 
hazards. Some might object that, while the moral hazards affect international investors, the harsh 
conditions attached to crisis loans apply largely to the citizens of the affected country. But, as 
was already noted, it is not entirely true that investors are unaffected by crises. More importantly, 
the history of financial crises shows that investors do not have long memories, even in the case 
of very costly crises. This is especially true in the case of sovereign debt crises (Jorgensen & 
Jeffrey Sachs 1989; Fishlow 1989). But, even if investors are not subject to moral hazards, 
policymakers are. Politicians, especially in developing economies, have to bear the political cost 
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of both crises and loan conditionality. This should provide policy discipline, which should in turn 
reduce moral hazards on the policy side. Finally, moral hazards can be avoided through the 
choice of appropriate tools. For example, one way to do this is by engaging in open market 
operations rather than bailouts of specific institutions (Humphrey & Keleher, 1984; Goodhart & 
Illing, 2002: 2). This is because such operations allow markets, rather than a LOLR, to determine 
which investors will survive (Goodfriend & King, 1988; Kaufman, 1991). Therefore, like social 
inefficiency, moral hazards are a problem that must be dealt with. However, they are not, in and 
of themselves, a reason to stop international crisis lending. 
In addition to these risks, we must also keep in mind that crisis lending will not succeed 
every time, and if it fails it can make things worse (Marz 1982: 187). Thus, in the case of the 
Asian crisis in 1997/98 regional efforts failed and international efforts took a while to get the 
crisis under control. Similarly, the policies that accompanied IMF and World Bank aid during the 
Latin American Debt crisis of the 1980s have been blamed for the so-called “Lost Decade.” As 
serious as these failures are they should not be taken as proof that the global financial system is 
better off without an ILOLR. Policy failures can be worse than doing nothing, but this is not an 
argument for inaction but for better policy. 
Therefore, the negative aspects of an ILOLR must be managed, but the provision of crisis 
lending remains an important public good. Without an ILOLR, international crises would still 
have to be dealt with, but policymakers would have to rely on inferior ad hoc solutions (Solow 
1992; Fisher 1999; Goodhart 1999). 
4.3 A Benchmark for Evaluating Governance 
Before discussing the strengths and weakness of various crisis response structures, it is 
essential to establish a benchmark against which they can be evaluated. Unfortunately, studies of 
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international politics and foreign policy have not produced a uniformly applicable standard. The 
subfields of political theory and of domestic and comparative politics have a great deal to say 
about evaluating domestic institutions. Unfortunately, these insights are not directly applicable to 
the international level because the organizing principles of global governance are very different 
from those of domestic government. Thus a benchmark for evaluating crises response regimes 
has to be created. 
There are many dimensions of governance that could be considered. However, these will 
be narrowed down according to two criteria. First, for the sake of parsimony, only the most 
relevant dimensions will be considered. In this case, what is relevant is determined by the 
research question being asked: what general governance arrangements are best able to mobilize 
resources in response to a financial crisis under the current political and economic realities of the 
international financial system? Second, a reasonable benchmark should only compare 
governance types according to their inherent characteristics. Therefore, characteristics that can 
vary within each type will be ignored. For example, criteria such as competence or benevolence 
would not be a useful. The reason for this is that, despite some cherished and firmly held 
ideological prejudices, there is nothing inherent in private or public actors that make them 
inherently competent/incompetent or benevolent/malevolent. 
The benchmark will consist of two primary standards: effectiveness (which will be 
broken down further) and legitimacy. The former is a teleological standard. It asks whether a 
regime fulfills the purpose it was created for. This means of evaluation goes back to Plato and 
Aristotle.57 In our case, effectiveness is important because international regimes are created, or 
 
57 Plato argued for teleology in his dialog Phaedo and Aristotle includes it as one of his four causes in Metaphysics 
(1013a). In books II-IV of his Republic, Plato argued that an ideal state, and by analog a just/healthy soul, is one 
where each social class performs its own and only its own function. He further states in books VIII-IX, that when 
social classes abandon their respective telos, the result is the emergence of an unjust political order. Furthermore in 
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develop, to meet a particular need. Thus their ability to achieve their goal is the primary way of 
evaluating them (Beetham & Lord 1998: 12; Bayne 2003: 229-32; Bini Smaghi 2005: 325). 
The question of legitimacy is also important, but in this case not for normative reasons, at 
least not primarily. As Rousseau (1762/1990: 388) famously put it “The strong is never strong 
enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into 
duty.” Therefore, any governance arrangements, whether domestic or international, benefits from 
the active or tacit support of those who are affected by it. This is particularly important at the 
international level because there is no sovereign to support the actions of a LOLR. Remember 
that a national LOLR is the ultimate source of liquidity in the system because it can create 
liquidity through its control of taxation and the money supply. At the national level this 
ultimately rest on the sovereign’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. None of this exists at 
the international level. This is not to say that power, both economic and political/military, does 
not play a role. It of course does. However, at the international level the willingness of countries 
facing a crisis to turn to an ILOLR is essential. Again, this does not mean that the relationship 
between borrower and lender does not involve some level of coercion. In fact, simply by 
threatening to withhold aid an ILOLR can coerce a government facing a crisis. However, 
ultimately the job of an ILOLR is made easier if it can cooperate with the government facing a 
financial crisis.58 
Effectiveness: In discussing effectiveness, we must keep in mind that it does not mean a 
lack of crises. As discussed in chapter one, it is practically impossible to design a financial 
 
his Politics (1278b-1279a), Aristotle famously classified constitutions to “good” and “bad” according to whether they 
meet the aims of the state, which for him were to satisfy man’s social instinct and prepare him for a good life. 
58 This coercive aspect of an ILOLR and crisis lending are discussed in more detail in chapters four and six. 
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system that is crisis-proof. Rather, effectiveness means that governance is able to deal with crises 
when they do occur. Therefore, there are three aspects of effectiveness that we need to consider. 
The first is feasibility: the likelihood that a proposed regime can be created and 
maintained. This is important because, if a solution is not feasible, then advocating for it is little 
better than simply assuming away the problem it is supposed to solve. For crisis governance, 
feasibility means that a governance arrangement will have sufficient financial recourses, 
technical expertise and market influence to respond to the crises that fall under the preview of its 
scope (see below). 
The second aspect is efficiency, specifically, process efficiency: the ability of a regime to 
identify and respond to a crisis with the minimum of resources in the shortest possible time. 
Because crises are time sensitive liquidity problems, the efficiency of crisis response is essential 
for their resolution. One could also consider outcome efficiency as part of this standard, since 
section three outlined the social inefficiency and moral hazards problems associated with crisis 
interventions. However, while these are important, they are inherent to all LOLR activities 
regardless of which governance type is intervening. Therefore, only process efficiency will be 
considered as part of this general benchmark. 
The final aspect of effectiveness is scope: the range of crises the regime will be able and 
willing to deal with. As was noted in section two, there are at least three types of international 
financial crises and, because they pose different risks, they can be prioritized. Furthermore, 
since, as will be argued in the next section, the scope of crisis response varies systematically 
across difference governance types, it is appropriate to include scope in this benchmark. Scope 
can run from the minimal (i.e. dealing only with systemic threats) to the maximal (i.e. dealing 
with all crises). 
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Legitimacy: It may seem odd to include legitimacy in a benchmark which is supposed to 
be positive rather than normative in its evaluation. However, we must keep in mind that, as per 
Rousseau’s dictum that “right” is useful augment to “might.” Thus legitimacy here is used in a 
utilitarian sense. The question is not whether the regimes are legitimate but to what extent will 
the regimes be view as being legitimate by their ultimate users, which in this case means states. 
The reason state participation is privileged over the participation of other actors is because 
legitimacy in international politics still derives from the state and is only conferred on 
institutions by states (Moravcsik 1993). Of course, a number of scholars have argued that 
globalisation is transforming sovereignty (see for instance Pauly & Grande 2005), but it remains 
to be seen when and if states will stop being the ultimate source of legitimacy in the international 
system. 
Furthermore, during an international financial crisis states are still the primary actors. 
They are the national LOLR. The ILOLR, whether in the guise of a state, concert of states or an 
IFI, primarily if not exclusively deals with the government(s) facing the financial crises. 
Similarly, other actors, such as investors, citizens, opposition groups, etc., still focus their 
attentions on the actions of governments during a financial crisis. It is the action of states and 
their credibility which feature most prominently in the calculations of market actors. 
In this narrow sense legitimacy can be understood in two ways: output-legitimacy and 
input-legitimacy. A regime gains output-legitimacy if it is successful at dealing with financial 
crises. Since this aspect of legitimacy is a result of effectiveness, as discussed above, it will not 
be further considered. Therefore in evaluating legitimacy, this benchmark will use only one 
measure – input-legitimacy: the way in which states participate in regime decision-making. Thus, 
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a governance structure is legitimate in this sense in terms of how states are involved in regime 
decision-making. 
Based on the economic and power differences between states that input-legitimacy can 
take two forms:59 ‘democratic’ (i.e. one stare, one vote) or ‘oligarchic’ (i.e. input being directly 
proportional to contribution).60 There is a natural tension between these two forms and each will 
appear to different states. The latter will primarily appeal to financial powers and the former to 
less financial powerful states. Thus, according to this benchmark no regime or institution can 
meet both forms of legitimacy simultaneously. 
 
Table 1 
Benchmark for Evaluating Crisis Governance 
Effectiveness 
Feasibility 
Likelihood that a proposed regime can be 
created and maintained. 
Efficiency 
Ability of a regime to identify and resolve a 
crisis with the minimum of resources and in the 
shortest possible time. 
Scope 
The range of crises the regime will be able and 
willing to respond to. 
Legitimacy  
The way in which states participate in regime 
decision-making. There are two types: 
“Democratic:” one state, one vote 
“Oligarchic:” votes waited by contribution 
 
 
59 A potential third form of legitimacy might be termed consensual, i.e. where all states must agree to a decision. 
Alternative terms for this might be ‘anarchist’ or ‘libertarian’ legitimacy. This, at least in theory, hold true in some 
areas such as the trade regime and specifically the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, it is rare in this 
issue area so it will be ignored. 
60 The terms ‘democratic’ and ‘oligarchic’ are borrowed from Aristotle’s Politics (1280a-1281a), where he argued 
that democracy takes equality as its organizing principle while oligarchy favors inequality (i.e. political right should 
be proportional on wealth). We might also call ‘consensual’ legitimacy ‘anarchic’ for obvious reason. 
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Interconnectedness of Effectiveness and Legitimacies: It would be impossible for any 
governance structure to perfectly meet all of these criteria since a number of them are in conflict. 
Thus, as was noted above broadening the scope of crisis management will strain feasibility and 
efficiency. Similarly, there is an irresolvable tension between seeking ‘democratic’ as opposed to 
‘oligarchic’ input-legitimacy. Furthermore, seeking ‘democratic’ legitimacy will increase the 
number of participants, which will in turn exacerbate collective action problems, thus adversely 
affecting efficiency. Similarly, seeking ‘oligarchic’ legitimacy will likely narrow the scope of 
crisis governance to only the systematically most important crises. As we will see shortly, it is 
for these reasons that not pure governance structure can meet this benchmark. Rather, only a 
hybrid regime will be able to do so. Furthermore, a hybrid regime will be more successful than 
any individual pure structure. 
4.4 Possible Governance Structures 
It would be impossible to examine all possible means of dealing with the outbreak of 
international financial crises. Therefore, this section will focus on the most general governance 
“types” which can exist in this issue area. In order to do this, this section will look at possible 
structures in turn. These types were chosen because they represent the most common forms that 
international economic governance takes. 
Should Governance be Public or Private? Free banking advocates such as Timberlake 
(1984, 1993), Gorton (1985), Schwartz (1986, 2002) and Selgin (1988) have argued that a 
national LOLR is not necessary because markets can provide effective crisis management on 
their own. That private crisis response is superior because it is less likely to bailout insolvent 
actors, thus reducing moral hazard problems. In fact, they argue, it is primarily the government 
provision of LOLR facilities which inhibits the development of these more effective private 
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solutions. There is some empirical support for these arguments. Thus from 1857 to 1907 the role 
of a LOLR was filled in the US by private clearing-house associations. Similarly, the Scottish 
and Canadian banking systems were remarkably stable even before the establishment of their 
central banks in 1844 and 1935 respectively. 
Furthermore, scholars such as Schwartz (2002) contend that the private sector is also able 
to provide LOLR facilities to the international system, since the latter is now deregulated and 
flush with capital. There is some merit to this argument. First, there has been a transformation of 
sovereignty in which nation-states are no longer the sole providers of public goods but are 
increasingly outsourcing to private and international actors (Pauly & Grande 2005). Second, as 
the next chapter will show, there were a number of cases, especially in the 19th century and the 
Interwar Period, where the private sector played a prominent role in crisis response. 
However, even at the national level there are serious problems with the effectiveness of 
private crisis response. First, the stability of banking systems like that of Canada is built on two 
important characteristics. The banks in such systems tend to be small in number, large and 
diversified. They also tend to have close cooperative pre-crises relationships with each other, 
which help them coordinate their responses. Systems that do not have these characteristics, as is 
the case with the US (both historically and today), tend to be much less stable (Calomiris 2000). 
Second, market solutions will only be more efficient if the private sector has an 
information advantage over the central bank (Freixas et.al. 1999: 153). This is rarely the case. In 
fact, central banks often have a broader perspective on the national financial system as a whole 
and often have better information then individual market participants (see Berger et al 1998). 
Thus, while the market as a whole may have better information that the central bank, the central 
bank is often the best informed individual agent in the market. This, of course, is not to argue 
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that central bank always have an informational advantage, which of course they do not. 
However, we cannot forget that it is precisely during crises that the ability of market to 
effectively process information beak down and when market participant are more prone to non-
rational decision-making (see for example Chen 1999). 
Third, in acting as a LOLR private actors face serious collective action problems. The 
more market participants there are, and the lower their individual market influence, the more 
difficult the problem becomes. Thus it is often necessary for a central bank or other public actor 
to coordinate such responses (Rogoff 1999: 29; Goodhart & Illing 2002: 2). However, if a 
financial system, particularly the banking sector, is characterized by intense competition, then it 
becomes much harder to organize private crisis lending even with the help of a central bank. For 
example, during the 1980s private sectors bailouts became much harder to mobilize in both the 
US and UK due to deregulation and more intense competition (Freixas et.al 1999: 161). During 
the resent crises, the competitive nature of the US financial system meant that, when Lehman 
Brother faced collapse, its competitors were more interested in profiting from its troubles then 
providing assistance. 
All of these problems are intensified once we move to the anarchic international system. 
Private solution to international crises will be ad hoc and depend on a state or international 
organization to help them overcome collective action problems. More important, investors are 
more likely to attack then support distressed markets. 
Therefore, while the private sector can play a constructive role in crisis response, and 
should be utilized in crisis management whenever possible, it cannot play the role of an ILOLR. 
On its own, it fails in terms of effectiveness because it will faces serious collective action 
problems that make this solution both unfeasible and not very process efficient. Thus it is 
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unlikely at a private ILOLR could form and during a crisis it is equally unlikely that it would be 
able to mobilize the efforts of private actors. As we will see private bailouts have happened in 
the past but in most cases they were initiated or coordinated by states or international 
organizations. Finally, private arrangements will not be legitimate according to our standard 
because they do not involve governments in their decision-making. 
Should Governance be Regional or Global? Given that most crises are not systemic, some 
have argued that regional solutions are superior to global ones (see for example Giannini 2002). 
After all, there is no global economy, rather the world today is best characterized as a series of 
international regional economies that are linked but not fully integrated. These regions, not 
national economies or the global economy, are the focus of private economic decision-making 
(Rugman 2005). They are also increasingly the focus of international decision-making and 
governance (Mansfield & Milner 1999). The advantage of regional crisis governance therefore is 
that they would be more responsive to local market and political conditions. Thus they should be 
superior to global governance in terms of effectiveness. 
They may also be more legitimate in a board sense because of their understanding of 
local conditions. However, in terms of the narrow definition of input-legitimacy, the legitimacy 
of regional governance will depend on the specific form it adopts, i.e.: multilateral, plurilateral or 
unilateral.61 
Unfortunately, regional solutions on the whole do not work for two reasons. The first is a 
consequence of the way the international system is structured: with a core and a periphery. This 
means that most countries of the financial periphery, both historically and today, have stronger 
 
61 Please see the next two subsections. 
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ties with the core then with their neighbors. In addition, the bulk of international capital 
originates in the core and, during serious crises, returns there in search of safe havens. 
These characteristics of international financial flows mean that regional solutions will not 
be effective during most crises. They will be easily overwhelmed by the flight of “hot money” 
from the regional economy to the core of the financial system. In fact, regional solutions may 
actually help to promote regional instability rather than prevent it. If countries in the same region 
set up a common crisis response system they will become more closely associated in the minds 
of investors. This will increase the likelihood of crisis contagion across the regional financial 
systems. Indeed, the lumping of countries from the same region into the same “troubled’ basket 
exacerbated the Latin American Debt crisis in the 1980s and the Asian crisis in the 1990s. The 
problem is even greater in Europe where countries have effectively chain-ganged themselves 
through various monetary institutions.62 During the current debt crisis in Europe this has insured 
that crises in the most vulnerable countries became a problem for all. 
Second, there is very little empirical support for the viability of regional solutions. Most 
regions still have not developed much financial governance. The exception to this is Europe, 
which has adopted numerous arrangements over the years: the European Payments Union (EPU) 
(1950-1958), the EMS (1979-2000), and since 2000 the EMU. The latter consists of the single 
European currency (the Euro) and the European Central Bank (ECB). However, even the 
European example shows the difficult of regional solutions. The difficulties member of the EMS 
experiences during the two crisis of the 1990s lead to different policy decisions: countries like 
England and Denmark abandoned regional currency cooperation while the Euro-Zone countries 
 
62 See the next chapter three detail on the development of European monetary institutions from the 1950s to the 
current European Monetary Union (EMU). 
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opted for a currency union. Furthermore, as we will see shortly, the creation of the EMU did not 
replace global with regional crisis governance. 
Furthermore, other regions have not followed suit. In the 1990s there was talk of creating 
an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The frustration with IMF lending during the 1997/98 crisis 
even energized some advocates of this scheme (see for example Katada 2001). This did lead to 
the creation of Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, series of bilateral currency swap schemes to help 
countries deal with speculative attacks, and the establishment of a regular finance ministers 
meeting among the ASEAN+3 (Rana 2002, Park & Wang 2005).63 This arrangement was 
modeled on the agreement between the central banks of the Group of Ten to avoid IMF 
borrowing and conditionality.64 As far as crisis governance goes, this represents the very 
minimum of effort. For most of its life this initiative produced more dialogue than substantive 
outcomes (Amyx 2008, Ito & Yong 2009). In 2010 this arrangement was transformed into a 
formal multilateral currency swap pool with a total size of US$ 120 billion, a weighted voting 
system for joint decision, and enhanced surveillance capabilities (ASEAN 2009). However, this 
is meant to supplement and not supplant the IMF as members are only able to access this pool 
after they have formally entered into negotiations of a stand-by agreement with the IMF 
(Henning 2002, Grimes 2011). Thus, it follows the EMU practice of supplementing not 
substituting for the IMF. Finally, this arrangement has yet to be tested since the region did not 
face serious currency problems during the global financial crises of 2008-10. However, it is 
telling that South Korean dealt with a potential currency crisis in 2008 primarily by arranging a 
 
63 This included the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Japan, China and South 
Korea. 
64 See the next chapter for more information on the Group of Ten. 
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temporary swap with the US (Grimes 2011).65 Interestingly, most countries in the region have 
adopted a common policy of hording large foreign currency reserves (around a trillion US 
dollars) as a way of insuring against future crises. But this is not the product of international 
cooperation. Rather it is a series of unilateral policies whose similarity is due to a common 
traumatic experience. 
Furthermore, such regional efforts have not scored many successes in the past and 
regional efforts has almost invariably turned to more globally focused institutions such as the 
G8/G20 and the IMF for help in times of crises. For example, during the Mexican Peso crisis of 
1994 the US and Canada worked with the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
Regional efforts at the beginning of the Asian crisis were quickly overwhelmed. This led to the 
intervention of the Group of Seven and the IMF. During the recent banking crises in Iceland and 
the debt crises in Europe, particularly those affecting the so-called PIIGS,66 The EU and it 
solvent members were more than willing to delegate a good deal of the crisis response efforts to 
IMF rather than trying to deal solely through EU institution. Specifically, the countries facing 
debt problems we told to seek IMF assistance before they received any help from the members of 
the EMU. For instance, the exceptions to this trend were the two EMS crises of 1992/93. Here 
the Europeans did not turn to outside help. Unfortunately their efforts found only limited success. 
This eventually forced them to abandon the EMS and create the euro.67 Therefore, just as with 
private actors, regional governance can be a useful auxiliary to global crisis governance, but 
cannot stand alone. 
 
65 This temporary swap agreement was established on 29 October 2008 between two members of the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (the Bank of Korea and the Monetary Authority of Singapore) with the US Federal Reserve, the Banco 
Central do Brasil, and the Banco de Mexico. Each country pledged up to $30 billion (US Federal Reserve, 2008). 
66 The so-called PIIGS countries are Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain, though there are variations on this 
term. 
67 For more details on these crises please see chapters five, seven and eight. 
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Should Governance be State-Centered? Like any public good, an ILOLR can be provided 
multilaterally, plurilaterally, or unilaterally (Olson 1971). The first case involves substantial 
collective action problems and will only function if states delegate authority to an institution. 
Therefore multilateralism will be discussed in the next subsection which deals with IFIs. The 
other two cases are examples of a privileged group: the public good is provided by a subset of 
states in the system. In the case of plurilateral governance, the subset will only consist of 
financial powers, and in the case of unilateral governance, it will consist of a preeminent 
financial power or hegemon. 
A financial power is a state that can provide liquidity during an international crisis. A 
state can provide such liquidity if its currency is a reserve currency or if it possesses large 
foreign exchange reserves.68 It is also helpful for a financial power to have influence over 
international capital markets. This influence is usually the result of having one or more 
internationally significant financial center in ones jurisdiction. Such centers host finical 
institutions (e.g. banks, brokerages, exchanges) which are important facilitators of international 
financial flows. Example of such centers include London, New York, Hong Kong, etc.69 Thus a 
financial power will tend to have a large industrialized economy, play an important role in 
international trade and investment, and have a robust financial system which may host an 
important international financial center. 
Turning first to plurilateral crisis governance, it is immediately apparent that a concert of 
financial powers cannot have input-legitimacy. Plurilateral governance is the product of self-
 
68 A reserve currency is a store of value used by central banks and governments to support their monetary and 
financial policies. Such currencies also tend to be vehicle currency (i.e. used in international trade and investment). 
69 This concept is somewhat lose and a number of financial center ranking exist such as the Xinhua-Dow Jones’ 
International Financial Centers Development Index or the Z/Yen Group’s Global Financial Centers Index. For recent 
ranking please consult Xinhua-Dow Jones (2011) and Z/Yen (2012). 
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selection by a small group of powerful states. It can only be justified by output legitimacy, i.e.: 
effectiveness. Thus, while G8/G20 decision-making is based on the consensus of its members, 
and it has recently often incorporates the input of affected states and civil society, it is still the 
product of an exclusive club. 
In terms of effectiveness, if a concert brings together all the relevant financial powers in a 
financial system, it will have at its command enough resources and influence to effectively deal 
with the most serious crises. Such governance is feasible because increased financial integration 
will create financial powers as well as a need for crisis response. However, plurilateral 
governance will face limitations in terms of its efficiency and scope of operations. 
As with any group, a concert will face collective action problems. These will not be as 
serious as those faced by multilateral governance, but the effectiveness of a concert will depend 
on its members developing an effective working partnership. As Kirton (2004) has argued in his 
concert equality model of G8/G20 governance, such partnership is often activated by the 
experience of a shock that illustrates common vulnerability and need for cooperation (see also 
Hodges et.al. 1999). Thus, in the 19th century, problems like the Barings crisis of 1890 led to the 
formation of a concert between the central banks of England, France, Russia, and Germany. 
Similarly, the important but brief relationship between New York and London in the 1920s was 
the result of post-WWI financial instability. Finally, the evolution of post-Bretton Woods 
governance was tied to significant financial crises.70 
Each one of these concerts developed a particular working relationship but all have 
avoided formalization. The reason for this is that institutionalization entails costs that are as 
damaging to a concert as the collective action problems it is meant to solve. It generally involves 
 
70 Each of these is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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a loss of flexibility and adaptability, which is critical in crisis response. The loss of flexibility 
also has long term implications because it makes it harder to adapt the concert to changes in the 
balance of power. We only need to look at the postwar experience of formal institutions like the 
UN and IMF and compare them to the development of the G8/G20 to see that this is the case. 
The Security Council and until very recently the IMF Board of Governors reflect the balance of 
power of the mid-20th Century rather that the early 21st. In contrast, from the G10 to the G20, the 
current concert has been much more responsive to changes in financial power. Finally, imposing 
formal rules on a concert risks straining the relationship of its members: it goes against the very 
reason concerts like the G8/G20 are created (Putnam & Bayne 1987; Smyser 1993; Ikenberry 
1993; Hodges 1999) 
The collective action problems and the way a concert overcomes them have a large 
impact on the scope of its operation. A concert will likely only meet the narrow goal of dealing 
with systemic crises. It is unlikely that plurilateral governance, no matter how benevolent, would 
have the ability or the will to intervene in every financial crisis. Domestic opposition and 
international obstacles to such constant micromanagement would be substantial. This would also 
strain the concerts legitimacy as defined by the benchmark. Rather a concert would concentrate 
on systemic stability and ignore instability in the periphery, so long as the latter did not endanger 
the former. 
So what about hegemonic governance? The difference between a unilateral and a 
plurilateral arrangement is not very great and each can be seen as a special case of the other. In 
fact, plurilateral government has been called “group hegemony” (see Bailin 2005). Hegemony 
will have all the characteristics of a concert in terms of input-legitimacy, overall effectiveness 
and the scope of its operation. It crucially differs in terms of efficiency and feasibility. A 
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hegemon does not face collective action problems because it acts unilaterally, so it will be more 
efficient in dealing with crises. This is why it has been so attractive to proponents of hegemonic 
stability theory (see Kindleberger 1973, 1978/96; Gilpin 1975; Webb & Krasner 1989). 
The great weakness of hegemonic governance is that it depends on the existence of a 
financial hegemon. Yet such concentrations of power are very rare. So while governance based 
on hegemony is desirable, it is rarely feasible. As Kindleberger (1973: 305) originally put it “for 
the world economy to be stabilized there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.” This does not 
describe the role of England prior to WWI nor that of the US after the 1950s. England was 
supported by France, Russia, and later Germany; and in a number of serious crises it did not even 
play a leadership role (Eichengreen 1992: 8). In the case of the US, beginning in the 1960s it, 
while still powerful, was no longer a hegemon according to Kindleberger’s definition.71 
More recently, some have argued that, while the US is now more of a borrower, than a 
lender, of last resort, it is still in an exceptional position due to its crisis management capabilities 
and the importance of the dollar as a reserve currency (Gowan 1999; Seabrooke 2001; Panitch & 
Konigs 2008). It is certainly true that the US is in a privileged position, but this does not make it 
a hegemon. To argue that it does would confuse financial importance with financial power and 
twist the original argument of hegemonic governance into an unfalsifiable proposition. While a 
state, like England until WWI and the US after the 1960s, may play an important leadership role, 
this does not make it a hegemon. Hegemony is not the leadership of a concert. It is the ability to 
unilaterally maintain financial stability. 
 
71 For dissenting opinions on the declined of US hegemony beginning in the 1960s, see Russet (1985) and Strange 
(1987). However, while the US was clearly a hegemon in the 40s and 50s, it also relied on the support of the 
emerging financial powers. Ikenberry (1992) and Gilpin (2001) have called this “hegemony by consent.” 
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Finally, while some may dispute these arguments against past hegemony, it is hard to 
argue that hegemonic governance is a viable option for the future. With the emergence of new 
financial powers such as the BRICS countries, and the continued importance of old financial 
powers, it is clear that financial power is diffusing not concentrating. Thus a concert is the only 
viable state-centered governance option for the foreseeable future. 
Should Governance be Institution-Centered? Multilateral governance requires strong 
institutions to overcome collective action problems, especially given the short time horizon of 
financial crises. Institutions help by reducing transaction costs, uncertainty and moral hazards 
through the dissemination of information and the provision of a legal framework (Keohane 1986; 
Lake 1991: 115). Governments want institutions to help them achieve their policy goals in the 
most effective and efficient manner (Bayne 2003). States, especially middle and small powers, 
also value membership in international organizations because it allows them to express their 
views and interests (Raab 2005: 339). Thus, there is a strong functionalist argument for the use 
of institutions in all aspects of crisis management (Singer 2007: 5). 
However, despite the value that states derive from institutions, they are also keenly aware 
of the potential drawbacks of membership. In particular, states are careful to ensure that on 
balance their association with an institution enhances rather than limits their autonomy (see 
Bayne 2003; Coleman et.al. 2008). They do not want institutions to weakens their position vis-à-
vis other states. Nor do they want them to be powerful enough to give them orders. This makes 
them look weak which can expose them to popular and legislative opposition (Bayne 2003: 230). 
There are two primary dimensions along which we can classify IFIs: the focus of their 
activities (or mandate) and how member input is aggregated. In terms of focus, such institutions 
can have either broad economic goals or a narrow focus on a particular policy issue. 
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Specialization allows for greater efficiency but prevents exploiting issue linkages and thus limits 
the scope of possible solutions (Bini Smaghi 2005: 325). In terms of member input, that is how 
the member states exert control, IFIs can be organized along “parliamentary” (i.e. one state, one 
vote) or “corporate” (i.e. votes weighted by contribution) lines. This gives four possible types: 
narrow-parliamentary, narrow-corporate, broad-parliamentary and broad-corporate. However, in 
practice only two are encountered: broad-parliamentary and narrow-corporate. Examples of the 
former are the League of Nations’ Economic and Financial Organization (EFO) or the UN’s 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Examples of the later are the BIS and the IMF. 
 
Table 2 
Possible Types of International Financial Institutions 
  Mandate 




IMF and BIS 
Development Banks 
no examples 





In terms of input-legitimacy, states will have different preferences depending on their 
financial importance. Financial powers will contribute the bulk of the resources of any IFI. 
Therefore they will prefer ‘oligarchic’ legitimacy and thus the corporate model since it enhances 
their control over the institution. Furthermore, since financial powers tend not to be revisionist, 
they will also prefer a narrow institutional focus as it limits the possibility of dramatic reforms. 
Financial powers will therefore prefer narrow-corporate IFIs. For exactly the opposite reasons, 
other states will prefer broad-parliamentary IFIs. According to Krasner (1985) and Pauly (2008) 
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this is one of the reasons why powerful industrialized nations have never supported the economic 
agenda of the UN. 
This different of opinion on the legitimacy of IFIs directly affects their effectiveness. 
Because financial powers prefer narrow-corporate IFIs they will be more willing to support 
them. Such institutions will have more resources at their disposal and have more autonomy to 
fulfill their mission. For example, the League of Nations had grand ambitions in the economic 
sphere. It did manage to play an important role in shaping the international financial system in 
the Interwar Period as well providing much of the groundwork for the Bretton Woods conference 
(James 1996: 19-21; and Pauly 1996).72 However, after the 1920s its role in crisis management 
diminished (Pauly 1997: 55-6). Similarly, since the beginning of the Bretton Woods era, the UN 
was shut out of most key economic policy areas (Pauly, 2008: 23). Thus, in terms of both 
feasibility and efficiency, narrow-corporate IFIs will be more successful then broad-
parliamentary ones. 
In terms of scope, IFIs will be effective at dealing with crises in the periphery of the 
system but not at its core. There are four reasons for this. First, financial powers will be 
unwilling to devote the resources necessary to create an IFI that can act as an ILOLR for the 
core. This entails a delegation of power that is unacceptable to states.73 In fact, throughout their 
history, the BIS and IMF have been underfunded and forced to rely on temporary assistance from 
financial powers when facing serious crises. 
Second, there is also domestic political opposition to the concentration of power in 
international institutions. In recent years this has been particularly true of the US (Broz & Hawes 
 
72 The League’s most important long term contribution however lies in the work of people like Nurkse (1944) who 
served in the League’s Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service from 1934 to 1945 studying the 
working of the Gold Exchange Standard. His report would have a great impact on the Bretton Woods Agreement. 
73 For a more detailed discussion on the problem of delegation please see chapter six. 
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2006). But most citizens have a problem with the concentration of power and resources in 
supranational institutions they have little control over (Beetham & Lord 1998: 59-93; Kual et.al. 
1999; Pauly & Grande 2005). 
Third, IFI lending has always tended to acquire a stigma. As discussed in the next 
chapter, this happened with IMF lending in the 1960s/1970s as well as with the international 
loans organized by the League of Nations in the 1920s. Most states in the core prefer to seek help 
from other members of the core. Other states turn to IFIs because they have no alternative. 
Finally, while concerts are unwilling to provide help to the periphery unless the threat is 
systemic, IFIs are both willing and able to do so. They are willing because by engaging in crisis 
lending they justify their existence, something all institutions are eager to do. They are able to 
because, unlike national finance ministries and central banks, their sole focus is the international 
financial system. 
Are Radically New Institutions Needed? Over the years there have also been many 
ambitious proposals for new institutional solutions to global crisis governance. These include the 
creation of a world central bank that could create liquidity (Garten 1998, 2008); international 
public agencies to ensure investors against debt defaults (Soros 1998); an international 
bankruptcy court (Kampffmayer 1987; Radelet & Sachs 1998); a global super-regulator of 
financial institutions (Kaufman 1/28/1998). However, for reasons already discussed, such 
suggestions are not feasible in the current international system. 
The simple answer to this questions is no. While there have been many proposals for 
radical reforms to global crisis response institutions they suffer from three problems. First, none 
of the alternative suggestions discussed above has enough support in either policymaking or 
academic circles to get to implementation. Second, most of them require a level of political will 
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that does not exist. Finally, most of them are not really necessary given the nature of the 
international financial system. 
 
Table 3 
Evaluation of Possible Crisis Governance 
Types of Governance 
Effectiveness 
Legitimacy 
Feasibility Efficiency Scope 
Private low low low fails 
Regional low moderate low uncertain 
Plurilateral 
(Financial Concerts) 
high moderate moderate fails 
Unilateral 
(Hegemons) 
low high moderate fails 
IFIs 
(Multilateral) 
Type 1 moderate moderate moderate “Oligarchic” 
Type 2 low moderate moderate “Democratic” 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
State-centered and institution-centered governance each have their strengths and 
weaknesses. Problems in the core are best dealt with by a concert and problems in the periphery 
are best dealt with by an IFI. In addition, an IFI can provide useful support for a concert by 
providing surveillance of the system as a whole. Concerts can provide leadership in a crisis and 
prod institutions to act (Bini Smaghi 2005: 325; Hodges 1999: 69-70). Therefore, in order to 
maximize effectiveness, international crisis governance must be built around a partnership 
between a concert of financial powers and an IFI. This partnership can be supplemented by 
private and regional governance, but it cannot be replaced by them. 
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Thus, while many solutions to crisis governance are possible, the most effective one is 
one that combines the efforts of a concert of financial powers and an IFI dedicated to financial 
crisis response. The reason this arrangement is the most effective is that it builds on the 
complementary strengths of each institutional type. Of course, as the international financial 
system evolved so must this partnership. However, as long as the international financial system 
retains the basic structure it has had since it emerged in the late Nineteenth Century, this will 




Chapter 5: Evolution of Crisis Response Governance 
In the previous chapter the argument was made that the most effective governance 
structure for dealing with financial crisis is one built around partnership between a concert of 
financial powers and an international financial institution (IFI). The concert, often acting as a 
group hegemon, deals with financial problems in the core while the IFI deals with problems of 
the periphery. Systemic crisis are dealt with in the same manner, except there is more need to 
coordinate the actions of the concert and the IFI. The goal of this chapter then is to provide 
empirical support for this assertion. 
This chapter will outline the evolution of crisis governance since the late 1870s to the 
present. The bulk of the chapter will focus on the four main periods of financial history: the 
Classic Gold Standard (1870s-1913), the Interwar Period (1919-1939), the Bretton Woods 
System (1944-1973), and the Post Bretton Woods System (up to the outbreak of the US banking 
crisis of 2008).74 Each subsection will examine: the nature of the financial crises in that period, 
the crisis governance that existed, and how effective it was at responding to financial crises. 
Section five of this chapter will then give a brief comparison of the four periods. Section six will 
examine how governance structures have been shaped by the crises they faced and why this 
ultimately lead to the institutions we have today. The final section will conclude. 
However, before examining the historical record it is very important to remember that 
effective crisis governance does not mean the lack of financial crises. Rather it means that 
governance institutions are able to deal with the crises that do occur as quickly as possible while 
minimizing the negative consequences of crises. Thus, in evaluating the stability of a period for 
 
74 The US-turned-global crisis, its aftermath and the G8/G20 and IMG response will be discussed in chapter eight. 
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the perspective of crisis governance, we must look at both the ability to deal with individual 
crises and the ability to maintain the longer term stability of a financial system. 
5.1 Classic Gold Standard: 1870s to 1913 
This period was on the whole remarkably stable, especially at its core. There were far 
fewer crises during the Classic Gold Standard than in any subsequent period (Kindleberger 
1978/1996, Bordo et al 2001). However, the system was not crisis-free. In particular, twin 
(banking and currency) crises were frequent. This is in fact a common problem when states 
maintain both capital mobility and fixed exchange rates. The period also saw serious systemic 
debt crises in the 1880s and in the decade leading up to WWI (Eichengreen & Lindert 1989: 2-
3). The most prominent characteristic of the system, however, was that the remarkable stability 
of the core was mirrored by equally remarkable instability in the periphery, where three-quarters 
of all crises happened (Bordo et.al. 2001: 58). Of these, the most devastating were Argentina’s 
1890 and Australia’s 1893 crisis. Each crisis cost the economy it affected around 10% of its 
GDP. 
This difference between core and periphery was primarily due to two structural 
characteristics of this system. The first is that while the economic and political underpinnings of 
the core promoted stability, those in the periphery promoted instability and exacerbated the 
effects of crises (see Eichengreen 1998: 39-42). Thus countries in the periphery lack stable 
banking systems and central banks. Furthermore, most of these economies depended on the 
export of a few commodities and foreign capital. When the demand of the former weakened this 
invariably lead to a financial crisis. The second is that, while states in the core could count on 
international support during crises, the periphery rarely received much help. As a result, crises in 
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the periphery tended to lead to severe economic dislocation that took years to correct 
(Eichengreen 1998: 35-38; Bordo et.al. 2001). 
Proponents of Hegemonic Stability Theory like to point to Britain as the primary cause of 
stability during this period. However, the Bank of England could rarely act alone. In fact, as 
Kindleberger (1973: 293) himself acknowledges, it was regularly supported by the Bank of 
France, the Bank of Hamburg and the State Bank of Russia. Thus, while this period lacked 
formal institutions, it did have an informal concert of core central banks. This concert was built 
around a consensus on the need for regular policy coordination and mutual aid in times of 
turmoil. This need arose from the fact that central banks were responsible for both defending 
their gold pegs and acting as national LOLR. The problem was that during a crisis the unilateral 
use of discount rates and liquidity injections to help distressed markets compromised a central 
bank’s ability to defend its peg. The only way to maintain stability was through coordinated 
interventions. Of course, this close cooperation between core central banks cannot by itself 
explain this remarkable stability,75 but it was an essential buttress of the system. 
As early as 1839 the Bank of England borrowed gold from the Bank of France to forestall 
a crisis and returned the favor in 1847. Other prominent examples include: the 1890 Baring 
Crisis in which the Bank of France and the State Bank of Russia supported the Bank of England; 
the 1893 decision of a consortium of European banks to support the US Treasury; the 1898 Bank 
of England and Bank of France loan to the Reichsbank and a number of German commercial 
banks; and the 1906 and 1907 Bank of France and Reichsbank support of the Bank of England. 
 
75 Gallarotti (1993, 1995) has convincingly argued that neither central bank cooperation nor British hegemony 
entirely explained the smooth functioning of the classic gold standard. Instead the diffusion of the politics of gold, 
classical liberal ideology, industrialization and economic development, convergence of expectations in a given issue 
area (money) and changes in political power structures created incentives for maintaining the system. 
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The crisis that perhaps best illustrates the nature of crisis management during this period 
is the Barings Crisis of 1890. Throughout the 1880s the Baring Brothers Bank had borrowed 
heavily to invest in bonds issued by both the central and local governments of Argentina. In 1890 
economic problems and news of a revolution triggered a debt and bank panic. The revolution did 
not lead to a major change of government, but the damage was done. The crisis severely affected 
Argentina and rendered Barings Brothers insolvent. This in turn threatened the stability of the 
entire English banking system because of the size of Barings and it links to other banks. The 
crisis was so serious that the Bank of England had to turn to the Bank of France and the Russian 
Treasury. Argentina meanwhile found no support. It was neither politically nor economically 
important enough to warrant foreign aid. As a result, England saved its banking system and gold 
peg, and experienced only a short and relatively mild recession. The cost to Argentina, in 
contrast, was much more severe: it lost close to 10% of its GDP and experienced a prolonged 
recession. The crisis also had a negative impact on many other Latin American countries 
(Mitchener & Weidenmier 2008). 
Thus, it is a mistake to idealize the stability of this period. The system was built on a set 
of circumstances that promoted stability at the core and instability at the periphery. The flows at 
the core of the system were regularly managed through international cooperation which favored 
international exchange rate and price stability over domestic employment and growth. More 
serious problems in the periphery were largely ignored. However, the circumstances that favored 
the core could not last forever and were finally destroyed by the economic and political changes 
brought about by WWI. 
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5.2 Interwar Period: 1919 to 1939 
This period remains the most crisis-prone in modern financial history, with the largest 
number of currency, banking and debt crises. It is also significant because the mid-to-late 1930s 
were the nadir of international economic cooperation. 
World War I did not just disrupt the economic and political foundations of the old gold 
standard, it fundamentally destroyed them. In addition, postwar recovery was very difficult as 
most belligerents faced problems of inflation and massive war debts with little means to pay 
them off. Even countries that had been neutral during the war were affected. Wartime inflation 
and the managed floats diminished the confidence that markets had in central banks’ 
commitment to gold. As a result, capital mobility, which used to be a key pillar of the old 
system, became the bane of central bankers. On the political front one of the key changes was the 
increased influence of labor in domestic politics (Eichengreen 1992; Simmmons 1994). This 
meant that international stability could no longer be promoted at the expense of growth and 
wages. The system posed new constraints and problems for policymakers to which they never 
fully adapted. 
Thus the system was more crisis prone do to a number of economic and political 
circumstances. Most economies were fist plagued by a difficult recovery after World War I and 
then a breakdown in economic cooperation during the Great Depression. This economic 
instability coupled with foreign debt problems weakened a number of banking systems. In 
addition, the fixed exchange rate system, which had been a pillar of support under the old 
system, became one of the greatest sources of instability. This was due to a combination of high 
capital mobility and democratization, both of which undermined political commitment to fixed 
exchange rates (Eichengreen 1996, Jeanne 1997). The significance of democratization lies not 
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only in the fact that more countries were democracies but that financial policy was no longer 
seen as beyond the pale of politics: governments could no longer subordinate domestic goals to 
international economic stability. 
Just as important, the political and economic fallout of WWI irreparably damaged the 
concert at the heart of the old system. By the early 1920s, London, New York, and to a lesser 
extent Paris, emerged as the premier financial powers (Brown 1940). Unfortunately an effective 
concert never developed between them. London had not fully adjusted its behavior in line with 
its diminished capacity. Thus, it often acted in a heavy-handed manner. Paris, due to its focus on 
political and security concerns, proved more of a hurdle than a help to crisis management. The 
US, which had just emerged as a financial power, never fully committed itself to supporting 
international stability. What is worse, the US Federal Reserve System was only founded in 1913 
and the US banking system was just as crisis prone as it had been before the war. In the early 
years, some stability was provided by the Anglo-American axis. Unfortunately, this was largely, 
although not exclusively, based on the personal relationship between Montagu Norman 
(Governor, Bank of England) and Benjamin Strong (Governor, Federal Reserve Bank, New 
York), which ended with Strong’s death in 1928 (James 1996: 23). 
However, in terms of formal institutions, this period also saw many innovations. The 
League of Nations embraced the full range of international economic issues (issues now divided 
among the IMF, World Bank, and WTO) in ways that the UN has never been able to (Pauly 
1997: 45-6). By the end of the 1930s the League even created an Economic and Financial 
Organization (EFO). Like the IMF today, its staff portrayed themselves as “technicians” 
involved in “technical” problems. Unfortunately, unlike the IMF, the League never had resources 
of its own to draw on. As a result it had to rely on private capital markets for loans, and 
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functioned primarily as a facilitator and guarantor of private crisis lenders (ibid.: 53). Thus, 
unlike the IMF today, the EFO could not act independent of, let alone in opposition to, private 
markets. This greatly diminished its scope of operations. 
This period also saw the creation of the first true IFI in the form of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). As early as the international conferences in Brussels (1920) and 
Genoa (1922) there were proposals for the creation of an international institution that would help 
central bankers share information and coordinate policy. However, nothing was done until 1930. 
Unfortunately, the BIS was the victim of poor timing and poor design. It was a victim of timing 
because it was created just a year before the international banking crisis of 1931 which deepened 
the Great Depression. This was simply too great a challenge for a new international organization. 
It simply was not ready for the challenges it would face. It poor design was a result of it dual 
mandate: overseeing German war reparations and central bank cooperation. This meant that 
political debates over reparation hampered international financial cooperation. 
The two worst periods for crises in the interwar years were the early 1920s and the early 
1930s. For a time in the 1920s Anglo-American cooperation, often with the support of the 
League of Nations, provided some stability (James, 1996: 19-21; Pauly 1996, 1997: 52-5). Loans 
were organized for Czechoslovakia (1922), Austria (1923), Hungary (1924), and many others. 
The loan to Austria was particularly interesting because in 1922 the US, Britain, and France 
effectively abandoned Vienna. As a result, the League stepped in with a £26 million loan raised 
in private markets, secured with the guarantees of eight European governments. Loan repayment 
was also directly administered by a League appointed commissioner, and was completed in two 
years. In 1924 a £10 million (unguaranteed) loan accomplished similar results in Hungary. By 
the middle of the decade the international financial system had largely stabilized. However, 
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despite these successes, the League’s interventions soon developed a stigma similar to IMF 
lending and political tensions ensured that it could not provide similar assistance to strategically 
important debtors like Poland or Germany (Pauly 1997: 55-6). 
In 1925, the British parliament passed the Gold Standard Act, which returned Britain to 
gold and began the so called Gold-Exchange Standard. This monetary system brought some 
measure of stability to the international financial system. However, it would end in 1931 when 
Britain was forced to abandon gold in 1931. By 1928 a number of new economic problems 
appeared. These would eventually culminate in the Wall Street Crash of 1929, which is 
traditionally taken as the beginning of the Great Depression. However, it was a series of 
international banking and currency crises that hit the core of the system in 1931 that deepened 
the 1929 recession into a depression. The three financial powers and the BIS tried to organize a 
series of interventions but these were slow and ultimately unsuccessful.76 In 1933 the 
representative of sixty-six countries met at the London Economic Conference tried to deal with 
the Great Depression through the restoration of monetary stability and international trade. 
However, it ended in failure. 
Thus the 1930s lacked both a stable concert of the key financial players and its formal 
institutional structures were seriously handicapped. As a result of the financial crises and 
deepening depression, the Gold-Exchange Standard, which had only emerged in 1925, collapsed. 
This first led to a tri-part financial system from 1932-36: a residual gold bloc centered on the US; 
a Sterling Area centered on Great Britain and its empire; and a complex system of currency 
clearing houses in East and Central Europe controlled by Germany. However, even this limited 
 
76 For more detail please refer to chapter five. 
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cooperation proved untenable and by 1936 most countries had turned to some form of managed 
float and varying levels of protectionism. 
5.3 Bretton Woods Era: 1944 to 1973 
This period does not lag far behind the Classic Gold Standard in terms of stability. There 
were virtually no banking crises. Debt crises, either in the form of liquidity problems or 
sovereign defaults, were rare and comparatively minor. However, just as with the pre-1914 
period, it would be a mistake to idealize the postwar era. 
The reason for the lack of banking crises was that both the domestic and international 
banking systems were heavily regulated and actively managed. In effect, most banking systems 
were closely monitored cartels which shared the burden of crises management with central banks 
(Bordo et.al. 2001: 57-8; Goodhart & Illing 2002: 20). This close relationship between the 
government and private banks was largely the product of diminished international competition 
and increased government management of the economy during the Great Depression, Second 
World War, and postwar recovery. As domestic and international finance recovered, 
governments found themselves increasingly unwilling and unable to maintain such extensive 
oversight. 
Similarly, debt crises were rare because the vast majority of sovereign loans during this 
period originated from other governments, either directly or through IFIs such as the World Bank 
(Eichengreen & Lindert, 1989: 1). Therefore, liquidity and solvency problems were resolved 
relatively easily through direct negotiation. As the international financial system recovered and 
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the demand for sovereign loans increased (due to decolonization and development), private 
capital increasingly dominated sovereign lending.77 
Currency crises, however, were a different matter. With the exception of the US dollar 
and a few others, most currencies did not resume convertibility until the early 1950s. But a return 
to convertibility did not mean an end to exchange rate problems. Even countries such as Great 
Britain, Germany and France had to deal with frequent current account problems and currency 
crises. It was only in the 1960s that most countries were in a position to defend their currencies. 
Ironically, it was at this time that it became apparent that US current account deficits were 
unsustainable and were posing a serious problem: the dollar was headed for a crisis that could 
derail the entire system. 
In terms of crisis governance, the experience of the interwar period largely informed the 
agenda and goals of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. This conference was the result of an 
Anglo-American consensus that the international system needed institutional supports. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to regulate the new Dollar Standard and provide 
support to countries with balance of payments problems. But it was also intended to be a forum 
in which countries could discuss common problems and coordinate policy efforts. However, the 
IMF in no way diminished the need for a concert of financial powers. Without US-British 
partnership, the Bretton Woods Conference could not have succeeded. In fact, the original 
intention was to base the new system around this partnership. However, Britain could not 
participate due to its postwar economic difficulties. 
 
77 Some might argue that, given the stability of the Bretton Woods and the instability of the current period, it would 
be desirable to return to this heavy government involvement in international banking and sovereign lending. 
However, currently the vast majority of international and domestic investments go through private markets. A shift 
to greater government involvement would be a mammoth undertaking. Better domestic and international financial 




But the Bretton Woods Conference was not as great a break with the past as it might 
seem. There were similar conferences in the past. More importantly, the Bretton Woods 
institutions did not come into existence fully formed in 1944. Rather they continually evolved in 
response to changes in the international financial system. During the late 1940s and most of the 
1950s the US acted as a hegemon. This is the only time that the international system truly 
achieved Kindelberger’s ideal of having ‘one and only one stabilizer’ (see Kindleberger 1973: 
305). It was the Marshal Plan (which dwarfed the original funds of both the IMF and the World 
Bank), not the new Bretton Woods Institutions, that supported the international financial system 
and provided loans and aid for postwar reconstruction. 
As postwar recovery progressed, governance slowly changed. The IMF and World Bank 
took over from the Marshal Plan. But their resources remained inadequate. As a result, from 
1950 to 1958 the Europeans ran the European Payments Union (EPU). This acted as a mini 
Bretton Woods, helping to support European currencies and relieving pressure on the system as a 
whole. Thus, US hegemony was gradually supplemented by the reemergence of financial powers 
in Europe and later Japan. 
Finally, as the problems plaguing the Dollar Standard intensified, new governance 
solutions were attempted. This led to the formation of the Group of Ten (G10) in 1962 under the 
auspices of the IMF.78 This was part of the General Agreements to Borrow, an auxiliary facility 
designed to generate additional funds through European central banks to support the dollar 
(Porter 2005: 32). The ultimate goal was to reform the system. 
 
78 It consisted of the future members of the G7 (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, the UK, and the US) 
plus Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Switzerland would join the group in 1964 despite not being a member 
of the IMF. 
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Therefore crisis management during Bretton Woods can be divided into two sub-periods: 
the slow return to convertibility from the mid-40s through 50s, and the long dollar crisis of the 
1960s. The first serious problem was the Pound Sterling crisis of 1947. Due to US pressure the 
British government moved to liberalize its current account. This proved a disastrous experiment 
and quickly dashed US hopes of a quick return to convertibility. The rest of the 1950s was 
characterized by the slow liberalization of European current accounts and occasional currency 
crises. These were handled through a combination of US, IMF and EPU programs. By the late 
1950s the system was stable, though occasional balance of payments crises still occurred. 
Starting in the 1960s a new problem emerged: the dollar shortage of the 1950s became a 
dollar glut. This threatened the value of reserves used to defend currency pegs. Just as 
problematic, the exchange rate system was becoming increasingly rigid. The G10 attempted to 
tackle these problems throughout the 1960s. It efforts culminated in the ultimately unsuccessful 
Smithsonian Agreement of 1971. At the same time, the Pound Sterling was also under increasing 
pressure. Just like the Americans, the British government was reluctant to devalue its currency. It 
even turned to the IMF for help, despite the stigma attached to such a move. These efforts would 
ultimately prove unsuccessful and London was forced to devalue in 1967. 
Assessment 
This period, though stable, still required crisis management. In the early years, most of 
the work of maintaining systemic stability was done by the US. However, as the world economy 
recovered, the role of the US was supplemented by the IMF and other financial powers. 
4.4 Post-Bretton Woods: 1973 to the Present 
The current period has been as crisis prone as the interwar years. However, while crises 
have become more frequent since the collapse of Bretton Woods they have not become more 
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sever in terms of their financial and economic impact (Bordo, et al 2001: 58) It can be divided 
into two parts based on the type of crisis which predominated (ibid). The first (1973-1988) was 
dominated by currency and debt crisis. These were largely a result of fallout from the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system and the oil shocks. The second (1989 on) has been dominated by 
frequent twin (banking and currency) crises. These are largely the result of difficulties 
surrounding capital accounts liberalization and setting effective exchange rate policy. Just as 
during the Classic Gold Standard, the majority of these crises affected developing countries and 
emerging markets. But, unlike the Gold Standard period, the current system has also seen some 
of the most serious systemic crises in financial history: the Debt Crisis (late-1970s and early-
1980s), the Asian-turned-global crisis (1997-2001), and the recent US-turned-global crisis.79  
This period has also witnessed numerous ideological battles over how the international 
financial systems should operate. In the early 1970s developing countries began calling for the 
creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and by 1974/75 the UN General 
Assembly had adopted some of the most radical resolutions along these lines (Krasner 1985). 
The 1980s and end of the Cold War saw the rise of Neo-Liberal Economics and the so-called 
Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1993; Pauly 2008). The Asian crisis has led to a 
reevaluation of the Washington Consensus and a call for a new financial architecture.80 Finally, 
the most recent crisis has stimulated continued debate and even led to call in some circles for a 
massive reform of domestic and international financial governance.81 
 
79 One may ask whether the current crisis, or even the Asian Crisis of a decade ago, signal a new era. This is 
possible, but as will be discussed in chapter eight, this does not seem likely. 
80 In 2002 the UN even sponsored the Monterrey Conference, which was widely supported by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, particularly the IMF. This has not led to the creation of a Monterrey Consensus as some proposed. But it 
has led to the creation of new links between the IMF and the UN and has signaled a move away from the 
Washington Consensus, although not from free market principles. See Pauly (2008): 33-43. 
81 These will be discusses in more detail in the next chapter as well as in chapter eight. 
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However, despite its volatility, this has also been a time of continued international 
cooperation and innovation in the realm of crisis governance. This is in stark contrast to the 
experience of the Interwar Period which led to depression and the breakdown of cooperation. It 
is also in contrast with the way in which the Bretton Woods System collapsed and the short-lived 
declined in international cooperation in the 1970s (Katzenstein 1978, Ferguson 2010). 
Thus, despite the failure of the Smithsonian Agreement, both the IMF and the G10 
proved useful. Since the 1970s the IMF has continued and expanded its role as a crisis lender to 
less-developed and emerging markets and has become the primary monitor of the international 
monetary system. Similarly, while the G10 quickly disappeared, it became the model for 
subsequent groupings of financial powers that would eventually become the G8 and the G20. 
In 1975 the proto-G8, which developed from the G10, was little more than an ad hoc 
working group created to discuss the issues surrounding the collapse of Bretton Woods and the 
energy crisis.82 During the next thirty five years the G8/G20 would shape the monetary and 
financial system. In order to do this it has constantly evolved in response to the problems it 
faced. In response to the appreciating dollar of the 1980s the G7 finance ministers and central 
bank governors emerged as a semi-annual forum for monitoring the international financial 
system and coordinating policy. The problems associated with the political and economic re-
integration of the former Soviet Bloc in the 1990s led to a working relationship with Russia and 
the eventual creation of the G8. The outbreak of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s resulted in the 
creation of the G20 finance ministerial group and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). This is the 
first time in history that a regular forum has brought together established financial powers and 
key emerging markets. 
 
82 In fact at this point it was a G5 consisting of France, Germany, Japan, the UK and US. 
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Thus, in its role as watchman of international financial stability, the G8/G20 is currently 
an interlocking and mutually supporting web of international institutions with the original G7 
still at its centre. Recent developments have signaled a shift of economic and financial 
coordination from the G7 to the G20. But just as important as these changes has been the key 
constant in this evolution: the close working relationship that has developed between the G8/G20 
and the IMF. 
In terms of crisis response this period has had successes and failures. During the 1970s 
the IMF dealt with most of the crises associated with the collapse of the Dollar Standard. The 
countries of the G5, which gradually evolved into the G7, engaged in some policy coordination 
but largely sought national solutions (see Katzenstein 1978; James 1996: 285-89).83 The most 
serious problem was the Debt Crisis which affected less-developed states. It was eventually dealt 
with through the creation of the Paris and London Clubs. Unfortunately, this has led to a net 
transfer of funds from debtor to creditor nations and negotiations still have not found a 
permanent solution to the debt problem. However, this is not dramatically different from the way 
serious debt crises were dealt with in the 1890s or the 1930s (see Lindert 1989; Fishlow 1989). 
In the 1980s, currency and debt crises persisted. The developing world largely relied on 
loans from the IMF, and joint IMF-World Bank structural adjustment programs in the case of 
debt problems. At the core, it became increasingly apparent that the new (non-)system required 
policy coordination, especially during the US Dollar appreciation of the 1980s. Because of the 
technical nature of this problem it was handled by finance ministers and central bank governors 
through ad hoc meetings: the Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) Accords (see Funabashi 1988). 
 
83 The European states are an exception, in that their efforst took a formal (i.e. planned and coordinated) regional 
rather than a national approach to the problems of the collapse of Bretton Woods Monetary System. The Europeans 
created the European Monetary System (EMS) along the line of the reforms that were proposed for the Dollar 
Standard under the Smithsonian Agreement. This lasted until the adoption of the euro in 2000. 
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The 1990s saw crises associated with financial liberalization due to a shift to market-
oriented policies by less developed and former communist states. This period also saw more 
serious threats to the stability of the core. These included the two EMS crises (in 1992 and 1992-
93) which that were dealt with by the EU with limited success; the Mexican Peso Crisis (1994) 
which was dealt with through $50 billion in coordinated loans and guarantees (by the US, 
Canada, IMF and BIS); and the Asian Finical crisis 1997-98 and subsequent crises in Russia, 
Latin America and the US. Crisis response efforts of the first decade of the 21st century have 
largely dealt with the aftershocks from the Asian and US crises, which hit almost exactly a 
decade apart. 
The post Bretton Woods system has been only slightly less volatile than the interwar 
periods. Markets have increased in power, perhaps even beyond their influence during the pre-
WWI era. What is more, in the period of one decade the system has experience two systemic 
financial crises that have taken a very long time to deal with, not to mention recover from. 
However, despite this increased volatility, overall stability in the system has been maintained. 
That is to say, at no point during the system has financial cooperation between states stopped not 
international economic activity retreated. 
5.5 Comparison of the Four Periods 
There are three key points about financial crises governance that should be taken from 
this review of the history the global financial system. First, it is true that current period is the 
most volatile since the interwar period. However, the consequences of this volatility have been 
dramatically different. The interwar period ultimately collapsed and produced a system of largely 
autarkic economic units. These were based on political (such as between the US and the America 
or Germany and Easter Europe) or colonial relationships. This breakdown in international 
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cooperation did have some benefits. By removing international economic and financial 
obligation it allowed leaders to experiment with new policies. This ultimately produced some 
economic beneficial and paved the way for new ideas that were adopted in the 1950s and 60s 
(Polanyi, K. 1944/2001, Nurkse 1944, Eichengreen 1992). A similar, although much less 
extreme, period of experimentation and a focus on national over international goals also helped 
economic recovery in the 1970s (Katzenstein 1978, Ferguson 2010). However, it also had a 
significant down side. The breakdown in cooperation and national focus diminished economic 
opportunities for all states and produced policy conflicts. In the case of the 1930s it also helped 
contribute to the rise of revisionist regimes, which ultimately helped bring about WWII. 
The current post Bretton Woods period has seen an unprecedented number of systemic 
crises: the debt crisis in Latin America, the Asian crisis and its aftermath, and the US-turned-
global financial crisis. However, despite their severity, none of these crises has lead to a 
breakdown of cooperation. In fact, not only has cooperation has been sustained but institutions 
have been maintained and developed to meet the new challenges. Critics might label this kind of 
muddling along which prevents meaningful reforms. However, the breakdown of cooperation in 
the 1930s, and its weakening in the 1970s, also led to slow recovery and reform. 
Second, the stability of the Nineteenth Century was problematic and should not be a role 
model for crisis governance. While the stability of the core may be envied, there are two flaws in 
this system which would make it unacceptable today. The experience of periphery was in fact 
worse the in the current period. There was not equivalent of the IMF that could step in and help 
less developed countries when they faced a crisis. And while IMF intervention has been rightly 
criticized, its outcomes have been the same or better then the neglect of crisis governance during 
the Gold Standard. Perhaps more importantly, the international financial stability of the time was 
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bought at the expense of domestic stability. Government back them could largely ignore 
unemployment and focus on domestic and international price stability. This is a political 
impossibility today. 
Third, the stability of Breton Woods System was ultimately artificial and unsustainable. It 
took a long time for financial systems to recover after the war. Currency instability was a 
problem in both the 1950s and 1960s. The stability of banking systems and international debt 
was largely due to the fact that these systems had contracted so much during the depression and 
war that they could be actively managed by governments. Once prosperity and international 
cooperation recovered this was not longer viable. Ultimately this system collapsed leading to a 
temporary breakdown in international cooperation. 
5.6 Institutional Evolution 
Concerts have developed from forums for the coordination or technical issues between 
technocrats to forums for the discussion of political issues by politicians. However, the process 
has not been linear and straightforward. The nineteenth century concert was essentially a 
technocratic forum that functioned largely in isolation from political pressures. The Interwar 
period concert tried to recreate this but unsuccessfully mainly due to the political and economic 
changes that took place as a result of WWI. The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 was built 
around the Anglo-American partnership that developed during the war. However, the postwar 
weakness of Britain, let alone that of other economics emerging out of the depression and war, 
meant a new concert could not be developed. However, as other countries began to recover, and 
the economic and political leadership role of the US in the 1960s began taking a toll on its 
economy, concerts such as the G10 and the G5 were formed.  
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With the creation of the G5 we begin to see the slow evolution of the current and its 
development of new forms. The technocratic cooperation between central banks which began 
under the Gold Standard still exists. However, the concert has now evolved into additional 
forms. These include the annual leaders’ summits among the G8 and the G20 as well as bi-
annual meeting of finance ministers and central bank government. 
In essence, the economic, political and technological changes that have occurred since the 
late 1800s have not erased the need for technocratic cooperation between the key financial 
powers. This cooperation now needs to be supplemented by larger economic and political 
considerations. This is why the concert has evolved into the G8/G20 system we currently have. 
The emergence of an IFI dedicated to dealing with financial instability has been more 
difficult and taken longer to develop. The nineteenth century lacked such an institution, which 
meant that financial problems in the periphery were ignored and emerging economies were 
largely left to their own devices. This led to a period of experimentation in the 1920s were first 
the League’s EFO (a broadly focused, parliamentary IFI) and the BIS (a narrowly focused, 
corporate IFI) emerged. Both of these institutions worked better that the highly dysfunctional 
concert of the 1920s. However, the success of the EFO was largely confined to peripheral crises 
the financial powers had not interest in. The BIS was more limited by its divided mandate. 
However, both also failed to deal with the banking and debt crisis of the 1930s. While the EFO 
may have had more successes in this period (most of them in the 1920s) then the BIS (which was 
only founded in 1930) ultimately the BIS model would prove the more successful. 
The IMF was founded in 1944 to help manage the new Dollar Standard and quickly 
developed it role in dealing with current account problems. After the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed the need for crisis lending in the periphery gave the institution a new lease on live. The 
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United Nations, however, was not able to replicate the success of the League in this area and 
never develop the equivalent of the EFO. This is largely due to the lack of support that such 
initiatives received for the financial powers as well as the fact that this role is already filled by 
the IMF. 
It also took a long time for a relationship between the various concerts and IFIs that have 
existed. No such relationship could emerge in the first period because only a concert existed. In 
the 1920s the weak concert between the US, Britain and to an extent France and the EFO largely 
worked parallel to each other. The EFO intervening in those peripheral crises the financial 
powers had no interest in and being shut out of those that were too politically important to be left 
to IFI. It role crisis response was largely eclipsed by the creation of the BIS. However, the 
League and its financial organs would play in important role in paving the way for the Bretton 
Woods concert. It was ultimately the inability of the concert to develop a working relationship 
between itself and either the EFO or BIS that lead to a failure of financial crisis governance in 
the 1930s. 
This situation changed after the war, although the relationship between the postwar 
governance institutions would take a long time to develop. Interestingly enough, the IMF was 
formed at Bretton Woods by the Anglo-American partnership and two decades later the IMF, by 
encouraging the creation of the G10 paved the way for the emergence of the G8/G20. During the 
1970s and 1980s these two institutions would slowly develop a working relationship. This 
arrangement is not without its problems, yet it is nonetheless effective.  
5.7 Conclusions 
Thus, the period since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the 1970 has been the 
most volatile except for the interwar period. However, despite this volatility and the problems it 
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has produced, international cooperation has been sustained. Furthermore, crisis governance 
institutions have continued to evolve to meet the challenges of continued financial integration. 
It is also important to realize that the stability of the Classic Gold Standard and of the 
Bretton Woods System is in many ways very deceptive. Before WWI the experience of countries 
in the periphery was considerably worse that what developing economies have experience since 
the 1970s. In addition, international stability was bought at the expense of domestic stability. 
That is, international financial stability was maintained through domestic adjustment that 
resulted in domestic unemployment. Something that is politically unacceptable today.  
As for the Bretton Woods System, while it had fewer financial crises this was in large 
part due to particular post-war circumstances that were unsustainable in the long run. 
Furthermore, the system was build with serious flaws that were never fixed. The end result was a 
collapse of the system, the economic difficulties of the 1970s and a temporary breakdown in 
international cooperation. 
There are five key points to take from this survey of financial crisis governance. First, 
current structures have been a product of a difficult yet continuous evolution from the late 19th 
century: a process that has been informed as much by policy and academic debates as by crises. 
Second, financial hegemony is extremely rare. The only empirical case is that of the US 
in the 1940s and 1950s. This was an accidental product of the economic and political 
circumstances of the Great Depression and the Second World War.84 The US played a vital role 
in establishing the system, but as early as the 1950s, its role was being supplemented by Europe. 
Britain was not a hegemon in the 19th century: it certainly played an important leadership role 
but it was just as likely to be on the receiving end of crisis lending. 
 
84 It is also questionable whether the US would have been willing to act as a hegemon, and whether Western Europe 
would have supported it in this, without the perceived Soviet threat and the Cold War. 
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Third, concerts have been much more common and have played an important role in 
maintaining overall stability in each system. The most successful examples of this governance 
structure are the informal concert of the Classic Gold Standard and the G8/G20. The nineteenth 
century concert did not need any formal support because cooperation at the core was largely 
isolated from domestic political pressures and was supported rather than opposed by 
international financial markets. Crisis cooperation since 1919 has not been so simple. Therefore 
the G8/G20 can be judged the stronger of the two because it has dealt with more difficult crises. 
Forth, IFIs have also played an important role, especially in maintaining stability in the 
periphery. During systemic crises they play an essential auxiliary role but they cannot maintain 
systemic stability without the support of financial powers. This is amply demonstrated by the 
experience of the League in the 1920s, the BIS in the 1930s, and the IMF in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. 
Finally, therefore the most successful types have been concerts and IFI. Cooperation 
between then is desirable but depend on the development of a working relationship. This is 




Chapter 6: What Makes for an Effective Partnership in Crisis 
Governance? 
 
The governance arrangements outlined in Chapter four are the most effective that are 
possible under the economic and political realities of the international financial system as it 
existed since the late Nineteenth Century. However, to truly live up to its potential as a 
governance structure it has to develop an effective working relationship between it elements. 
Otherwise it is entirely possible for cooperation between its element to collapse, the concert and 
IFI may even begin to work at cross purposes. Three aspect of this partnership are particularly 
important. First, the concert has to effectively overcome collective action problem. Second, the 
IFI must enjoy the support of the concert if it is going to be able to fulfill its mission. Finally, a 
harmony must be achieved between the primarily political nature of the concert and the primarily 
a-political or technocratic nature of the IFI. 
This chapter argues that current global governance is built around such a partnership 
between the Group of Eight/Group of Twenty (G8/G20)85 and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This partnership works because it is based on four strengths: the resources and influence 
of these organizations, the close institutional ties between them, a clear delineation of 
responsibilities, and an emphasis on coordinated rather than common action. 
The next section will discuss the problems facing the governance structure outlined in 
chapter two in more detail as well as discussion what is necessary to deal with these problems. 
 
85 It is important to keep in mind that in the area of international financial and monetary policy the work of the G8 is 
the product of five interlinked and co-evolving institutions. Thus, the term “G8/G20” will be used to refer to the 
coordinated operations of all five institutions. 
143 
 
Section three will discuss the partnership between the G8/G20 and the IMF. Section four will 
discuss some of the criticisms leveled at this relationship. Section five will conclude. 
6.1 Problems Facing International Cooperation 
While governance built around a concert supported by an IFI is theoretically desirable, to 
be successful in practice it has to develop into an effective working relationship. As was outlined 
in chapter two, both governance arrangements have their problems. Concerts, being informal 
associations, are in danger of dissolving due to either the indifference or frustration of their 
members (Collective action problems). IFIs, being formal institutions established by treaty, need 
the material and policy support of their members, particularly the most influential, in order to 
function (Principle agent problem). Finally, these two institutions need to develop a modus 
vivendi to avoid conflict and wasted efforts (Avoiding puck-passing and conflicts). 
The most important element of the partnership is the concern at its heart. The reason for 
this is that stability at the core of the system is the most important factor in determining overall 
stability of the system. This means that a system that cannot manage crises at its core will not 
survive long. A concern, like any group of states, has to be able to overcome collective action 
problem if it is going to be effective at crisis response. There is, of course, no set formula for 
achieving this. However, perhaps the most essential element is regular collaboration which helps 
to establish ties between the members of the concert. 
Kirton (2004) point to two primary mechanisms for sustaining concert cooperation: 
iteration and shock-activated cooperation. The importance of iteration is that it created a 
relationship between the participants. This does not eliminate conflict. However, through regular 
cooperation policymakers begin to change their views of their partners. They begging to see 
other members of the concert as potential sources of support, to see policy problems beyond a 
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national perspective, and develop a better understand what can and cannot be achieved through 
cooperation. In addition, iteration allows for socialization which makes cooperation easier. Thus, 
the actual people participate in concerts decision-making, be they leaders, finance ministers or 
central bank governors, will regularly rotate through the system. Iteration means that newcomers 
will be socialized and that the concert does not have to figure out “re-invent the wheel” every 
time they meet to deal with a crisis.  
As Kirton (2004) has argued in his concert equality model of G8/G20 governance, such 
partnership is often activated by the experience of a shock that illustrates common vulnerability 
and need for cooperation (see also Hodges et.al. 1999). This is essential in this governance issue 
because by definition financial crisis governance is “shock-management.” Thus, the member of a 
concert will periodically be reminded about the importance of their crisis management 
responsibilities. 
However, these two elements can lead to either a virtuous cycle or a vicious one. In the 
virtuous cycle scenario the shock will lead to a successful response and iteration will underline 
the value of cooperation. Under a vicious cycle cooperation will be strained and will likely end if 
a particular crisis is poorly handled leading the members of the concert disillusioned with 
international cooperation. 
Thus, the two most effective concerts – that of the Classic Gold Standard (CGS) and the 
G8 and the newly emerged G20 today – both achieved this but in very different way. The concert 
of the CGS was essentially a concert of central bankers of the most important financial powers at 
the time. It was maintained through regular interaction through policy coordination and, where 
necessary, crisis response. This cooperation took place in isolation from domestic political 
pressure and with the support of financial markets. The relationship among the G7, G8 and now 
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the G20 is very different. The interaction is now between central bank governors, finance 
minister and leaders. They no longer enjoy the political isolation that their predecessors did. 
However, they have established a working relationship though continued cooperation. 
Each one of these concerts developed a particular working relationship but all have 
avoided formalization. The reason for this is that institutionalization entails costs that are as 
damaging to a concert as the collective action problems it is meant to solve. It generally involves 
a loss of flexibility and adaptability, which is critical in crisis response. 
This can be contrasted by the ineffective cooperation of the proto-concerts of the 1920s 
and 1960s. Thus, as will be discussed in chapter five, Britain, the United States, and France, 
never succeeded in establishing an effective concert in the 1920s. Furthermore, their inability to 
deal with the crisis of 1931 further undermined their ability to cooperate for the rest of the 
decade. For its part, the proto-concert of the 1960s, the so-called G10, was created to deal with 
the problems that were plaguing the late Bretton Woods System. However, it was unable to deal 
with the problems affecting the system. It was only the continued economic difficulties of the 
1970s that convinced what would eventually become the G8 that economic coordination was the 
only solution to their common problems.  
Thus, both the short lived Anglo-America economic concert of 1944 which produced the 
Bretton Woods agreement and the G8, formed after a prolonged periods of suboptimal crisis 
governance. It is also interesting to note that the development of the G20 was also shock 
activated. The G20 finance ministers’ summits were first created as a result of the dissatisfaction 
with the way the Asian crisis was handled. It became a leaders’ level summit in 2008 as a result 
of the US-turned-global crisis. 
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For its part, an IFI needs the support for key financial powers if it is going to be effective 
at dealing with crisis in the periphery of the system. Most important, it needs to have adequate 
funds to achieve its mission. Just as important however, the IFI needs to be able to conduct its 
operation independent of the interference and micromanagement of the concert. 
There are a number of views on how and why states delegation to international 
organizations. The first primarily looked at international delegation as solutions to coordination 
problems which could not be solved through bilateral agreement or ad hoc multilateral 
cooperation (Keohane 1986, Putnam 1988). Later models incorporated the domestic element of 
international cooperation. These models looked at how domestic constraints not only limit 
international cooperation but also stimulate delegation to international organization in order to 
limit such interference (Tsebelis 1994, Fearon 1998, Martin 2000, and Gilligan 2004). The third 
line of inquiry has emphasized the informational advantages of delegating power to international 
organizations (Milner & Rosendoff 1996, Kydd 2003). 
However, a key insight that is missing from this literature was proposed by Epstein & 
O’Holloran (2007). They point out that want makes international delegation fundamentally 
different form domestic delegation is that fact that states are generally not bound by membership 
in the international delegation the way a legislator is bound by the decision of his or her 
legislature. A state can simply leave an international organization if it wishes. What keeps states 
in international organization are the network externalities they produce: the more states are 
member the higher the benefits of membership.86 
 
86 There is of course also a vast literature on delegation at the domestic level as well as on delegation of power to the 
European Union. The problem with this literature is that, as noted in this paragraph the nature of this delegation is 
very different form delegation to the international level. This is true of the EU because this institution occupies a 




Two further points have to be made about this insight. First, it returns us to the original 
Neoliberal argument for why state delegate power to international organization in the first place 
(Keohane 1986). Second, in many cases it is not just that many states have joined, but rather 
which states have joined that matters. This is particularly true in the case of financial crisis 
governance. The reason is that an IFI resources and power are greatly enhanced by the support of 
the financial powers in the system. In fact, it is the support of these powers which make or break 
an IFI. 
So how much responsibility will financial powers delegate to the IFI? Since states are 
unwilling to give up their sovereignty unless they have and will set up international organization 
to meet a particular need they are unwilling or unable to meet themselves, an IFI should only 
receive enough resources to deal with crises in the periphery. Why would other countries join 
such an organization? There are two reasons. First, because this will likely be the only way they 
can access resources during a financial crisis. Second, not joining such an organization will be a 
strong signal to the international community, markets and domestic constituents that the state is 
either unwilling or unable to meet the requirement of joining this organization. This can limit the 
state’s economic prospect. 
In the 1920s the League of Nations tried to fulfill this role without the support of key 
financial powers. However, despite some notable, even remarkable successes,87 it was not able to 
maintain this role. The Bank of International Settlements (BIS), was in theory better suited for 
this role, but as we will see shortly, it institutional structure made it subject to very destructive 
interference during this crisis of 1931. The success of the IMF lies in that it has been able to 
develop a working relationship with the G8/G20 
 
87 See the Interwar Period subsection of the empirical discussion of chapter five. 
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An Effective Partnership: Avoiding Conflict and Buck-passing 
The two main problems that this governance structures need to avoid is conflict and 
buck-passing. The first arises can arise because the IFI and concert disagree about how a crisis 
should be dealt with. This problem will primarily arise if the IFI is unwilling to defer to the 
concert in such situations. Buck-passing should be less of an issue because an IFI has a strong 
incentive to intervene in financial crises that the concert it not interested in dealing with. As 
outlined in chapter four, this is because by doing so the institution justifies its existence. Thus, 
the key to managing these problems lies with the IFI. It must be willing to defer to the concert in 
times of conflict and be proactive in crisis that the financial powers do not have a clear interest. 
6.2 Current Crisis Governance88 
The G8/G20 and IMF have developed such a relationship by building their partnership on 
four pillars: membership, institutional ties, a clear division of labor, and non-interference. 
The G8/G20 includes all current, and emerging, financial powers. The members of the 
G7 have at their command a unique set of resources that make them indispensable in crisis 
management.89 Increasingly this is also true of the members of the G20, especially in the case of 
the BRICS. These resources include large financial reserves; financial systems of considerable 
size, depth and sophistication; and the fact that the world’s most important financial centers are 
found in their jurisdictions. This gives the G8/G20 both an impressive ability to provide liquidity 
to distressed markets as well as a great deal of influence over international capital. Thus during a 
crisis they can use both massive liquidity injections to stop speculative attacks and moral suasion 
to persuades investors that the underlying problems that led to the crisis are being addressed. For 
 
88 This sections draws heavily from an earlier version of this argument published as Savic (2010). 
89 The reason the G7 and not the G8 is sued is because of Russia’s ambiguous status as a financial actor on part with 
the rest of the G8 as well as its membership in the BRICS countries. 
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example, during the South Korean crisis in 1997/8 the G7 was able to influence foreign investors 
by using both their financial resources and by endorsing the South Korean government’s 
response to the crisis (Kirton 2002). 
The most important ties that keep the G8/G20 together are the regular annual leaders’ 
meetings of the G8 (and most recently the G20) and the biannual finance ministers meetings of 
the G7 and G20. The partnership with the IMF is also strengthened through these meetings since 
the Managing Director of the IMF participates at the finance ministers’ level and is regularly 
invited to leaders’ summits. This regular interaction helps establish a rapport between the 
leaders, finance ministers, central bank governors, and IMF technocrats. This helps the 
institutions deal with the friction that naturally arises from policy harmonization and collective 
problem solving. It also helps to preserve the continuity of the relationship despite the regular 
electoral changes among leaders and finance ministers. 
The formal ties between the G8/G20 and the IMF are also important. First the G8/G20 
has a great deal of influence in the IMF Board of Governors. This member appointed board is 
responsible for setting IMF policy. In it the G7 states control 44.39% of the votes and the G20 
states control 64.69%. Since important decisions, such as amending member quotas or the 
Articles of Agreement, require 85% of votes to pass, this effectively gives a veto to not only the 
US, but also the rest of the G7 and G20. Furthermore, of the 24 members of IMF Executive 
Board, which is responsible for the day-to-day decision-making of the IMF, five seats 
automatically go to the members with the largest quotas (currently this is the US, Japan, 
Germany, France and the UK) and the rest are appointed on the basis of their quotas and the 
demand for their currency. This also gives the G8/G20 a good deal of influence. Finally, by 
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tradition, the Europeans choose the head of the IMF. All of this guarantees the G8/G20 has a 
great deal of influence in shaping IMF policy. 
However, the IMF is not simply a puppet of the G8/G20. Like all institutions it jealously 
guards its autonomy and its staff maintains a great deal of independence in daily operations (see 
Bini Smaghi 2005: 327; Raab 2005: 345). In addition the IMF’s regular participation in the 
G8/G20 Summit process and its indispensable surveillance capacity give it an influential voice in 
G8/G20 decision-making. 
The G8/G20 and IMF have developed a three part division of labor along the lines argued 
in chapter two. The G8/G20 coordinates policy and deals with problems in the core. The IMF 
monitors the global financial system and deals with crises in the periphery. Systemic crises are 
handled jointly with the G8/G20 dealing with the core and providing supplementary funding for 
IMF efforts in the periphery. For example, during the turmoil of the late 1990s, the G7 played a 
decisive role in supplementing IMF resources with bilateral loans, especially in Asia, Russia and 
Brazil. However, once the systemic threat was over, it left the interventions in Argentina and 
Turkey to the Fund. Thus the real advantage of the current system is that it builds on the 
strengths of these two different governance structures and minimizes their individual 
shortcomings. 
There are also instances when regional crises emerge that are serious enough to affect 
members of the G7. These do not often fit neatly into the three part division of labor but they 
also do not substantially deviate from it. In such cases, affected members will be heavily 
involved but will usually let the IMF take the lead. 
This means that the two institutions generally keep to the division of labor outlined above 
and support the policy autonomy of member states as much as possible. In fact, even when 
151 
 
responding to a systemic crisis, the efforts taken by the G8/G20 take the form of a harmonized 
set of individual policies, not a common policy. Similarly, while the members of G8/G20 
regularly supplement the efforts of the IMF, they never try to supplant them. For example, during 
the 1994/95 Mexican Peso crisis, the US and Canada intervened to help their NAFTA partner but 
did so in cooperation with the IMF. More recently, a similar response has been adopted by the 
Europeans. Instead of directly bailing-out countries such as Iceland and later Greece, they largely 
left this to the IMF while focusing their efforts on providing supplementary funding and 
guarantees. 
This non-interference is largely the result of basic political and economic realities. The 
IMF and the member of G8/G20 do not have the power to bully other members, although they 
will often try to persuade them. In addition, there is an appreciation that they often operate under 
different economic and political constraints. Thus, during the recent crisis, the US and UK 
disagreed with Continental Europe about the appropriate levels of economic stimulus. There 
have also been cases when members have not been able to participate in crisis response efforts. 
This occurred, for example, during the Asian crisis when the US was hampered by domestic 
political opposition and Japan was hampered by its own economic problems.90 This was resolved 
by the other members of the G7 making up the shortfall. 
Finally, the G8/G20 gives the IMF a great deal of autonomy. It does this because it is 
better off supporting rather than undermining the IMF, since it does not want to get into the 
business of peripheral crisis management. Thus, the G8/G20 embodies Ruggie’s (1983) norm of 
embedded liberalism. Holding to this principle strengthens the working relationship and makes 
cooperation more palatable. 
 
90 See next chapter. 
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6.3 Criticism of Current Structures 
The G8/G20, the IMF, and their relationship attract a great deal of criticism. Much of this 
holds for any crisis governance arrangements and was therefore covered in chapter two. This 
section will briefly outline and evaluate three criticisms specific to the current partnership. 
The issue of legitimacy is very complex and there are other normative dimensions we 
could consider. Scholarly, policy and popular debates about global governance have proposed a 
number of these, of which the most important are the following. Transparency: institutions are 
clear and consistent in terms of their membership criteria, mandate, and rules of operation 
(Hodges 1999: 69-70). Legality: actions are consistent with an institution’s mandate and 
operating procedures (Bini Smaghi 2005: 325). Accountability/Stakeholder Principe: decision-
making is transparent and accountable to international and domestic public opinion (Beetham & 
Lord 1998: 12; Bini Smaghi 2005: 326). Technocratic Principle: policy is made by specialists 
with technical knowledge (Beetham & Lord 1998: 16-17). Ownership: those directly affected 
(especially marginal groups) are involved in the creation and implementation of policy (Kual 
et.al. 1999; Best 2007). Fit: policy is tailored to local circumstances (Best 2007). 
The question is whether the current partnership between the G8/G20 and the IMF meet 
any of these criteria. This is of course controversial. It largely depends on ones understanding of 
these criteria and how far they have to be met. Discussing this in detail would take one too far off 
topic. It does have to be acknowledged that the G8/G20 and the IMF have made efforts to meet 
these considerations. However, given the nature of this relationship it would be impossible to 
meet all of these criteria of legitimacy. As argued in the previous two chapters, the nature of the 
problem necessitates this structure and alternative models have not been very successful. 
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There is a great deal of debate about the relevance and contribution of particular members 
of the G8/G20. However, the fact remains that no relevant financial power is excluded from the 
G20. Another common criticism is that the G20 is too big. But given that the average 
government cabinet or corporate board of directors contains as many and usually more members, 
it is hard to see why the G20 is so unmanageable. As noted in section five, it is also very 
common to question the legitimacy of a small self-selected concert. However, it should be 
remembered that the G20 represents the first time in history that emerging markets have been 
included in plurilateral governance. Finally, the fact that the G8/G20 discusses a very broad 
range of issues has led to criticism that this diminishes its effectiveness and that it should return 
to the old economic focus of the G7. However, this argument is undermined by the fact that each 
leaders’ summit is preceded by two G8/G20 ministerial meetings. These, of course, focus 
narrowly on the technical economic and financial issues. 
The IMF is perhaps one of the most widely criticized international institutions. Research 
has shown that the results of its lending are far from ideal. Thus, participation in IMF programs 
is associated with weaker macroeconomic performance (Bordo & Schwartz 2000; Przeworski & 
Vreeland 2000; Dreher 2006), and is not followed by restoration of pre-crisis capital flows (Bird 
& Rowlands 2002; Jensen 2004, Stiglitz 2002). 
The legitimacy of IMF decision-making has also been questioned. Critics have variously 
questioned the influence of its staff, executive board, or its largest shareholders over IMF policy 
(XXX). However, despite these criticisms, there is a reasonable balance between the influence of 
the staff and the board. As for the influence of shareholders, while emerging markets are 
underrepresented, developing and transition economies are actually slightly overrepresented. 
Thus, there are 160 developing and 24 transitional member countries. They provide 35% of total 
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IMF funding, but control 40% of the vote (Bini Smaghi 2005: 330). As for emerging economy 
votes, this is an ongoing part of G20 summit negotiation. In fact, there has been a breakthrough 
on this from at the October meeting of the G20 finance ministers in Soul. The G20 has decided 
to approve the shift of 6% in IMF quotas form developed nation, such as the European member 
of the IMF, to emerging economies, such as China and India. This is a significant move which 
effectively deals with this longstanding criticism of the IMF. 
The IMF is also criticized for its lack of accountability, transparency and program 
ownership. In these areas the IMF has made progress in recent years. However, the willingness 
of borrowers to disclose information, as well as the cost to effectiveness and efficiency this 
entails, limits how far the IMF staff can pursue these goals. 
Perhaps the most criticized aspect of the IMF is conditionality (see Bond 2000; Rude 
2005). Kapur (1998) has argued that it has grown to absurd and dangerous dimensions, becoming 
increasingly intrusive. This is another problem that the IMF has recognized and is trying to 
address. In September 2002 the IMF’s Executive Board approved the reform of conditionality 
guidelines according to five principles: parsimony, tailoring, co-ordination, clarity and 
ownership. The IMF has made strides towards these goals (Best 2007). 
But conditionality must also be put in context. First, as (Marz 1982: 187) points out, 
crisis lending, be it national or international, has always had a conservative bias. Second, 
conditionality is the product of a complex set of explicit and tacit bargains between the various 
stakeholders, and is not simply dictated by the IMF (MacIntyre 2001; Gould, 2003). Third, 
despite its influence, the IMF cannot force the recipient government to implement any policies, 
nor can it perfectly monitor compliance (Kahler, 1993). Finally, making crisis borrowing 
painless is an invitation to moral hazard problems. 
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The general issue of who benefits from global crisis governance has been dealt with in 
chapter two. This section will therefore only examine the criticism that the G8/G20-IMF is 
driven by a monolithic ideology, the so-called Washington Consensus. This term was coined by 
Williamson (1993) to describe the intellectual agreement that developed by the early 1990s that 
statist development strategies had failed. This simple observation was then developed into the 
idea that, through their ties with the New York Federal Reserve and Washington, Wall Street is 
using US hegemony to impose a radical free market regime (Wade 2002). However, this 
consensus was not then nor is it now a deliberate strategy. It is simply an intellectual framework 
that became prominent in the early 1990s, one that has been shaken by the recent experiences of 
the Asian and US sub-prime Crises. The emergence of such frameworks is, for better or worse, a 
frequent occurrence in economic history.91 It is a mistake to see the IMF and G8/G20 as 
incurably ideological institutions. Rather they are forums for the exchange of ideas between 
policymakers (Baker, 2006). 
6.4 Conclusion 
In the final analysis, these criticisms have to be taken seriously and there is clearly much 
room for improvement. However, two points deserve emphasis. First, current structures are not 
static but are continuously evolving. Second, there are no feasible reforms that could 
dramatically solve all of the problems outlined above. As Giannini (2002) points out, successful 
institutional reforms usually do not happen as quantum jumps, but instead as small changes at the 
margins. Ultimately, the G8/G20 and IMF partnership is sound. 
  
 
91 See Ruggie (1983) for a general overview of the role of ideas in financial regimes. For the Classic Gold Standard 
see Polanyi (1944/2001) and Gallarotti (1993, 1995). For the Interwar Period see Eichengreen (1992), Simmons 
(1994) and Pauly (1997). For the postwar periods see James (1996), Pauly (1997) and Krasner (1985). 
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Chapter 7: Two Cases of Systemic Financial Crises 
 
This chapter will illustrate the problems that arise from a poorly structured partnership 
between a concert of financial powers and an IFI. It compares crisis response during the Central 
European Banking Crises of 1930/31 and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98. It argues that the 
crisis response efforts of the early 1930s failed because they were poorly coordinated, whereas 
the efforts of the late 1990s, although far from ideal, were in the end effective. The main reason 
for this difference lies in the regimes in place during each period. 
7.1 Case Selection 
The two cases were selected because of a number of desirable characteristics. First, both 
represent serious financial crises that, although they began as relatively minor problems, quickly 
spread and threatened to destabilize the entire financial system. Looking at such cases is useful 
because it is during such crises that the need for international cooperation is the most obvious but 
also the most difficult. 
Second, there is a good deal of similarity between these two crises: both were preceded 
by an economic boom; both case of twin crises (i.e. a simultaneous currency/balance-of-
payments and banking crisis); both were characterized by problems of contagion and attempts at 
international coordination. Of course, we should not exaggerate the similarities between them. 
One very important difference was that the financial crises of the early 1930s were preceded by a 
slump in the real economy, while for the Asian Crisis there were few obvious problems before its 
outbreak.92 Yet their outbreak, the way in which they developed and spread, the threat they posed 
 
92 See for example the assessment of World Bank in the 1993 The East Asian Economic Miracle: Economic Growth 
and Public Policy Paper and the 1997 World Bank Annual Report. 
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to the international financial system, and the attempts made to deal with them make them 
remarkably similar. 
Third, there are several ways in which these two events differ which are important. The 
most relevant of these are the institutional environment in which they took place and the level of 
cooperation that was undertaken to deal with them. Again these differences should also not be 
exaggerated but they are still significant. So while there was some level of institutional support 
for the international financial system in the Interwar Period, this was very sparse and not geared 
toward dealing with serious financial crises. In terms of international cooperation, both crises 
had their share of problems. Indeed many would object to calling IMF loans and conditionality 
the result of “negotiation” or “cooperation.” Still, the level and success of cooperation was very 
different in these two periods, especially with respect to the coordination of efforts by the most 
important financial powers of both eras. 
Finally, they are significant in terms of their outcome: while the results of the Asian 
Financial crises are far from ideal, when comparing it to the fallout of the Great Depression, they 
can be judged a success. Thus, the financial crises of the Great Depression had numerous 
negative effects: they deepened the already serious economic depression; they destabilized and 
eventually led to the collapse of the international exchange rate system; they greatly hampered 
the functioning of the international financial system; and finally, the collapses they produced 
further inhibited cooperation during the rest of the decade. 
7.2 Central European Banking Crises, 1930/31 
There were five problems that led to crisis in Central Europe. First, a series of defaults by 
heavily indebted nations, mostly in Latin America, made international investors reluctant to lend 
in 1930. This was a serious problem for Central European governments as they relied heavily on 
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foreign loans to finance their debts and spending. Second, Austria, Germany and Hungary, were 
having balance of payments difficulties and their gold pegs were set too high, a common 
problem under the Gold Exchange Standard. Third, their banking sectors had serious 
vulnerabilities. Like their governments, their liquidity depended on foreign short-term deposits. 
In addition, banks in Austria and Germany had close ties to industry and those in Hungary to 
agriculture. As both sectors had experienced a long slump, this further undermined the banking 
sector. In addition, there were problematic ties between governments and banks, although not as 
serious as in the Asian case. Fourth, domestic crisis response efforts were hampered by the 
double bind imposed by a twin crisis. The reserves of central banks were not large enough to 
both maintain the overvalued peg and provide liquidity to distressed banks. This worried foreign 
depositors and, as is often the case, doubts became self-fulfilling prophecies. Finally, high levels 
of capital mobility, close regional links between banking systems, and incomplete information 
about the actual conditions ensured the crisis spread quickly. 
The crisis began in Austria when its largest bank, Credit-Anstalt, experienced liquidity 
problems. At first the Austrian National Bank was able to provide assistance as it had carefully 
managed it reserves. However, by mid-May it was forced to ask for foreign help and secured a 
$14 million loan through the BIS. Unfortunately this loan took three weeks to negotiate and was 
inadequate since the Credit-Anstalt had $100 million in foreign deposit obligations. The loan was 
exhausted in a week. This meager international response was largely due to French opposition. 
France was worried about a proposed customs union between Austria and Germany, which it 
saw as a dangerous step towards the repudiation of Versailles. But delays were also caused by 
Anglo-American squabbling over national contributions to the loan. A second loan was also 
blocked by Paris, this time with the support of Belgium and Italy. Eventually the Bank of 
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England unilaterally extended £4.3 million and was soon followed by the BIS. But this was too 
little too late. The Credit-Anstalt collapsed due to delayed assistance brought on by too much 
caution, political conflict and a miscalculation about the magnitude of the problem (Bennett 
1962; Clarke 1967: 183-9; Moggridge 1982: 180) 
Hungary’s crisis was directly related to events in Austria as the Credit-Anstalt had a 
controlling stake in Hungary’s largest bank. When the news of Credit-Anstalt’s problems 
surfaced in May, foreign investors started a run on the Hungarian banking system. In June the 
BIS and a consortium of nine central banks extended a $10 million three-month credit, but these 
funds were quickly exhausted. By July Hungary’s banking system collapsed and it was forced 
off gold. 
The ties between the Austrian and German banking systems were not as close as those 
between Austria and Hungary. Credit-Anstalt’s investments in Germany were insignificant in 
terms of the size of the German banking sector. Similarly, German banks maintained only 
modest balances in Vienna. The reason why the crisis spread was that the two economies and 
their banking systems were very similar. As a result, international investors, lacking timely 
information on Germany, took Austria’s crisis as a warning that they needed to pull out 
(Eichengreen 1992: 271). This time the international response got off to a better start: on June 24 
markets were calmed by $100 million loan organized by the Bank of England, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, Bank of France and the BIS. Despite this, the crisis deepened and the 
Reichsbank requested a further $1 billion. This met with a great deal of resistance, and this time 
not just from France. Negotiations dragged on because London and New York wanted to force 
Paris into making concessions on its reparations demands (Clark 1967: 190-91; Eichengreen 
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1992: 276-7). Eventually, a loan was secured but again it was too late (Clarke 1967: 173-6; 
Sayers 1976: 233; Moggridge 1982: 179) 
Next, the crisis spread to Britain, but for slightly different reasons. Because London was 
geared primarily toward international finance, it was not as badly affected by the early stages of 
the economic downturn in the rest of the British economy. Rather it was the City’s exposure to 
Central European banks that proved fatal: a combination of international debt defaults and frozen 
deposits led to insolvency. This further deteriorated Britain’s already difficult balance of 
payments problems. Because of the importance of London, for the first time since the crisis 
began, international assistance came quickly. New York and Paris raised a total of $650 million. 
Unfortunately, this was only enough to prolong the crisis, rather than actually halt it (Moggridge 
1982: 181). 
Britain was quickly forced off gold. By the end of the year it was followed by a dozen 
other countries. But the real importance of these crises is that they deepened the depression. 
Economies contracted as monetary policy tightened, bank lending contracted, and investor 
confidence eroded (Eichengreen 1992: 258). 
In the end, the problem with international efforts was not a lack of funds but rather the 
slow and ineffective way they were distributed. Between May and September 1931, Britain, 
France, the US and the BIS raised approximately $1 billion. This is 10% of international short-
term indebtedness or just under 5% of the (slump-diminished) value of world imports (see BIS 
1932: 12-3; Moggridge 1982: 181). 
The delay was the result of the inability of the regime to manage conflict between the key 
players. Crisis response was hampered at every turn by France’s geopolitical concerns, Britain’s 
attempts to use the crisis to make far-reaching changes to the international economic order, and 
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the domestic constraints imposed on the New York Fed (Bennett 1962: chs. 6-8; Clarke 1967: 
189-201; Moggridge 1982: 180-1). While the BIS made concerted efforts to provide assistance, 
with only $400 million in total assets, it could do very little on its own (Clark 1967: 147). 
7.3 Asian Financial Crisis, 1997/98 
In the late 1990s East Asia was dealing with many of the same problems that affected 
Central Europe in the early 1930s.93 First, the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994/95 eroded 
international confidence in emerging market currency pegs. However, unlike the early 1930s, 
this did not mean an immediate slowdown in international capital flows. Second, most countries 
in the region (particularly Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea) were running large current 
account deficits while setting their currency pegs too high (especially against the US dollar). 
Third, there were serious vulnerabilities in the banking sector. Most large private banks 
borrowed short-term in dollars and lent long-term in their local currency without covering their 
exchange rate risk. They also carried bad loans on their books which were backed by government 
guarantees. Fourth, once the crisis broke, governments could not stretch their reserves to defend 
both their currency pegs and provide liquidity to distressed banks. Finally, the presence of a large 
volume of hot money, a lack of transparency, and close ties between Asia’s banking sectors 
aggravated these problems and helped spread the crisis. 
The crisis originated in Thailand in the summer of 1997. It then quickly spread to the 
Philippines, which was soon forced to float the peso. However, at first the G8 ignored the crisis. 
At the Denver Summit of 1997 it was completely absent from discussions. Similarly, while the 
G7 finance ministers meeting mentioned the events unfolding in Asia there was no urgency to 
 
93 One key difference is that the financial crises of the early 1930s were preceded by a slump in the real economy, 
whereas, with the exception of Thailand, there were few signs of serious problems before the Asian crisis. See for 
example the assessment of the World Bank (1993; 1997). 
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their statement. The G8 was more than happy to leave the issue to Asian countries, regional 
institutions and the IMF. 
This changed dramatically by their next meeting, which coincided with problems in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. As the crisis spread to Indonesia and South Korea the first dramatic steps 
were taken at the semi-annual IMF meeting. The G7 finance ministers agreed to increase IMF 
reserves by 45% and to amend the IMF’s Article of Agreement within the year. In the autumn of 
1997, Japan and the US provided significant contributions to the so called ‘second line of 
defense’ fund for Indonesia. This was set up in case the funding provided by the IMF and other 
IFIs proved inadequate. By November 1997, the G8 formalized the ‘second line of defense’ 
agreement and its members started working on obtaining legislative authority to contribute to it 
as the crisis progressed. In December, the G7 endorsed the $35 billion package the IMF and 
other IFIs had created for South Korea and pledged to reinforce it if necessary. The specific 
pledges were as follows: Japan $10 billion, the US $5 billion, Germany, France, the UK and Italy 
$1.25 billion each, and Canada $1 billion. More importantly the G7 leaders were able to 
persuade their banks to roll over and reschedule their loans to South Korea (Kirton 2002). This, 
along with pledges by South Korea’s newly elected government, calmed markets without 
drawing on the ‘second line of defense.’ 
The pressure on other governments also decreased. The notable exception was Indonesia, 
which refused to adopt IMF prescriptions. As a result, at the beginning of 1998 Germany and the 
US intervened with the support of other G7 members. By mid-January, Indonesia negotiated a 
new letter of intent with the IMF revising its economic targets and pledging far-reaching 
structural reforms. By April 1998 the situation in Asia had stabilized. The crisis would 
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eventually spread to Russia, Brazil and Argentina, but further contagion was prevented through 
joint IMF–G7 actions. 
It is important to note that throughout the crisis the US and Japan experienced serious 
problems that hampered their contributions. Japan was dealing with problems in its banking 
sector unrelated to the Asian Crisis and the US experienced financial problems as a result of the 
crisis. Most notably, the New York Federal Reserve was forced to organize a private consortium 
to deal with the collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management. In addition, 
throughout this period the US Congress mounted serious opposition to US crisis lending and 
increases to IMF quotas (see Phillips, Davis and Druckerman 1998). Fortunately the other G7 
members successfully covered this shortfall in US support. 
As one would expect with a crisis that did not initially affect the core of the system, the 
Asian crisis initially drew the attention of the IMF, but not the G7. Thus the G7 reacted much 
later then it should have. However, once the extent of the danger was realized, the G7 and IMF 
played a decisive role in managing the crisis. Another problem was that, even as the crisis was 
unfolding, the G7 and IMF were being accused of imposing the same policies that were 
responsible for the crisis in the first place. This negative view of crisis response efforts further 
hampered their effectiveness (Cardim de Carvalho 2001). 
One surprising aspect of the crisis is that it resulted in the creation of two new 
institutions: the G20 and the FSF. At the Vancouver APEC conference in November 1997, 
President Clinton announced the creation of a temporary committee called the G22 (also known 
as the “Willard Group”), which first met on April 16, 1998 in Washington. It was quickly 
superseded by the G33 in early 1999, and then by the G20 later that year. The FSF was based on 
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a study commissioned by the G7 finance ministers, and was created to propose improvements to 
the international financial architecture (Kirton 2002; Hajnal 2007). 
7.4 Explaining the Divergent Outcomes 
Crisis response efforts of the early 1930s were a failure on at least three levels: at no 
point did they produce a coherent and timely response; they failed to prevent the spread of the 
crisis to the core of the system; and the experience irreparably damaged already weak 
international cooperation. By comparison the response of the 1990s was a success in both 
relative and absolute terms. Of course there were many failures in the G7-IMF response. A 
concerted effort early on could have confined the crisis to South East Asia. In addition, the 
affected countries could have been given more economic support in their post-crisis recovery 
efforts. However, an effective response was eventually mounted, a potential disaster was averted, 
and international governance was strengthened. 
What explains the different outcomes? Eichengreen (1992: 10 & 259) gives three causes 
for the breakdown of international cooperation in 1930: domestic political constraints, 
international political disputes, and incompatible conceptual frameworks. However, similar 
problems plagued international cooperation in 1997. The key difference between 1997 and 1931 
comes down to the governance structures: while in theory they were similar, in practice those of 
1997 were able to overcome obstacles to cooperation while those of 1931 exacerbated them. 
First, the efforts in 1931 were clearly hampered by powerful domestic groups that wanted 
to avoid costly adjustments made necessary by the crisis. However, similar domestic opposition 
to lending and conditionality hampered the response of East Asian governments in 1997/98 (see 
MacIntyre 2001). In terms of domestic political opposition in donor countries, the situation was 
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actually more severe in 1997/98 than in 1931. While Congress hampered the efforts of the New 
York Fed in 1931, it effectively tied the hands of the US government in 1998 (Kirton 2002). 
Second, international tensions over German reparation and French and British war debts 
to the US certainly stalled crisis response in 1931. However, one of the main reasons why these 
issues could be exploited by Paris, and to a lesser extent New York and London, is because of 
poor institutional design. The mandate of the BIS was divided between supporting and 
coordinating central bank activity and managing reparation payments. In addition, similar 
tensions also existed in the 1990s over IMF quota and voting reforms, conditionality (specifically 
their perceived Washington Consensus bias), and most importantly, over persistent current 
account imbalances. Indeed, recipient anger over conditionality and lender frustration over the 
persistent trade deficit with South East Asia could have derailed crisis response in 1997. 
One could also argue that French geopolitical concerns, particularly its fear of the 
proposed Austro-German customs union, played an important role. However, France did not 
have that much to fear from the Weimar Republic and could have been persuaded to relent 
earlier than it did. Regardless, the fact remains that France was not a financial power on par with 
the US and Britain. The latter could have easily organized a loan without French participation. 
Perhaps the most important obstacle to cooperation was the divergence in conceptual 
frameworks. However, as Eichengreen (1992) himself points out, this disagreement was not 
about fundamental questions such as the value of maintaining gold or containing financial crises. 
Rather it was about how these goals could best be achieved. Radical policy experimentation 
would only begin after these crises (Pauly 1997: 56-61). This intellectual divergence was not all 
that different from the divergence that existed in the 1990s over issues surrounding the exchange 
rate regimes, imbalances, capital controls, etc. In fact, these issues continued to generate serious 
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debate both during and after the Asian Crisis. Thus the existence of intellectual disagreements is 
not enough to explain the poor cooperation. 
It could be argued that the real obstacle to an adequate response in 1931 was the two-
year-long economic slump. In contrast, the global economy was not facing any serious obstacle 
in 1997 and the emergence of the Asian Crisis came as something of a surprise. However, rather 
than being a hindrance to crisis response, the economic clump of 1928/29 should have acted as a 
catalyst for international cooperation. By 1930 there were signs of recovery, something a 
financial crisis could only endanger. In contrast, the sudden outbreak of the Asian Crisis only 
made it harder to mobilize an international response. This is in part why the G7 took so long to 
respond. 
Thus, while the problems plaguing international cooperation in 1931 were serious, they 
were neither unique nor insurmountable. The failure of 1931 and the success of 1998 lie in the 
effectiveness of crisis governance and its ability to do what international institutions are intended 
to do: overcome the obstacles to cooperation. 
Institutional Failure 
The governance structures of 1931 were a dismal failure in this regard. First, even though 
it is easier to create an effective working relationship between three powers than it is with seven 
or twenty, Paris, London and New York never managed this. True, each faced obstacles that held 
it back. Paris was overly concerned with geopolitics, reparations and establishing its role as a 
financial power (Moggridge 1982: 177). London was too keen on playing a leadership role 
despite its decline (Kindelberger 1978/1996). New York certainly faced the greatest obstacles. 
Not only was it new to international crisis cooperation (it played almost no role in prewar 
governance) but it faced substantial domestic opposition from both Congress and the other banks 
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in the Reserve System (Eichengreen 1992: 11). Such conflicts could have been overcome if a 
working relationship had been developed through regular interactions. Such interaction solidified 
the G7 in the 1980s; the relationship between England, France, Russia, and Germany in the late 
19th century; and briefly established a relationship between London and New York in the 1920s. 
Second, the Bank for International Settlement could not provide an effective crisis response. 
Since it was founded less than a year before the crisis broke, it lacked the experience to deal with 
problems of the magnitude it faced. Its resources were also small to the point of being ridiculous. 
Its divided mandate produced a political fault-line that was exploited by its member countries. 
Finally, the Federal Reserve was legally forbidden by Congress to join the BIS. Thus, one of its 
major supporters was limited to giving unofficial and sporadic assistance. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Thus, the G8 and the IMF have developed an effective working relationship that has been 
able to deal with move very significant financial crises and maintain international cooperation 
during one of the most volatile periods in the history of the international financial system. 
The big question now is whether the G20 will be able to continue this prelateship. In the 
end, only time will be able to answer this question. However, there are strong reasons for 
optimism. First, the G20 finance minster forum was created during the Asian financial crisis. The 
recent crisis has demonstrated the need for strengthening this institution and placing it at the 
center of financial and economic governance. Over the last three year of crisis cooperation the 
G20 has been able to maintain it cohesion despite at times serious disagreements.94 
Second, it is also very significant that, for the foreseeable future, the G8 and the G20 will 
continue to exist as separate institution. The G8 will primarily deal with political issue, while the 
 
94 See chapter six. 
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G20 will primarily focus on economic issues. Thus, in 2011 the two institutions will hold two 
distinct summits, though both hosted by France. The G8 has meet in May 27 in Deauville, while 
the G20 will meet almost six months later in November 3-4 in Cannes. This separation of the two 
institutions is significant because the political differences among the member of the G20 are 
much more significant than their difference on economic and financial issues. 
Finally, it is important to appreciate the continuity between the G8 and the G20. The 
creation of the G20 as the leader’s level was preceded by almost a decade of cooperation at the 
level of finance ministers. More importantly, this shift represent what Ruggie (1983) would call a 
change in regime as opposed to a change of regime. This means that this change reflects the 
change in the underlying distribution of power in the system not a change in how the issue area is 




Chapter 8: G20 and IMF Response in 2008-2010 
 
The November 14-15, 2008 Summit of the Group of Twenty (G20) held in Washington 
D.C. was heralded by some as a Second Bretton Woods.95 Not only was this the first time that 
the G20 met at the leaders’ level but this summit also made very ambitions commitment to dealt 
with the regularity problems that lead the American-turned-global financial crisis. However, this 
was not the first time that key financial leaders promised dramatic changes to the international 
financial system. One is immediately reminded of the past attempts at reform that end in failure. 
Perhaps the most significant are the 1933 London Economic Conference and the 1971 
Smithsonian Agreement, which failed to save the interwar and post-war international monetary 
systems respectively. Of course, we do not need to go that far back to find such worrying 
examples. More recently, in the wake of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994/95, the Group of Seven 
proposed the idea of a New International Financial Architecture at the 1995 Halifax Summit. The 
goal was to strengthen international institutions in order to help identify and prevent financial 
crisis. Calls for this new initiative were renewed in the wake of the far more serious Asian-
turned-global financial crisis of 1997/98 and the crises that follows. However, few concrete 
actions were taken. Now more than two years after the first leader’s summit what has the G20 
actually achieved? More important, what are the implications of their success or failure? 
The goal of this paper is threefold. First, it will evaluate compliance with the 
commitments made by the G20 on reforms to oversight in: accounting standard, the banking 
industry, credit rating agencies, and derivates markets. It will also put these efforts in context of 
the larger efforts of the G20 to deal with the 2008 crisis and its aftermath. Second, it will explain 
 
95 See Helleiner (2010: 619) for some examples of this idea. 
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the observed levels of compliance. Finally, it will discuss the long term impact of regulatory 
changes for global financial stability. 
So far the members of the G20 have only made moderate striates toward financial reform. 
This modest success can be explained by five key factors. Timing: the G20 initially 
underestimated how long the crisis and its aftershocks would affect the international financial 
system. Ideological divergence: while there is board agreement in principle significant 
differences of opinion among the G20 remain on a number of issue. Resurgence of financial 
markets: an ironic consequence of the strengthening of finical institutions is their increased 
willingness and ability to challenge governments. Growing domestic opposition: that is a result 
of the slow recover and the need for painful political decisions. Lack of regulatory capacity: 
regularity authority is not fully under the control of G20 leaders, much of it is either sub-national 
(e.g. the US and Canada) and supranational (e.g. EU members). 
The issue of regulatory reform will likely occupy the G20 for the next decade. Progress 
will likely be made, given the stakes, however it will be slow. Most importantly, the unrealistic 
expectation that a future set of sound regulatory reforms will ensure future global financial 
stability will not be achieved. Financial crises will remain a threat. However, the expectation that 
somehow the G20 could come together to design a set of regulations and policy commitments 
that would prevent future crises was always unrealistic. The real danger is that failure to meet 
there unrealistic expectation on the financial regulation front will overshadow some notable 
successes that the G20 have achieved in the last three years. More importantly, it may strain the 
relationship of the G20 which is the greatest danger. Future crisis are simply inevitable and the 
G20, with the support of the IMF and other IFIs, will have to play the role of International 
Lender of Last Resort (ILOLR) 
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The next section will briefly outline the origins of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and 
how it spread around the world. Sections three and four will discuss the joint efforts of the G20 
over the last three years. Section five will discuss the attempts at financial regulation among the 
G7 countries. This subset of the G20 was selected because, as will be discussed, they are the 
most curtail for the success of financial reform efforts. This is because the G7 countries that were 
more effected by the recent crisis and because they contain the most important global financial 
center. Section six will forward an explanation for the limited success of financial reforms. The 
final section will assess of the implications for current efforts for future financial stability. 
8.1 Origins of the Crisis 
The crisis began with the collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market. A real estate 
boom, along with ineffective regulation, poor government policy, and unscrupulous and in some 
cases illegal behavior by lenders, played a role in expanding mortgage investment (Wade 2008: 
31-32; Brunnermeier 2009: 78). When prices in the real-estate market began to deflate, mortgage 
holders, many of whom were overextended, began defaulting.96 But it was the securitization of 
the US mortgage market which made the crisis systemic. By creating “toxic assets,” Wall Street 
obscured the connections between the original mortgage holders and final investors. It is these 
derivatives that made the crisis global (Economist 2008) 
This crisis is one of the most serious the international financial system has faced. Indeed, 
it is a more serious challenge then the Asian Financial Crises because it originated and has 
serious implications for the very core of the international financial system. The scale of the 
problem and the potential negative economic impact already suggests comparisons with the 
 
96 Liebowitz (2009), using data from the Mortgage Bankers Association, asserts that 51% of all foreclosed 
mortgages were prime, not subprime, and that the rate of prime foreclosure grew at double the rate of subprime 
loans. It is also interesting to note that similar crises also developed independently in the UK and Spain due to 
analogous trends in their housing and banking sectors. 
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Great Depression. However, the problems today are most similar to those of the mid 1970s: 
financial crises at the very core of the economic system, the spectre of both economic recession 
and rising inflation, rising commodity prices, and currency instability. 
A financial crisis hitting the core economies is not a new or even rare phenomenon. In the 
late 1990s the Japanese financial system experienced severe problems due to the asset market 
bubble, which was in part stimulated by the deregulation of Japan’s banking industry. This crisis 
led to the contraction of the Japanese’s economy, which took years to recover, and in part 
hampered the recovery of East Asia after the 1997/98 Meltdown.97 The US has also had its fair 
share of financial problems. In the late 1960s the US economy was burdened by the twin 
constrains of US’s Cold War foreign policy and it central role in the Bretton Woods financial 
system. By the 1970s the US had to abandon it gold peg and was hit by the energy crises, 
stagflation and serious problems in its banking sector. In the 1980s the US experienced problems 
resulting from a rising dollar and a crisis in its savings and loan industry. The later crisis, which 
was in part a result of poorly thought-out de-regulation, led to the collapse of around 1,200 S&L 
institutions and caused about $160 billion in economic damage to the US economy (White, 
1991). 
Five general causes of the crisis can be identifies. The first is the formal and informal 
process of weakening oversight and deregulation of US financial markets. The role played by 
deregulation is a contentious and partisan issue but we can say with some confidence that 
weakening oversight was in part responsible for the increased risk-taking in the housing sector. 
However, the weakening oversight is not just a matter lack of government regulation. The failure 
of private oversight is just as significant. Despite the promise of free-market believers; rating 
 
97 For an overview and analysis of Japan’s crisis and economic problems see Grimes (2001) and Maswood (2002). 
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agencies, mortgage brokers, and self-regulating banks all failed to manage risk and provide due 
diligence. 
A second cause was the collapse of the Dot.com Bubble. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s a great deal of capital flooded into the so-called new economy. This lead to the inflation of 
stock prices of most internet related business. As is usually the case in these situations, when this 
bubble burst investors were concerned with finding safe havens for their money. Traditionally 
housing is one of the safest investments and this sector was growing at the time so a great deal of 
the dot.com money found its way into the housing market. This inflated prices and prompted 
more investor interest in the housing market. 
The third cause was speculation in the housing market. While in the U.S. there has been a 
tendency to portray the crises and the subsequent bailout as a fight between Wall Street and Main 
Street the actual situation is much more complicated then this. Wall Street certainly acted with 
greed and recklessness. However, there was also a great deal of speculation on the part of Main 
Street. Thus, in 2005 around 28% and in 2006 around 22% of housing purchases were 
investments: people buying homes not to live in them but to “flip” them for profit. In fact this 
idea was so popular that there were a number of reality television programs, such as “Flipping 
Out,” “Property Ladder,” “Flip this House,” etc. which centered around people buying and 
renovating a home so they could sell it for a profit.  
The fourth cause we can point to is government policy. The US Federal Reserve interest 
rate policy made investing in housing look more attractive than it was. However, this does not 
get investors off the hook since forward looking markets should have been able to avoid this 
temptation. A more serious issue is the role played by the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977. This act was aimed at getting loans to minority and low-income household that had 
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historically been denied access to leaning due to so-called “redlining” policies. Though the act 
had been around since the 1970s it was deal law until the Clinton Administration breathed new 
life into it in 1995. Despite half-hearted attempts to modify this policy under the Bush 
Administration it was still in force after 2000. This policy lead to the creating of sub-prime 
mortgages and strengthened the profits and influence of Freddie Mac and Fannie May two 
government sponsored entities which backed a large portion of the mortgage market in the U.S. 
This did contribute to a number of problematic mortgages that would lead to the crisis. However, 
it should also be pointed out that many bad mortgages were not a direct result of this program 
and that many mortgages that have come out of this program have not turned bad. 
The final cause was the introduction of a number of innovations to the mortgage market, 
in particular the securitization of mortgages. It did play a role in distorting perceptions of the risk 
associated with investing in the mortgage market and thus lead to more reckless behaviour. 
However, its real importance lays in terms of spreading the effect of the crises far further then 
would otherwise have been the case. If we compare current Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis with 
Savings and Loans Crisis of the 1980s, which were very similar in many respects, one thing that 
stands out it how far the effect of the current crises are felt and how quickly they spread to the 
rest of the financial system. The trading of mortgage-backed securities spread the crisis to Wall 
Street, to banks in Europe and Asian, and even to small town around the world that turned to 
these securities as safe investments. 
Thus there are multiple causes to the current crisis. One negative side-effect of this fact is 
that it helps politicize the discussion about the crises. Many commentators, on both the left and 
right, have interpreted the crises through their own ideological filter in order to support their own 
agendas. Thus believers in free markets can point to the government’s role and use this as ground 
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for criticizing any government efforts to fix the problem. Those that are sceptical about financial 
markets can point to government deregulation and the failure of market self-regulation and call 
for more government oversight. Some have even turned to populist rhetoric portraying the crisis 
as a struggle between Wall Street vs. Main Street. However, there is in fact enough blame to go 
around. But these debates do tell us that the crisis response and post-crisis reform efforts are 
going to be very politicized and difficult. 
The current difficulties have been further exacerbated by: US budget and balance of 
payments deficits; a weakening US dollar; a rise in oil prices (partially influenced the events in 
the Middle East), and rising food prices (partially the result of increasing oil prices and 
government energy policy). All of this seems like déjà vu of the economic problems of the 
1970s. 
8.2 Early Crisis Response 
The problems underlying the US mortgage market came to a head in the summer of 2007. 
A number of banks and financial institutions, including Bear Sterns, were facing severe liquidity 
problems as a result of their exposure to the sub-prime market. By October financial giants like 
Citigroup and Merrill Lynch and even non-US banks like the Swiss bank USB announced losses 
from exposure to mortgage markets in the billions of dollars. In December 2007, as the number 
of foreclosures and bad loans on the books of most financial institutions continued to mount, the 
US government outlined plans to help more than a million home owners facing foreclosure. At 
the start of 2008 the full extent of the crisis has become increasing apparent. In January the 
World Bank predicted a world economic slowdown for 2008. On February 10, G7 finance 
ministers announce that losses from the crisis could reach $400 billion. And on April 8, the IMF 
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announces that the losses could reach or exceed $1 trillion as the crisis moves from the mortgage 
industry into other sectors of the economy. 
Since its outbreak the sub-prime crisis has occupied the attention of all actors in the 
international financial system. Most have looked to the G8/G7 to provide leadership in dealing 
with this crisis as well as the other economic problems affecting the international financial 
system. The latter include: increasing commodity prices, inflation, international imbalances, the 
declining US dollar, the rising Euro and the inflexibility of the Chinese Yuan. In this period, 
responses to the crisis took three forms. First, attempts to inject liquidity into the financial 
system. This includes lowering interest rate, direct injection of capital into markets and swaps of 
bad mortgage based debts for government bonds. Second, government or governments sponsored 
private bailouts and takeovers of key financial institutions affected by the crises. Finally, there 
were concerted attempts to stimulate the economy and stave off or minimize the negative effects 
of the crisis. The most significant of which was the US government’s Economic Stimulus Act of 
2008 which was passed in February of that year. 
Thus, 2007 saw a number of national and coordinated international open-market-
interventions to help stabilize the difficult situation. The first official response came on August 9, 
2007 when the US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank (ECB), and the Bank of Japan all 
intervened to inject liquidity into the market. Despite these efforts inter-bank interest rates 
continued to increase as a result of liquidity concerns. On September 19 the Bank of England, 
which had previously been reluctant to intervene, injected £10 billion into the financial system. 
The second intervention to improve liquidity took place on December 13 when the Federal 
Reserve coordinated the efforts of five leading central banks (ECB, Bank of England, Bank of 
Japan, Bank of Canada, and the Bank of Switzerland) to offer billions of dollars in loans to 
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banks. This was followed on December 17 by a $20 billion auction by the Federal Reserve and 
on December 18 the European Central Bank offered $500 billion in auctions to help commercial 
banks over the Christmas holidays. However the crisis was still only heating up. By January 21, 
2008 global stock markets responded with their biggest fall since 9/11. This fall was followed by 
an emergency rate cut by the US Fed which helps markets rally. On March 7 the Federal Reserve 
was once again force to intervene with a $200 billion loan. Similarly the Bank of England 
announced on April 21a £50 billion plan to allow banks to swap bad mortgage loans for 
government bonds. 
While these efforts were well coordinated they were not enough to help troubled financial 
intuitions which were threatening the stability of a number of banking systems. As a result, 
governments turned to direct bailouts of key financial institutions. One of the first was the Bank 
of England’s temporary nationalization of Northern Rock Bank on February 17. This step 
followed a series of failed attempts to stabilize the bank through government loans and private 
sector rescue proposals. The first serious direct intervention by the US government took place on 
July 14 when it stepped in to help Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These two financial institutions 
were the main supports to the mortgage industry in the US and together own or guarantee around 
$5 trillion in home loans. On September 7, these two financial institutions are bailed out by the 
Federal Reserve in the largest rescue in US history. Despite these and other efforts growth 
projection for the US, UK and Europe were downgraded in September. 
In addition to these official efforts, the private sector also made efforts to bailout troubled 
banks. Thus on March 17, 2008 Bear Sterns was acquired by JP Morgan Chase, in a deal backed 
by government loans. By September 10 Lehman Brother announces losses of $3.9 billion for the 
quarter ending in August. Despite efforts to find a buyer, Lehman’s filed for bankruptcy. This 
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was first major collapse of the crisis, though its European subsidiaries are currently still looking 
for buyers. However, other distressed financial institutions did find buyers: Merrill Lynch was 
bought by Bank of America for $50 billion and Lloyds TBS took over the UK bank HBOS.  
Finally, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have announced plans to begin commercial 
banking operation as a way of minimizing the risk of their traditional focus on investment 
banking. 
In addition to the coordinated interventions, one of the most important actions undertaken 
by the G7 Finance Ministers was commissioning a report by the Financial Stability Forum in 
October of 2007. The report was presented to the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors on April 12, 2008. The report concentrated on recommendations in five areas: 
1. Strengthened prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management  
2. Enhancing transparency and valuation  
3. Changes in the role and uses of credit ratings  
4. Strengthening the authorities’ responsiveness to risks  
5. Robust arrangements for dealing with stress in the financial system98 
The G8 accepted these recommendations and pledged to carry out the most crucial reforms in the 
first 100 days and the rest by the end of 2008 (G8 Research Group, 2008: 58). 
On June 11, 2008 the FSF issued another press release on the progress that has been 
made on the implementation of its recommendations. It concluded that the members of the G8 
and other IFIs have made good progress, especially on the most crucial reforms. But it 
acknowledged that there is still a great deal to be done. It planned to present a more 
comprehensive follow-up report to the G7 Finance Ministers Meeting in October 2008. The G8 
 
98 For a summary of the repost see FSF’s April 12, 2008 Press Release, the full study is also available. 
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has also discussed the need to deal with inflationary problems, contain the credit crisis, ensure 
economic openness during the crises, and maintain exchange rate stability (ibid: 53-65). In 
addition individual governments are dealing with their individual economic problems and trying 
to stimulate their economic recovery. It of course remains to be seen how successful these 
measure will ultimately be. However, so far the G8 and the other IFIs have been able to 
coordinate their responses to the crises. 
By September, efforts to deal with the crisis intensified. As already mentioned on 
September 7 the US government bailed out Fannie May and Freddie Mack. And despite letting 
Lehman Brother file bankrupts it spent $85 billion to bail out AIG and in return for an 80% 
public stake in the company. On September 18 the central banks of the UK, US, Europe, Canada, 
Switzerland and Japan released $180bn into their money markets. This is the fourth such 
coordinated intervention since the outbreak of the crisis. Most recently the Bush government has 
pledged to create a fund of up to $800 billion to back a much of the bad mortgage debt as 
possible, though this still needs to be approved by congress. The Federal Reserve has called on 
other governments to adopt similar policies and has so far found official support from the G7. 
8.3 The G20 Summit Process 
Thus by September 2008 the crisis had become headline news and began to dominate 
political and popular discourse. The meetings of both the G7 (Oct 27) and G20 (Nov 7-8) finance 
ministers were dominated by the crisis. It was also decided that the crisis warranted the first ever 
meeting of the leaders of the G20 (or L20) at a special Washington Summit on Nov. 14-15. At 
this meeting the L20 decided that the G20 should coordinate their crisis response efforts, make 




Washington, November 14-15, 2008: By the time the leaders met in Washington, the 
mood had changed dramatically from September. The crisis seemed, if not yet fully contained, 
then at least under control. As a result the focus of the first meeting of the Group of Twenty at 
the leaders’ level shifted from crisis response to post crisis reform. At this meeting the L20 
decided that the G20 finance ministers should coordinate their crisis response efforts, make 
provisions for minimizing the impact on emerging markets, and begin the process of financial 
reforms. In their communiqué, the L20 instructed their finance ministers to take the suggestion of 
the FSF and begin the process of translating these broad outlines into a workable program of 
financial reform. It was also agreed that the L20 would meet again in six months time. One of the 
main aims of this meeting was to discuss the progress of finance minister and begin the process 
of implementing financial reforms. 
London, April 2, 2009: By the time of the L20 met in London on April 2, 2009, events 
had overtaken plans for financial reforms. Problems continued to spread through the 
international financial system as secondary crisis began affecting diverse financial markets. In 
addition, the economic fallout of the crisis proved to be much greater than most had expected. As 
a result the London switched focus form financial regulation to economic stimulus. 
At the summit, the G20 increased IFI resources by $1.1 trillion through member 
contributions, the creation of new special drawing rights and the sale of IMF gold. The G20 also 
agreed on the transformation of the FSF into the FSB. Substantial changes to the international 
financial system were proposed, including the extension and harmonization of financial 
regulation and the reform of IFIs (especially the IMF). Although members of the G20 disagreed 
about the need for more economic stimulus (favored by the US and UK) and the need for 
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immediate financial reforms (favored by continental Europe), the extent and coordination of 
efforts on both fronts were substantial. 
Pittsburgh, September 24-25, 2009: The Pittsburg Summit of September 24-25, 2009 
continued this work by reiterating the need for stimulus and proposed further changes to 
financial regulation. Perhaps most important, it institutionalized the L20 as an annual summit 
and pledged substantial quota/vote changes in both the IMF and the various development banks. 
Between the Pittsburg and Toronto Summit of June, 2010 there were further problems. On the 
whole, the recovery was sluggish and there was disagreement over prematurely ending stimulus 
efforts. Debt and deficit problems loomed, especially in Europe where the most serious 
manifestation was the Greek debt crisis. Financial reform also seemed stalled, especially at the 
EU level, and with the defeat of the proposed uniform G20-wide bank tax. However, during the 
summer of 2010 US Congress finally passed financial reform legislation. 
Toronto, June 26-27, 2010: By early 2010, the problems in Greece had spread to a 
number of other Euro-Zone countries. Thus, sluggish recovery was now made worse by further 
financial instability which threatened the EU and the future of the Euro. These crises and the 
measures adapted to deal with them, lead to popular protest. Thus, the G20 summits would again 
have to put significant financial reform on the backburner while the issue of crisis response and 
sustaining fragile economic growth again took center stage. 
In addition, even before the summit, a major reform initiative had been quashed. The US 
and the Europeans, with the support of the IMF, were pushing for the introduction of a common 
bank tax among the G20. The goal of the tax was, in effect, to create a bank insurance fund 
which could be collected in periods of stability and used to deal with serious liquidity problems 
in the banking sector during crises. Proponents of this proposal argued that it was a fairer and 
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more effective way of dealing with liquidity problems compared to bailouts. However, critics 
lead by Canada and supported by emerging powers such as China and India, felt that this was 
unfair to countries whose banking seconds had traditionally been stable and had avoided the 
temptation that lead to financial problems in the US and Europe. In addition, there were concerns 
that once these funds had been levied, governments would be tempted to spend this money, 
especially given the fiscal problems countries like the US were facing. However, while the idea 
that such a tax would be universally adopted by the G20 was abandoned in May 2010, but it is 
still being unilaterally considered by the US and the member of the EU. 
Soul, November 3-4, 2010: The summit in Soul, the first chaired by a non-G8 country, 
saw significant movement on a number of issues. Two of these were particularly important. First, 
at the G20 ministerial meeting in Soul held in October, the finance ministers agreed to shift IMF 
quotas by 6% in favour of key emerging economies such as China and India. This, along with the 
increase in IMF funds over the last two years represents a significant reform the IFI primarily 
responsible of crisis response. 
The second, and more significant form the point of view of financial regulation, was the 
adoption of the so-called Basel III at the Soul summit in November. The Basel Committee 
outlined an ambitious set of standards which aims at improving the quality of bank capital, 
liquidity standards, and the coverage of risks. These measures include a call for stronger industry 
supervision and risk management through a strengthening of the Pillar 2 provisions of Basel II. 
They also increase the Pillar 3 standards of disclosure on complex financial transactions. 
Two of the new measures are particularly important. First, Basel III has increased the 
minimum common equity that banks must to hold to 7%. This consists of an increase of the 
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common equity requirement to 4.5% and an additional capital conservation buffer of 2.5%. This 
is a dramatic increase from the 2% required under the Basel II agreement. 
Second, the new measures also contain provisions to ensure the procyclicality of the new 
capital requirements. This essentially forces banks to increase their capital levels in boom times 
by as much as 9.5% of risk-weighted assets. The goal of this provision is to both avoid asset 
bubbles in good times and to ensure adequate capital reserves in bad times. One notable aspect of 
this is that if capital levels fall below the 2.5% conservation buffer, banks are automatically 
required to suspend all distributions. This is to avoid market pressure to maintain the payment of 
dividends and bonuses when a bank is facing potential solvency issues. 
However, while this is a move in the right direction, there are still two issues that have to 
be resolved before Basel III can be called a success. First, the new liquidity and capital standards 
have to be enacted. They will do little good unless they are consistently adopted and enforced 
across jurisdictions. This could prove problematic since the new provisions may face opposition 
from both domestic legislatures and banking industries. Second, Basel III has called for higher 
standards for so-called Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Unfortunately, it 
has not yet indentified what these higher standards are and which SIFIs they apply to. 
8.4 Explaining Slow Regulatory Reform 
There are number reasons for the limited progress on financial reform and for the 
observed variations. The first is the ongoing economic crisis. In November 2008, when the first 
commitments were being made it seemed to most that the crisis had been largely contained and 
that the time was right to begin a process of financial reforms. Thus a board outline of reforms 
was proposed at the advice of the Financial Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board) 
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and the April 2009 G20 Summit in London was set as the first check point at which leaders 
would assess progress in implementing these reforms. 
However, by early 2009 it became clear that the G20 had underestimated the extent of the 
economic crisis they were facing. As a result, even before the London Summit, the G20 shifted 
its focus from financial reforms to economic stimulus. It was necessary to put regulatory reform 
on hold because of the inherent conflict between efforts to tighten financial regulation on the one 
hand and to stimulate the economy on the other. The later requires an expansion of liquidity and 
the promotion of easy lending while the former requires the reining in of lending practices and 
thus a contraction of liquidity. By 2010, the outbreak of the European Debt Crisis, which lasted 
much of 2010 and has not fully been resolved, further delayed reform efforts. 
The second reason is the difference of opinion on what reforms are necessary and the 
dominance of the status quo in policymaking. At the time of the Washington Summit there was 
much excitement about the possibility of using the crisis as an opportunity to make dramatic 
changes to financial markets. Some even went so far as to call the Summit a second Bretton 
Woods Conference. However, once the process of designing regulatory reforms began it because 
clear that there was a great deal of disagreement not just among but also with the countries of the 
G20. Thus, while there were many different ambitions proposals, few could get more support 
then maintaining the status quo. As a result most reforms are rather conservative and are adopted 
nationally or regionally rather than by the G20 as a whole. 
In addition, there is also a great deal of national variation in terms of the need for reform 
as well as the economic and political circumstance that policymakers find themselves in. 
Countries like Canada, Japan, Australia and China were not directly affected by the crisis; most 
of the EU was indirectly affected; and the US and the UK experienced serious domestic financial 
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crises. In addition there was a great deal of variation in terms of the political obstacles to 
enacting reforms. In the US proposed reforms still face potently strong legislative opinions. 
Efforts among the member of the EU are complicated by the fact that they are happening at both 
the national and the supranational level. And in the case of Canada there is a federal vs. 
provincial dimension to the issue. 
In addition, the economic recovery has also complicated the politics of enacting financial 
reforms. On the whole, financial markets have recovered much more quickly then the economy 
as a whole. This has meant that financial institutions, and the banking sector in particular, has not 
only regained their confidence but are also much less depended on government support then they 
were at the beginning of the crises. This means they have begun to resist government reforms 
efforts, especially in the US. On the other hand, the slow economic recovery has meant that 
voters are much more concerned with ending the recession then they are with preventing future 
crises. 
Finally, it also has to be remembered that even among the G20 many countries lack 
regulatory capacity. In particular, the EU is only now beginning the process of creating 
regulatory institution at the EU level. This initiative, like most efforts at further integration, is 
controversial and will take some time to iron out. On the other hand, countries such as Canada 
and the US do not have a singles national financial regulator. As a result attempts at regulatory 
reform are complicated and subject to turf wars. 
8.5 Assessment and Future Implications 
These are a number of important issues we now face. Four of which are particularly 
important: the balance between governments and markets; the future of the norm of embedded 
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liberalism; the limitation of reform through regulation; and the actual prospects for meaningful 
reform in the post-crisis environment. 
On the one hand, there are growing concern about having unrestricted markets and 
especially the lack of regulatory oversight. There is something to these concerns. The idea that 
markets do not need government regulation and that they can provide their own oversight is 
problematic. Markets have failed to regulate themselves, not just in the current crisis but in past 
ones as well. The most prominent case of this is the Enron Scandal that hit a few years ago. This 
scandal has shown that private sector oversight, in the case of Enron by supposedly independent 
audit firms, is subject to the same dangers of capture and conflict of interest that have plagued 
public regulation. Although excessive regulation is dangerous, complete deregulation is not the 
answer. 
There is similarly a danger of reining in markets too much. A great deal of prosperity has 
come out of markets and the internationalization of investment. Even if we decide that we need 
to rain in markets, there are practical problem in trying to impose greater restriction on the 
market in the short term. Despite the worries by some that the U.S. facing the prospect of 
socialism, it is Wall Street who would be the first to oppose any such attempts. The real issue 
facing us is not a choice between government intervention in the economy and free markets, as 
some have contended, but in the need to find an appropriate balance between the two.  
Another prominent issue that some have been worried about for some time now is 
whether international interaction, particularly in the realm of the economy, is still governed by 
the norm of embedded liberalism. The idea of embedded liberalism was first proposed by Ruggie 
who argued that the post-World War II economic system created at Bretton Woods was governed 
by this principle and that economic relations are still governed by it. This norm, according to 
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Ruggie, helped ensure that states could capture the benefits of the free market while at the same 
time avoiding the danger of becoming subservient to it. In effect, as Ruggie notes, the liberal 
market was embedded in the society and thus served the needs of society and not the other way 
around, as was the case under the Classic Gold Standard. At the same time this also helped avoid 
the danger of economic nationalism and beggar-thy-neighbour policies that characterized the 
Inter-War Period. 
This norm is still alive today and will remain relevant despite concerns over the rise of 
neo-liberalism and/or economic nationalism. The fact is that the forces that first created a need 
for embedded liberalism – the benefits that free markets confer on society and the negative 
impact that unrestricted markets can have – are still around today. We see them in the benefits 
and danger of the current process of globalization. We also see them in the debates that are 
taking place about what needs to be done to effectively deal with the current Sub-Prime 
Mortgage Crisis. The bailout effort is being shaped by two forces powerful forces: markets and 
domestic politics. For the bailout, the post-bailout reforms – and any economic policy for that 
matter – to be effective it must strike a balance between the needs of markets and domestic 
politics. 
On the issue of post crises reform it is very important to remember that regulation is not a 
magic bullet that will end crises once as for all. No such solutions exist! There are four reasons 
why we should not to be too optimistic about what regulation can do. 
First, markets are constantly changing and regulators are always trying to catch up. We 
can apply the old cliché that generals are always preparing to fight the last war to financial 
markets as it is just as true that regulators are always preparing to prevent the last crisis. Even a 
very traditional sector like the mortgage industry can produce surprises. No one should have 
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been surprised by the current crisis. Yet there are still some aspects that have made it very 
different form past real-estate bubbles. The development of new financial instruments – the so-
called securitization of mortgages – led to the spread of the crisis to Wall Street and nearly every 
developed financial market. It also played a role in bad investment decisions by partially 
obscuring of the risks involved – that is in a number of cases investors though they were buying 
much safer investments then was actually the case. 
But even when regulators identify a problem ahead of time it is not always easy to know 
what needs to be done. And even if it is, regulators and policymakers can still lack the political 
will necessary to take steps to correct the problem. This leads us to the second problem with 
regulation, namely there are serious limitations to what regulation can actually achieve. In the 
private sector the accounting scandals have shown that there is always potential for a conflict of 
interest with any regulatory institutions. With government regulation this problem is even 
greater. After all, there is always the old problem of where regulators come from. They usually 
come from the industry they regulate or they wish to enter it once they leave the public sector. So 
if a regulator is too tough then his or her future employment prospects are not very bright. 
Similarly a politician who decides to intervene in a booming financial market because he is 
worried that the apparent economic bonanza is just a price bubble faces resinous political risks. 
The political benefits of “ending the party” are few the political or at best long term. The cost, in 
terms of lost votes and campaign contributions, are significant and immediate. 
The third issue is what kind of regulation is optimal. We tend to think of regulation in 
terms of imposing rules and government intervening to stop unacceptable behaviour. However, 
equally important, if not more so, is promoting transparency and disclosure in an industry. This 
allows people to make informed decisions, which should be more effective and less costly and 
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controversial. There was an unacceptable lack of transparency in many part of the U.S. mortgage 
market. There is evidence that some people were fooled into contract they did not understand. In 
fact, to date around 500 arrests made by the FBI in connection with the mortgage scandals. But 
more could have been done to let people know what they were getting into beforehand. A lot of 
ordinary people and even financial institutions did not understand the risks of mortgage 
derivative securities.  
A final problem with turning to regulation as a solution is the issue of political will. A 
crisis generally produces a lot of political will, both at the domestic and international level, in 
favour of reform and better regulation. But as time goes on, this political will slowly dissipates. 
The best analogy to this situation is waking up with hangover after a night of heavy drinking. 
Your head hurts and you know you went too far. So you solemnly decide that from now on you 
will only drink in moderation. But a few weeks go by and you have one more drink then you 
usually do with no ill effect. One drink leads to another and so on… suddenly you are drunk 
again and all bets are off. The next morning you are predictably hung-over again and you say to 
yourself “no more excessive drinking for me…” but this time you add with firm conviction that 
“…this time I mean it!” The danger with reform efforts which are too radical and try to do too 
much is that after a while markets and government will begin to ignore them. Markets do not like 
such speed bumps and try to find ways around them once they get back their confidence. 
Similarly governments are usually lax in enforce them in times of prosperity. 
In closing, reform of financial regulation is absolutely necessary and should be the focus 
of national, multilateral and IFIs efforts once the crisis is over. However, at the same time we 
should not set our expectations too high. We are not looking at new Bretton Woods. Such a 
radical transformation of the international economic system is unrealistic. However, this is a 
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chance to fix a number of problems that have plagued the international system form some time, 
not just in the area of international finance but other economic issues as well. We have a chance 
to make up for the lost opportunity of the 1970s when we were faced by similar problems. Many 
of the reform will be technical rather than sweeping and they will crucially depend on 
international cooperation and coordination for their success. This is why I think that IFIs like the 
IMF and smaller forums such as the Basel Group and the FSF are going to be crucially 
important. This is going to be an important test of embedded liberalism. The fact that the G20 is 
co-ordination their effort is crucial. This is not one country’s problem. It is a systemic problem! 
But this will not be easy, each government has it own idea of what needs to be done, as do 
markets and domestic political groups. Reform efforts will not satisfy everyone but they must 
still be guided by multiple perspectives and allow for individual variation where possible and a 
united front where necessary. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Thus, while there are a number of problems, overall crisis response has been relatively 
good. Almost a year before the crisis attracted headlines, the central banks of the G7 plus China 
and Switzerland were coordinating open market operations at a level not seen since the Classic 
Gold Standard. As is often the case, the biggest problem hampering crisis response was denial. 
The US led the way by ignoring IMF warnings about the potential downside of its financial 
expansion. Unfortunately, most other countries adopted a similar position even when the extent 
of US problems was realized. While leaders acknowledged the global importance of the problem, 
they publicly denied that their financial systems were at risk. Had governments been more 
cautious and reacted sooner, the fallout of the crisis could have been less damaging. 
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Once the full severity of the crisis became evident in August 2008, the focus of crisis 
response efforts shifted from central banks to the G8/G20 proper and the IMF. Although the 
Leaders’ summits from Washington to Toronto have attracted most of the attention, they are only 
a small part of the summit process, with includes the semi-annual IMF meeting and the G7 and 
G20 finance ministerials. None of these meetings produced the kind of dramatic unified response 
to the crisis which many expected. However, financial crisis governance rarely works in this 
manner. Instead the various summits have incrementally advanced crisis management efforts. 
It is also important to note that, despite disagreements, the G20 has made headway on the 
issues of economic stimulus, financial reform, and the support and eventual reform of IFIs. The 
size and speed of economic response has varied widely. However, the G20 as a whole has 
delivered an impressive amount of stimulus (see Prasad 2009). Similarly, despite some deep 
philosophical disagreements on the issue of financial market reform, especially between the 
Anglo-Americans and the Continental Europeans, progress has been made on this front. 
Although much work still remains, full regulatory reforms should not be enacted until the crisis 
is completely under control (i.e. financial markets fully stabilize) and economic growth is 
restored. In fact, the G20 made a mistake in pledging dramatic reform at the November 2008 
Summit. It did so because it mistakenly concluded that the crisis was largely under control. It 
was only later that the extent of the coming recession was realized. But, the G20 has wisely 
expanded the IMF’s financial recourses while avoiding the delicate issue of reform of IMF 
quotas until after recovery is achieved. It did so by extending temporary loans to the IMF, by 
approving the sale of IMF gold, and – for the first time in history – approving an IMF bond issue 
(see Prasad & Sorkin 2009).99 
 
99 The IMF bond issue was also important because it alleviated some of the concerns of over the future strength of 
the dollar. In a repeat of Tiffin’s dilemma of the 1960s, countries with large US dollar reserves (e.g. China and 
192 
 
Finally, it should also be noted that this level of cooperation has been maintained despite 
serious domestic political problems. In October 2009, political debate over crisis response gave 
the Democrats the US Presidency and a strong hand in Congress. In August 2009, the 
Democratic Party of Japan came to power. Except for an eleven month period in 1993/94, this 
was the first time the Liberal Democratic Party was out of power since 1955. In November 2009, 
Canada experienced a constitutional crisis over budget issues related to the crisis. This led to 
parliament being prorogued for two months. Most recently, in May 2010 the Brown government, 
one of the most dynamic forces behind the G20 response, lost power in Britain. Yet, despite 
these domestic political problems, there have been no dramatic deviations from international 
cooperation and consultation by the G20. 
  
 
Russia) face serious problem if the value of the dollar drops. This is a real possibility given the US trade deficit and 
international debts. By creating these bonds, and expanding special drawing rights, the G20 and IMF have created a 







The underlying assumption of this dissertation has been that financial crises are inevitable 
and costly. Proper regulation and reform are necessary to minimize this risk by the can never 
eliminate it. We must therefore understand how crisis response works in order to understand it 
potential to deal with financial problems as well as it limitations. This has been the goal of this 
dissertation which has examined three crucial issues in: the politics of negotiating an 
international crisis response, the ability of international institutions to improve policy changes, 
and what type of overall crisis governance is best at maintaining stability in the international 
financial system as it exists today. 
First, by adding domestic and market press to the process of negotiating a bailout 
agreement we get a much richer picture of the process. In particular it becomes clear that 
governments facing a crisis are not necessarily helpless nor are domestic pressures ignored. Of 
course this does not mean that every government receives a bailout package that it is perfectly 
happy with nor that all domestic concerns are always dressed but it does show that both 
governments and their citizens are not simply at the mercy of International Lenders of Last 
Resort like the IMF or the G8/G20. 
Second, institutions can be an essential tool to help governments solve policy 
coordination problems under uncertainty. Specifically, intuitions in the form of information 
exchanges (i.e. conference such as the meeting of the G8, G20 and FSB) allow government to 
share information more quickly and more completely then the process of social learning. 
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However, they do not necessarily produce better outcomes then the process of social learning 
through observation. That is, while information exchange allow governments to coordinate 
quicker then social learning they do not significantly improve the likelihood that the right 
outcome is achieved (i.e. that the appropriate policy switch is made). But this is still a great 
improvement over the social learning process because in situations where timing is crucial, such 
as during an actual or potential crisis, being able to coordinate faster is of the utmost importance. 
Institutions, such as the IMF, BIS or World Bank, can also aid in the learning process if 
they are a source of superior information. Institutions may be a source of such information 
because of their specialization and broader focus then those of individual governments. In fact, 
intuitions might even be able to provide better information outside the structure of a formal 
conference. However, as with all agency problems the usefulness of intuitions in this regard 
crucially depends on how they are rewarded. It is of great importance that intuitions are rewarded 
based on the actual outcomes of their advice. To an extend this is the case with the IMF as its 
resources (i.e. the quotas of its members) in part depend on the continued wealth and prosperity 
of its members. Similarly the value of its assets is tied in to the prosperity of the international 
financial system. This means that the IMF has an interest in maintaining the stability and 
prosperity of the international system as a whole. This does not, however, mean that it is equally 
concerned with the prosperity of all its members. It may in fact be willing to provide advice that 
is very costly to some of its member if it feels that this will benefit the system as a whole, or at 
least the core of the system (i.e. the more important financial powers). 
Finally, both state-centered and institution-centered governance each have their strengths 
and weaknesses. Problems in the core are best dealt with by a concert and problems in the 
periphery are best dealt with by an IFI. In addition, an IFI can provide useful support for a 
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concert by providing surveillance of the system as a whole. Concerts can provide leadership in a 
crisis and prod institutions to act. Therefore, in order to maximize effectiveness, international 
crisis governance must be built around a partnership between a concert of financial powers and 
an IFI. This partnership can be supplemented by private and regional governance, but it cannot 
be replaced by them. 
Thus, while many solutions to crisis governance are possible, the most effective one is 
one that combines the efforts of a concert of financial powers and an IFI dedicated to financial 
crisis response. The reason this arrangement is the most effective is that it builds on the 
complementary strengths of each institutional type. Of course, as the international financial 
system evolved so must this partnership. However, as long as the international financial system 
retains the basic structure it has had since it emerged in the late Nineteenth Century, this will 
remain the most effective governance solution to financial crisis management. 
The final question we need to ask is: what has the current crisis taught us about the 
institutions we have in place today? On the whole, the G8/G20-IMF partnership is indispensible 
for maintaining international financial stability. Although one can argue about the focus and 
effectiveness of their efforts, the members of the G20 have shown remarkable solidarity and a 
willingness to coordinate policy despite serious disagreements and problems. Recent cooperation 
has been as good as it was during the heyday of the Classic Gold Standard. However, unlike the 
late nineteenth century, much more attention has been paid to the effects of the crisis on the 
periphery. 
The 2008 crisis has also brought major institutional transformations. The G20 has been 
strengthened, and the L20 has emerged as a new center of economic governance. Similarly, the 
FSB, at least on paper, has been given substantial new responsibilities for monitoring and 
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reforming the international financial system. We have yet to see just how permanent these 
institutional changes will be. During both the G20 leaders’ summits some used the terms 
“Bretton Woods moment” and “Bretton Woods II” to capture the importance of these events. 
However, this is premature and raises unrealistic expectations. Recall that the Nixon 
administration heralded the 1971 Smithsonian Agreement as “the most significant reform of the 
international economic system,” and yet, just two years later, the Bretton Woods System 
collapsed. In fact, even the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 was not really the “Bretton 
Woods moment” many imagine it to be. In practice, the system that it created did not function 
the way its designers envisioned and was riddled with many structural flaws that eventually led 
to its collapse. 
The emergence of the L20 is a significant event because it is the first concert to include 
key emerging financial powers. However, it will take time for it to develop a working 
relationship like that of the G8. There is reason to believe that this will happen since the current 
crisis and the economic problems it has created are very similar to the problems that forged the 
G8 in the 1970s and 1980s. The major challenges that face the L20 include reforming the IFIs (in 
particular in the area of quotas), addressing persistent international imbalance, responding to 
concerns over reserves currencies, and completing financial regulatory reform. 
The G20 will likely continue to evolve in response to these and future problems. There 
are three things we can say about the future of this evolution. It will likely be gradual rather than 
dramatic and be shaped by future financial crises. Second, whatever changes happen, the basic 
structure of crisis governance will persist. Finally, for the foreseeable future the G20 will likely 
not replace the G8 on non-economic issues. Globalization and the current crisis have 
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demonstrated the need for international cooperation on financial and economic issues. However, 
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